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CHAPTER 1: Introduction 
 
Transatlantic relations are once more under the spotlight. Policy-makers and the public are 
more and more engaged in on-going talks for a Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (TTIP), an agreement between the United States and the European Union aimed 
at fostering and strengthening the existing commercial ties across the Atlantic. The success of 
this renewed cooperative environment is to be found in the efficacy of preparatory 
negotiations so far, despite the numerous obstacles on the road towards a final agreement1. 
The “green light” came from the Council of the EU on June 14, 20132 and negotiations 
between the EU Commission and the United States Trade Representative (USTR) are running 
their course since that date3. Negotiations have been characterized by continuous talks with 
private and non-governmental actors active at the transatlantic level or with diffuse interests 
both in the EU and in the US. Most of the debate evolves around the so-called investor-to-
state dispute settlement (ISDS), which, besides its definition, seems to be connected to a 
general view of “total liberalization” deeply rooted in the TTIP so far. What will be the 
outcomes of this cooperative effort between two major economic powers that will be 
concluded in the next months? Are there any lessons from the past on how to better reframe 
it? Is there a theory developed in the past that can help policy-makers and scholars to 
understand better what is at stake? 
Economic and trade cooperation between the EU and the US has been going on both 
through official and unofficial channels in the last twenty years. Many lessons may be drawn 
                                                            
1 Most importantly, last year skirmishes are due to the security crises in Middle East and to the surveillance of 
many European leaders’ private conversations. On the European side, these factors have had a much deeper 
2 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/137485.pdf 
3 EU news sites report constant troubles arising from the different conceptions on the aims of the agreement. At 
the time of writing, the most debated issue is a critique from the US to the EU system of opening access to 
business in consultation for new policy proposals. EU Trade Commissioner Karel de Gucht has answered that 
EU system may be changed but not so radically as to suggest a shift towards a US-style attitude about opening 
lobbying channels for business. For further clarification:  
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/6e9b7190-9a65-11e3-8e06-
00144feab7de.html?siteedition=intl#axzz2uAW8UPO5 
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from the past, and this work aims at clarifying some of the thorniest issues by looking at the 
interactions between the EU, the US and private actors rather than taking a mere picture of 
the historical achievements. Therefore, both grand theories in International Relations (IR) and 
middle theories applied to transatlantic policy-making are useful to answer the research 
questions.  This does not mean that each and every possible theorization of the on-going 
relationship will be given the same amount of space and relevance. Considering the limits this 
dissertation imposes, only major theories will be used to evaluate the empirical material, and 
among them only those which are more suitable for the subject.  
The topic of this dissertation is not an analysis of the current situation, for which there are not 
yet elements to carry on a coherent research project4. Nevertheless, the conclusions I will draw 
may be useful, as said, to assess the potential of the current stable (though engulfed) situation. 
Talking broadly, this dissertation is an attempt to find out whether and to what extent the 
transatlantic economic cooperation among business companies and throughout civil society 
(the so-called “non-state actors”, “NSAa”) has been institutionalized5 in the last twenty years, 
since the launch of the New Transatlantic Agenda (NTA). And, more importantly, how this 
institutionalization impacted on the overall design of trade and economic relations across the 
Atlantic. It uses case studies, process-tracing, and interviews, covering the period from the 
establishment of the New Transatlantic Agenda until the re-launch of the partnership with the 
Transatlantic Economic Council (TEC) in 2007. A strong focus will be on the perils and 
achievements in trade relations. Why trade and not, as an example, financial cooperation? 
Trade issues better reflect the determinants and features of decision-making, and show how 
strongly interconnected they are.  
                                                            
4 There is a growing interest towards transatlantic relations, revamped by issues such as the rejected ACTA 
Agreement furthermore the constant data protection “troubles”. Other authors, which, during their studies, have 
always kept an eye firm on the evolution of transatlantic policy-making, have recently dealt with mergers policy 
(Damro 2011) and global environmental system and climate change (Savaresi 2013) 
5 See infra for a detailed account and clarification of the term. Social sciences, and international relations in 
particular, apply concepts and theory: the former have to be defined in the clearest way. As Sartori (1970) 
showed, you can talk of a dog or you can talk of a cat. Either way, you can not talk of a catdog. I will try to stick 
to this simple commandment throughout the dissertation. See also Note  
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Undisputedly, non-tariff barriers to trade are one of the most important limits to transatlantic 
dialogue, especially in sectors such as food products, health, chemicals or data privacy. The 
role of private actors in (re)shaping regulatory standards is increased for example during 
current negotiations in Brussels and in Washington6. Regulated differently in the EU and the 
US, these areas show the different approaches the two main actors have employed. A blunt 
regulation in the EU sometimes becomes a strict one in the US. This makes no surprise when 
policy-makers complain about the extreme differentiation of standards that creates a divide 
between the Atlantic7. The first element to be analysed, then, is how standards have changed 
within the chosen timeframe, who decided to change them, in which way they changed and 
what are the prospects for future change. 
Secondly, policy-making in the transatlantic sphere is adjusted to the needs and exigencies of 
the different relevant actors. Therefore, the peculiarity of the topic I am going to present can 
not be treated as if it was simply a matter of institutions, rational choices and bargaining8. 
Policies are a result of a complex web of interactions, which can be framed by theories and are 
shaped by conjectures and norms. Even though this might seem a negative point, I assume 
that political decisions can be explained by looking both at the different levels to which they 
are agreed upon and at the different factors they may be influenced by.  
Informal contacts and non-governmental liaisons are assumed as normal and plain facts, given 
the importance they have assumed during the last decade. Both the US and the EU think of 
their respective relations as exclusive. They do not share the same level of “embeddedness” 
with any other state or regional grouping in the world. Private actors contribute for a great 
                                                            
6 See note 3. Moreover, private interests are now being consulted as “stakeholders” for a three-month period. 
Unmentionable sources talk of troubled schedules and timing and of non-cooperative attitude from both private 
and public actors.  
7 http://americastradepolicy.com/regulatory-convergence-in-the-ttip-facilitating-trade-and-cooperation-in-the-
transatlantic-region/#.U_WuNUvN9FE  
8 These peculiar characteristics of many policy-making categorizations should not be neglected, and they will not. 
But certainly there are specific traits in the transatlantic policy-making processes that are worth mentioning and 
that influence the whole analysis. For further clarification, see Levin, M., Shapiro, M. (2004), Transatlantic 
Policymaking in an Age of Austerity Diversity and Drift, Georgetown University Ptess 
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share to the transatlantic political cooperation. I say “political” for the same reason why I will 
tend not to use the word “institutional cooperation”. “Political” means that interests are 
various and multifaceted, and all of them contribute to shaping how actors cooperate. What 
drives transatlantic relations nowadays does not exist in any other part of the world. A similar 
web of frequent meetings and mutual interdependence has been achieved only between few 
countries. Even though US diplomacy is usually seconded to non-diplomats and most typically 
to businessmen9, this does not imply that they are concretely able to have the same level of 
contacts and entry points into the policy-making sphere as they have in the Old Continent. 
This work addresses two key issues: 
- first of all, the reasons behind attempts to cooperate at the transatlantic level in the 
economic field. As the following part will make clear, there have been many examples of this 
particular cooperation, side by side with security, military and defence synergy. Moreover, 
economic cooperation has been quite successful only in recent years (and probably it will be in 
the future),   
- secondly, as an addendum to the research question, main findings show that cooperation has 
been quite successful in the beginning, while losing grip in recent years, becoming afterwards a 
de facto “defeat”10. What are the factors behind this evolution? Why there was no clear 
objective to strengthen the ongoing relationship between the two partners? What is the 
rationale of certain forms of cooperation, which weakened the status quo rather than changing 
it? More generally, I am looking at transatlantic fora for dialogue among private actors and how 
these have impacted on the breadth and scope of transatlantic policy-making. 
As Philippart and Winand (2001) have thoroughly explained, low- and medium-level 
relationships have acquired a good standing until the turning of the century, before issues such 
                                                            
9 Saner, R., Liu, L. (2010), “International economic diplomacy: mutations in post-modern times”, Discussion 
Papers in Diplomacy, Clingendael 
10 In an interview with viEUws, Hans Stråberg, Europe Co-Chair of the Trans-Atlantic Business Dialogue 
(TABD), has discussed this point while looking at the potential benefits of the EU-US trade deal with Lénaïc 
Vaudin d’Imécourt, EU Trade Insights‘ Editor: for the viEUws TTIP’s video-series here: 
http://www.vieuws.eu/eutradeinsights/video-interview-ttip-great-opportunities-for-smes-claims-trans-atlantic-
business-dialogues-europe-co-chair/ 
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as international terrorism and security threats, wars in Afghanistan and Iraq took the scene. 
My initial claim is that the determinants of this phenomenon are structural, being a constant 
feature of transatlantic policy-making. Therefore, intervening (non-economic) variables such 
as the abovementioned security threats or the data protection mechanism can be quite roughly 
excluded and insulated from the analysis.  
Business and consumer issues are two different worlds. But their impact on policy-making is 
almost total, both in the US and in the EU, especially on the regulatory side of political 
choices. Another interesting feature of this research is the evaluation of these two actors’ 
approaches towards new policy challenges. The empirical material which was collected 
(original and non-original) for this thesis has been framed by referring to a double set of 
theoretical tools. On the one side, grand theories are examined in order to find out whether or 
not the relationship can be traced back to established practices (i.e., already theorized). The 
conclusion is positive, and therefore in the fourth chapter I am conducting an analysis by 
using middle-range theories, focusing on actors, processes and (when possible) identities. 
After explaining the existing assumptions, I am choosing to frame the work with a specific 
theoretical and institutional pattern: on the one side, by making up a coherent choice of issue-
specific theories. On the other side, by extrapolating the roles and relevance of actor-based 
interactions.  
In the course of the dissertation, then, I will sketch a brief overview of the processes that 
developed after the New Transatlantic Agenda (NTA) in 199511 and after the launch of a so-
called Transatlantic Economic Partnership (TEP) in 1998, detailing the expectations and 
lessons learned from those long-standing processes. The policy outcomes mentioned in the 
title, then, refer to a certain timeframe that allows for a good overview of the material. 
                                                            
11 The most important original text with regards to this initial timeframe is certainly the EU Commission’s 
“Progress report on EU-US relations“ (1994), a text containing all relevant expectations from the newly born 
relationship. Particularly notable are the references to elements of “Trade and economic relations”. Many of 
them are still unresolved issues, at least for one of the two counterparts.  
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Peterson defines the 1990s as an era of “new transatlanticism”12, characterized by deepened 
cooperation in transatlantic relations and by increased efforts in economic integration, and 
bringing more domestic actors into play. Nevertheless, this courageous step has not been 
enough. A changing world, increased standing of new emerging powers had to be taken into 
account in common transatlantic interests. In this context, Smith (2009) speaks about the 
transatlantic relations of the period 2001–2008 as a form of “new new transatlanticism”13 
where cooperation reacts in global development. For the EU-US cooperation became a 
challenge of the management of the new strong economic impact coming from countries such 
as India, China, Brazil or South Africa. 
 
1.1: Hypotheses 
The research question may also be tackled by making reference to two main hypotheses, 
which shed light on the positive and negative elements governing the relationship. They are 
expressly non-exhaustive, since their role is to guide through the research, and not to 
summarize it.  
- Firstly, my claim (H1) is that the institutionalization of practices like business dialogues 
and/or fora after the New Transatlantic Agenda had a significant impact on how transatlantic 
state actors have governed their respective economic ties and trade relationships. According to 
Steffenson, “de-centralisation of decision-making powers has resulted in more 'policy setting' 
and 'policy shaping' by lower level civil servants and non-state actors participating in 
transgovernmental and transnational institutions”14, with a revamped attention from higher 
level politicians and officials on the two sides of the Atlantic to this mechanism of policy 
convergence and delegation from private actors.  
                                                            
12 Peterson, J. (2002), “The case for the new Transatlanticism”, in Peterson, J., Europe and America: The Prospects for 
Partnership, Routledge, pp. 153-205 
13 Smith, M., (2009), “Transatlantic Economic Relations in Changing Global Political Economy: Achieving 
Togetherness but Missing the Bus?”, The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 11, 1, pp. 94–107. 
14 Steffenson, R. (2005), Managing EU-US relations: Actors, Institutions and the Transatlantic Policy Process, Manchester 
University Press (UK)/ Macmillan (US) 
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- Secondly (H2), I claim that economic cooperation in the private realm has resulted in a series 
of structured “liaisons” between the two partners, which, by the way, have not been able to 
translate them into a real policy impetus due to extensive differences both in terms of 
purposes and of expectations. Rebus sic stantibus, if we insulate the external pressures of the 
economic crisis and other concerns during the analysis of the TEC, it may be ironically said 
that the higher these meetings grew, the smaller their success was. By saying this, I state that 
high-level political meetings, such as the one that gave rise to the Transatlantic Economic 
Council in 200715, have been influenced in their agendas and policy outputs by growing 
networks of private actors and businesses. Nevertheless, this influence has not been translated 
into a coherent attitude or a set of joint policies.  
Given a situation in which cooperation is already existing but in a different environment than 
before the end of the Cold War, the intervention of a “need” for institutions16 (or at least 
some sort of structured cooperation) has generated differentiated outcomes. On the economic 
side, it is more likely that not much space will be given to institutional cooperation, since a 
common ideology already permeates the roots of economic exchange, making it almost 
pointless to build up permanent platforms for dialogue as in the security sector (Paemen, 
2005)17. The explanandum of this dissertation is then how trade relations (and, more broadly, 
economic relations) between the EU and the US have developed after the establishment of 
the NTA. The explanans, as it will be clearer after the two theoretical reviews of Parts 3 and 4, 
is the role of established norms that changes at a certain point in time. This change creates the 
conditions, over which a continuous reassessment of trade strategies takes place.  
                                                            
15 See 2.3 for a detailed account of the Transatlantic Economic Council 
16 This may represent another really interesting concept: arguing from the point of view of neo-institutionalism, 
institutions do matter. They are not only binding formal structures for the development of policies and joint 
actions, but also tools for the creation of a policy agenda and not simply the process of following others’ inputs 
when creating policies. See for a better reframing of institutionalism, Peters (1999),  
17 “Since the end of the Cold War this bilateral economic partnership […] has been largely delinked from the 
security context, which, until then, had exercised a kind of ameliorating effect upon possible trade conflicts […].” 
See Paemen. H (2005). “Egan M., Creating a transatlantic marketplace, Manchester University Press, pp. 156-175 
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The main added value of this dissertation is the discovery of a new way of approaching non-
governmental cooperative environments in transatlantic relations. Previous research has 
shown that transgovernmental and transnational interactions have usually followed a certain 
path, characterized by government-led policy proposals. This existing knowledge is 
questioned: the way business and consumer dialogues have exerted their potential 
demonstrates a different niveau in the effectiveness of government actions. In the conclusions 
I will not only put clear what this dissertation adds to the research substrate, but also which 
directions may be taken in order to develop a complete understanding in the issue.  
In the first part, I will outline a brief overview of the main processes, actors and institutions 
involved in the “Great Game”. I will clarify some extremely thorny issues such as the 
relevance and key features of each agreement signed by the two counterparts during the last 
twenty years. These agreements may be judged negatively if their effectiveness had to be 
tested according to certain standards18. Nevertheless, even though they did not allow to 
advance concretely under many respects with regards to transatlantic decision-making 
mechanisms, they still represent a positive outcome. In a similar way, I will conduct a brief 
literature review, underlining the major strands in research on transatlantic relations. There is a 
major advantage in undertaking such an effort: compiling previous research on this topic 
allows to complement existing knowledge with the new empirical material, which will be 
presented in the final part.  
 
1.2. Methodology 
The methodology is twofold: on the one side, I will apply qualitative analysis tools in order to 
assess press releases, statements, agreements and other official documents from both the 
European Commission and the Department of State on a singular juncture of transatlantic 
                                                            
18 Gray, J., Slapin, J. (2010), “How Effective Are Regional Trade Agreements? Ask the Experts”, The Review of 
International Organizations, Volume 7, Issue 3, pp 309-333 
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policy-making, namely the TEC19. Moreover, I will take into consideration press releases from 
private networks’ organization established under the aegis of institutional settings, the most 
important being, as already mentioned, the Transatlantic Economic Council. As an example, I 
will apply the tools of structural analysis of discourses to understand the different perceptions 
from the two authors on the relevance of the Transatlantic Economic Council. Every other 
forum has its own website and joint press releases, while the TEC has two separate sources of 
information. Secondly, a cross-time analysis of two different timeframes will be undertaken, 
aiming at understanding if there were changes in the focus and structure of transatlantic 
agreements in two key moments. I will also use interviews and questionnaires to external 
relations and/or international affairs managers from member organizations of the three 
considered organs, in order to achieve a good framework of background information useful 
for the assessment of whether there are specific traits between these fora, the motivations 
driving the policy-makers’ intentions and the negotiations within the cooperative loci 
themselves20. These interviews are drawn from the dataset “Transatlantic trends”, a joint 
project by the German Marshall Fund of the United States and Compagnia di San Paolo21. 
Established in 2003, it covers the last ten years and allows for a reflection on the élites and 
citizens’ attitudes towards the transatlantic partnership. Another set of opinions comes from 
the élite surveys carried on under the framework established by the Transworld project, a FP7 
consortium led by the Institute of International Affairs in Rome22. They are not yet accessible, 
but some papers using those data have been released on the website and can be now 
downloaded and scrutinized.  
Two key variables will eventually be highlighted in order to somewhat limit the applicability 
and effectiveness of the research question I set forward in the beginning: first of all, only a 
                                                            
19 Many suggestions for this methodological part come from Bowen, G. (2009), “Document Analysis as a 
Qualitative Research Method”, Qualitative Research Journal, Vol. 9 Iss: 2, pp.27 - 40 
20 Interviews and people interviewed do not provide any “scientific” background to the empirical part. They can 
only help in better framing the analysis. 
21 Here the full Transatlantic Trends Archives: http://trends.gmfus.org/archives/transatlantic-trends/ 
22 Here a full list of publications so far: http://www.transworld-fp7.eu/?cat=13 
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small number of direct talks or interviews was conducted with businessmen or other key 
figures in transatlantic practices. Surveying élites is a good experimental and empirical basis, 
but in the end it may turn out to become a self-fulfilling prophecy. If questions are not posed 
in the right way, answers can only be either straightforward or useless for the purpose of this 
research23. Secondly, the technicalities of many issues regarding trade matters have not been 
touched upon. Regulations can be very complex, and a thorough explanation of all detailed 
negotiations and achievements would have required much more effort than this purely 
qualitative study. The methodology employed in this thesis was therefore strictly qualitative. 
This introduction noted that other studies on the NTA have attempted to measure policy 
output in quantitative terms24. This thesis did not try to present a quantitative measure of what 
has been achieved under the NTA, for a number of reasons: it was difficult to establish a 
causal relationship between institutions and policy output, because institutions cannot be 
eliminated from the equation. In addition official documents provide only part of the picture, 
particularly as transatlantic policymakers have a tendency by transatlantic policy makers to 
'recycle' and 'repackage' their announcement of policy successes 
 
1.3: What is at stake: how can the TTIP connect the past and the future? 
The untold nature of this dissertation is clear. It aims at creating a bridge between the past and 
the future, trying to understand what happened twenty years ago in order to give some 
rationales on what could happen in the future. This sub-Chapter tackles this topic by making 
reference to the potential gains of a transatlantic trade deal. Figures are not at the core of this 
research, since they represent only one view on the entire topic. They can certainly show the 
interrelatedness and the strong trade exchanges between the UE and the US, but they do not 
                                                            
23 Seidman, I. (2012), Interviewing as Qualitative Research: A Guide for Researchers in Education and the Social 
Sciences, Teachers College Press 
24 Princen, S. (2002), EU Regulation and Transatlantic Trade, Kluwer Law International 
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tell the whole story. They do not show why, if such integration was possible and there were 
windows of opportunity in the past, no real agreement has ever seen life.  
A study by CEPR London for the European Commission models the effects of the TTIP in a 
computable general equilibrium (CGE) model25 . An ambitious deal, consisting of tariff 
barriers being lowered to zero, non-tariff barriers lowered by 25% and public procurement 
barriers reduced by 50%, would lead to an increase in EU GDP by 0.5% in by 2027. Growth 
effects for the rest of the world will be positive, on average 0.14% of GDP, due to increased 
demand from the EU and USA. Because of different compositions of trade, particularly low 
income countries will not be negatively affected by the TTIP. Another, less frequently cited 
study by the Bertelsmann Foundation26 finds larger long-term GDP per capital effects of 5% 
for the EU and 13.4% for the USA as a result of dismantling all tariff and non-tariff barriers. 
Here, gains would largely come at the expense of third countries. For Canada and Mexico, 
whose free trade agreements with the USA would lose value, TTIP would in the long run 
imply a 9.5% and 7.2% decrease in GDP per capita over the baseline scenario. The EU Trade 
Commissioner Karel de Gucht, citing the CEPR numbers, writes that TTIP offers significant 
benefits to the EU and USA over ten years during times of hesitant economic recovery27. As 
shared values will facilitate negotiations, results should be reached in three dimensions: market 
access, regulatory cooperation and trade rules. Improved market access will benefit European 
companies and consumers alike. Standardisation in regulation would avoid unnecessary costs 
for global producers. Dean Baker argues that calls to support TTIP for its beneficial impact 
on jobs and growth are lies28: The CEPR model assumes full employment anyway and a GDP 
raise of only 0.5% over 13 years will not have a discernible impact on employment. Growth 
                                                            
25  VV.AA. (2013), “Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership The Economic Analysis Explained”, 
accessible here: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/september/tradoc_151787.pdf (last accessed 
20/08/2014) 
26 VV.AA., (2013), “Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) Who benefits from a free trade 
deal?”, accessible here: http://www.bfna.org/sites/default/files/TTIP-GED%20study%2017June%202013.pdf 
(last accessed 20/08/2014) 
27  http://oecdinsights.org/2014/06/16/aiming-high-the-values-driven-economic-potential-of-a-successful-ttip-
deal/ 
28 http://www.cepr.net/index.php/blogs/beat-the-press/why-is-it-so-acceptable-to-lie-to-promote-trade-deals 
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effects may in fact even go in the opposite direction: Stronger patent and copyright 
protections may result in higher prices for goods.  
Gabriel Siles-Brügge and Ferdi De Ville challenge the proclaimed benefits of this much-
vaunted deal29. Most of the economic benefit outlined in the CEPR study is due to the 
dismantlement of non-tariff barriers. Yet the commission has itself pointed out that only 50% 
of non-tariff barriers are at all “actionable”, i.e. within the reach of policy. Eliminating half of 
these, as assumed by CEPR seems already highly ambitious. Furthermore, due to strong inter-
sector linkages, these benefits will only materialise if liberalisation is successful in all sectors. 
The global significance of bilateral agreements Pascal Lamy writes that preferential trade 
agreements (PTAs) such as TTIP could be very beneficial if they helped to bring down 
remaining tariff barriers30. However, most PTAs focus more on regulatory issues than tariffs. 
Some non-tariff barriers such as consumer protection serve legitimate objectives. And there 
exists a risk that PTAs may lock various groups into different regulatory approaches, 
increasing transaction costs. In the end, a functional multilateral trade system through the 
WTO remains vital to avoid economic fragmentation and set globally sensible rules. Michael 
Boskin points out that TTIP may have consequences that extend beyond the USA and EU31. 
After NAFTA was signed, the Uruguay round of trade talks was revived. Similarly, a 
successful TTIP may be a major impetus for rekindling the moribund Doha Round. It will be 
of great importance, whether compromises can be found in the truly contentious issues 
between the EU and the USA. One of the most difficult is the EU’s limitation of imports of 
genetically modified foods, which presents a major problem for US agriculture. Another is 
financial regulation, with US banks preferring EU rules to the more stringent framework 
emerging at home. This is of interest to countries outside the deal, too: if the EU relaxed its 
rules on genetically modified food imports and translated this with careful monitoring to 
                                                            
29 http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/usappblog/2013/12/17/eu-us-free-trade/ 
30 http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/pascal-lamy-on-the-need-for-a-coherent-global-trade-regime 
31 http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/the-global-implcations-of-eu-us-freet-trade-by-michael-boskin 
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imports from Africa, this could be a tremendous boon to African agriculture. Hans-Werner 
Sinn is not surprised that bilateral trade agreements have been gaining traction globally lately, 
as there is no real progress on multilateral trade negotiations32. The Doha round of WTO talks 
basically was a flop. Currently, fear of negative effects on consumer protection in the EU is 
distorting the debate. In reality, consumer protection standards in the US are often much 
higher in the US than in the EU where, following the Cassis de Dijon ruling of the European 
Court of Justice, the minimum standard applicable to all countries is set by the country with 
the lowest standards. TTIP could bring significant economic benefits while scrapping some 
misguided EU regulations such as the capping of CO2 emissions on cars, which is a covert 
industrial policy aimed at protecting Italian and French manufacturers of smaller cars. 
There are many other valid opinions on the TTIP, EU-US trade and the past and future 
prospects of a transatlantic trade deal33. All of them reflect a varying degree of satisfaction in 
seeing that things are moving, and that what has been achieved in the past can now be treated 
as a starting point for the future. 
 
1.4: Research output and structure of the dissertation  
The output of this dissertation  . However, in order to predict the future or try to shape it, it 
may be useful to understand the past. What has worked in the EU-US relations of recent 
years? What has not? Which factors have contributed to shape the relations? Are they both 
positive and negative? These many questions need a dive into the past twenty years. The 
starting point was the same. Both entities felt themselves disoriented, without a guiding light 
throughout the realm of international politics. In the 1990s, the US felt the need to spread 
                                                            
32  http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/hans-werner-sinn-considers-the-risks-of-the-transatlantic-
trade-and-investment-partnership 
33  Among those which are worth a mention, Paul Krugman’s 
(http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/28/opinion/krugman-no-big-deal.html?ref=paulkrugman&_r=1), Robert 
Basedow’s (http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2014/07/02/far-from-being-a-threat-to-european-democracy-
the-eu-us-free-trade-deal-is-an-ideal-opportunity-to-reform-controversial-investment-rules-and-procedures/), 
Dean Baker’s (http://www.social-europe.eu/2014/02/ttip/)  
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around their ideals in order to achieve tangible results around the world. The liberal idea was 
seen as a means to defend themselves and to pre-empt menaces from the non-liberal world34. 
The EU for its part defended its recently achieved results of the Single Market and common 
policies by projecting them towards the world. What drove policy-makers and political leaders 
was the belief that only a “giant” transatlantic market could be the answer to the growing 
uncertainty given by a unipolar world that could be challenged at any time.  
The refuge of many with this view was the newly established World Trade Organization 
(WTO), which gave a new and positive facet to the liberal stronghold of lowering the access 
costs to the markets and increased the positive opinion towards trade as a facilitator of 
economic prosperity35.  
This work is structured as follows. 
Part 2 addresses the history of transatlantic economic and trade cooperation, by looking at the 
main events but also at three important definitions, namely “cooperation”, “alliance”, 
“partnership”. It also reviews the main dialogues within the transatlantic “civil society” and 
“business community”.  
Part 3 is the theoretical part: it employs International Relations Theory (IRT) to assess mainly 
the reasons behind cooperative endeavours of international actors, with a specific inclination 
towards constructivist explanations and broader explanatory variables than simple power or 
state preferences.  
Part 4 aims at building a sound understanding of the processes that govern transatlantic trade, 
the actors involved, and how certain concepts can frame the empirical part. 
Part 5 analyses public opinion as the most useful way to assess transatlantic common traits 
and differences. The assumption is that private networks have substituted governmental 
                                                            
34 This idea was advanced by Doyle, M., (1986), "Liberalism and World Politics". The American Political Science 
Review 80 (4), pp. 1151–1169 
35 A good summary of the relationship between WTO and transatlantic market issues may be found in a study by 
Notre Europe in 2008, at the preparatoy stage of the “new” New Transatlantic Agenda”. See  
http://www.eng.notre-europe.eu/011-1771-Transatlantic-market-and-WTO-related-issues.html 
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actors, whenever possible and wherever it could bring back into the game interests that had 
been thrown out before. 
Part 6 uses a case-study to address the role of private networks and content analysis of 
selected official documents to claim that the focus shifted from general issues to more specific 
ones, and that the role of private actors grew through time. This will be epitomized by the 
increased references to certain topics in documents signed by governmental officials and used 
as milestones for advancing transatlantic trade.  
Conclusions will try to sum up the main teachings this dissertation has been able (or not?) to 
provide. 
 
1.4.1: Originality and significance  
Is the government (i.e., the US government and the EU Commission36) still the central player 
in the transatlantic relationship, as traditional theories of international relations have posited? 
Has the European Commission emerged as a pivotal actor in transatlantic relations, alongside 
national governments? And what is the relationship between these governmental actors and 
their private domestic constituents in the making and implementation of international trade 
policy and in the creation of the New Transatlantic Agenda? Are we witnessing the 
development of governance by trans governmental networks of US and European officials, as 
some authors have suggested? Are the participants of these networks faithfully implementing 
the policies of their superiors, or can these networks act independently within their respective 
spheres? And, assuming that trans-governmental networks are emerging as an increasingly 
important form of governance, what are the normative implications of a form of governance 
                                                            
36 Discussion on whether the Commission can be categorized as the EU’s government and administration would 
be simply too long to be reported here. It will be discussed at a certain point. For this moment, a good 
clarification on the distribution of power (especially in EU trade policy) in the European Union can be found in 
Dimopoulos, A. (2010), “The Effects of the Lisbon Treaty on the Principles and Objectives of the Common 
Commercial Policy”, European Foreign Affairs Review 15: pp. 153–170 
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that is fast, flexible, and effective but may escape democratic accountability to national 
legislatures and electorates37? 
These are just a few of the main questions that will be dealt with and possibly answered in the 
following Chapters. Many lines of interpretation can help to navigate the key issues. First of 
all, transatlantic relations are played out through many channels. The US–EU channel is 
probably less important or productive than the architects of the New Transatlantic Agenda 
hoped or thought it would be by now. One of the Clinton administration’s top foreign policy 
officials ascribes to the NTA “an ameliorative effect” but also noted a “lack of high-level 
commitment to policy co-ordination” and a continuing need “for a more institutionalised, 
enduring effort that depends less on personalities”38. Yet, even here we find a call for more 
institutionalisation. Whatever their limits, we would argue that the NTA institutions help get 
each side closer than any other major global players to the holy grails of rational choice theory: 
perfect information and perfect attention39. They routinely produce new attempts to deepen 
and broaden co-operation and consistently justify their own existence. The NTA system is an 
integral part of a wider dialogue that keeps both sides focused on a pragmatic agenda of policy 
co-operation. To be clear, the US and EU remain far from an institutionalised partnership. 
The long list of post-1995 transatlantic rows, including (of course) over Iraq, shows that 
transatlantic relations are determined primarily by events and currents at the level of high 
politics that can easily overwhelm or marginalise ongoing efforts at policy co-operation. If we 
were to compile a list of factors that matter more than institutions, we would probably start 
with personalities, at multiple levels. Someone40 has attributed warmer transatlantic relations 
post-Iraq to the electoral victories of Merkel and the French president, Nicolas Sarkozy, both 
                                                            
37 O’Toole, L. (1997), “The Implications for Democracy in a Networked Bureaucratic World”, Journal of Public 
Administration Research and Theory, 7-3, pp. 443-459 
38 Steinberg, J. B. (2003) “An elective partnership: Salvaging transatlantic relations”, Survival, 45:2, 113–146 
39 Peterson, J. and Ward, H. (1995), “Coalitional instability and the multi-dimensional politics of security: A 
rational choice argument for US–EU co-operation”, European Journal of International Relations, 1:2, pp. 131–
156. More details on rational explanations of the transatlantic relations will be presented in the theoretical part 
40 Rubin, J. P. (2008) “Building a new Atlantic alliance”, Foreign Affairs, 87:4, 99–110. 
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of whose commitment to reviving relations with the US contrasted sharply with their 
predecessors. 
Similarly, EU officials complained of poor chemistry with Nicholas Burns, the US 
Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs in the Bush administration, who participated in 
NTA exchanges, as well as lack of interest on the part of Dan Fried, the top National Security 
Council official for Europe, in the EU itself. Perhaps it might matter eventually that Barack 
Obama had chaired the Senate’s sub-committee on European affairs and (for example) 
presided over the confirmation hearing of Kurt Volker, who previously served as the lead 
American official in NTA exchanges, when he was named US ambassador to NATO41. A 
second factor that trumps institutions is the so-called ‘values gap’ between Europe and 
America. Europeans might be encouraged by Condoleezza Rice’s insistence that the US does 
have ‘permanent allies: the nations with whom we share common values’. An important 
question is whether European confidence in US leadership has collapsed, particularly on 
issues such as the treatment of suspected terrorists as prisoners, climate change and Iran, thus 
demonstrating a breakdown of shared values that have underpinned the transatlantic 
relationship (see Rubin 2008, 99)42. If so, pragmatic policy co-operation on these—as well as 
many other—issues would be difficult or impossible. However, the values gap does not 
appear equally wide between America and all EU member states, or to diminish enthusiasm 
among Europeans and Americans for transatlantic renewal. These points were reinforced by a 
2008 British Council survey which found that (on average) 62 per cent of Europeans favoured 
closer European–American relations (compared with 91 per cent of Americans), and 
suggested that the Poles (77 per cent), and not the British (51 per cent), were the strongest 
                                                            
41 For a sceptical view of Obama’s engagement in this role, see Zeleny, J. (2008) ‘The caucus: A rare day in the 
spotlight, New York Times, , available at: 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=990DE5DF1E30F93AA35757C0A96E9C8B63  
42 For an analysis of the ‘values gap’, see Peterson (2008), which is also available as a podcast at: 
http://www.podcasts.ed.ac.uk/politics/2006/peterson_inaugural/peterson_inaug_html.mov 
	   22	  
supporters of partnership with the US43. These figures will be thoroughly explained in the final 
part. 
A final factor is conflicting notions of multilateral engagement. Characterisations of a 
unilateral America that clashes with a multilateral Europe are usually gross simplifications (see 
Pollack 2003). Amid speculation about American foreign policy post-Bush, there are reasons 
to believe that any successor administration would (in Obama’s words) ‘make a virtue of 
working through multilateral institutions’44.  Still, perceptions about the use of force or rule of 
law as tools of global governance remain different on either side of the Atlantic (Rubenfeld 
2004). Closing the gap between them may take generations, if it happens at all. The new 
institutionalism that sprouted in the mid-1990s has, in important respects, changed the nature 
of the transatlantic relationship. It is now more Brussels and EU focused, and becoming more 
so. As a case study, US–EU relations offer no real evidence to suggest that partnership 
between major powers can be institutionalised or even that bilateral institutions can prevent 
‘strategic divorce’ (see Herd and Forsberg 2008). But the post-1995 record of the NTA stands 
as a new chapter in the now lengthy history of transatlantic co-operation. That historical 
record, as well as a lack of alternative partners and very real and shared external threats, may 
make Europe and America the worst of allies, except for all the others (Sarotte 2008). The 
various transatlantic gaps that we have described make the negotiation of more ambitious 
treaties or institutions with more political weight seem unlikely in the near future. 
 
                                                            
43 Transatlantic Trends 2020, The British Council, January 2008, http://www.britishcouncil.org/tn2020- 
research-findings-authors.htm?mtlink=tn2020-homepage-research-findings-authors-mt-link 
44 ‘Briefing: Barack Obama. Explaining the riddle’, The Economist, 23 August 2008, p. 21 
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CHAPTER 2: Transatlantic economic and trade relations after the Cold War 
 
In subiecta materia there is a growing scholarly attention45 to two key issues: on the one side, the 
explanatory variables of cooperation at the transatlantic level46. On the other side, the 
interrelatedness of certain economic fields, which allow for the evolution of the transatlantic 
sphere of cooperation, especially in the regulatory sector47. Little attention has been paid to 
the processes behind fora such as the recent Transatlantic Economic Council (TEC) or the 
Transatlantic Business Dialogue (TABD). Scholars have strongly focused on how cooperation 
was intended in practical terms rather than trying to operationalize it for the greater and more 
general sake of researching the history of transatlantic decision-making. In fact, on this issue 
scholars have tended to be rather neglectful: a good interest has been demonstrated for the 
structural lines of conduct in the partnership, but not much on how this structure has been 
shaped, and how it created the environment where transatlantic actors have played 48 . 
Nevertheless, a good share of it has devoted attention to the history-making decisions, 
political entrepreneurs and game-changing events, rather than focusing on more middle-
ranged political developments. By doing so, important parts of the last twenty years have been 
lost, especially those related to the causes and roots of cooperative endeavours. Scholarship 
has explained then how big decisions by political leaders have fostered the (re)launch of 
transatlantic relations, but it has not uncovered many other interesting features and elements 
                                                            
45 See as pure indicative examples, Antal (2011), Smith (2009) and Alcaro & Renda (2013). Another input from 
this thesis goes in the direction of renewing a research root, which seems to be quite parched, or at least stopped 
in its significant contributions to 2005. However, a sign of constant attention to this subject may well be 
demonstrated by the amount of studies that appear in the Archive of European Integration at the University of 
Pittsburgh. Among 1825 original publications on EU external relations, an outstanding number of 391 
publications deal with the issue of EU-US relations. See http://aei.pitt.edu/view/subjects/D002009.html (last 
accessed on 01/03/2014) 
46 See for example a good political economy approach to this issue: Crombez, C., Josling, T. (2013) “The Political 
Economy of Transatlantic Free Trade”, unpublished WP (courtesy of the authors) 
47 Meuwese, A. (2011), “EU–US horizontal regulatory cooperation: Mutual recognition of impact assessment?”, 
in Transatlantic Regulatory Cooperation: The Shifting Roles of the EU, the US and California, Cheltenham : Edward Elgar 
Publishing, pp. 249-264 
48  An example is Foreign Affairs’ list of books on Transatlantic Relations so far, accessible here: 
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/features/readinglists/what-to-read-on-transatlantic-relations (last accessed 
26/08/2014) 
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of the whole process, namely variables such as the attitudes of businessmen and high-level 
government officials on the two sides, or the complex interrelatedness of the different 
institutions. This is a core aspect of the entire relationship. “Institutions matter”49: this does 
not only entail a reconfiguration of the existing knowledge, but also a different point of view 
from which to look at things. This practically means that despite the insistence on the 
institutionalization processes, something may have been lost on the ground if still nowadays 
we lack a good comprehension of the transatlantic phenomenon and the hermeneutical 
criteria to critically assess it.  
This dissertation aims at improving the knowledge on these existing forms of cooperation by 
pointing the eye to the successes and failures of these forms of non-state coalitions in the field 
of regulatory and trade cooperation. Finally, the whole topic can be connected to a wider 
strand of research on these issues, which is related to regulatory and conformity assessment 
issues (Steffenson 2005, Shaffer 2002). These issues have acquired a higher standing than 
other subjects because of their relevance in fostering trade agreements. Historically, regulatory 
cooperation among states helps building up closer ties50. Mutual Recognition Agreements 
(MRAs) are considered as the main “force of regulatory convergence”51 and their relevance is 
displayed by their place in international agreements since the NTA. The scope of many 
negotiations so far between the EU and the US has been to lower non-tariff barriers hindering 
the entry of business into their respective markets. The driving reason behind conformity 
assessments and regulatory cooperation is that internally both the EU and the US have a 
longstanding acquis of favouring access to trade and markets. Externally, DG Trade has been a 
policy entrepreneur under many circumstances, but the task on the transatlantic scale has been 
                                                            
49 Przeworski, A. (2004), “Institutions matter?”, Government and opposition, 39(2), pp. 527-540 
50 Ahearn, R. (2009), “Transatlantic regulatory cooperation: background and analysis”, CRS Report for Congress, 
accessible here: http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34717.pdf (last accessed: 22/07/2014) 
51 See Steffenson, R. (2005). “Competing trade and regulatory strategies for the mutual recognition of conformity 
assessment in the transatlantic marketplace”, in Egan M., op.cit., pp. 156-175. An agreement on MRA was signed 
in 1999 and set the pace of integration also in this delicate sector. For the text of the agreement, see  
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/single-market-goods/international-aspects/mutual-recognition-
agreement/usa/index_en.htm#h2-3 (last accessed 01/02/2014) 
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daunting, especially when dealing with such a complexity of regulatory divergences. The 
business and the consumer world have been struggling against each other to make their voices 
heard during years long negotiations, and at a certain point EU officials thought they needed 
to engage them in order to have more responsiveness in the public.  
Studies have brought under scrutiny the perils (Peterson, 2006) but also the potential (EU 
Commission, 2013) of a definitive trade agreement aimed at finally reducing the barriers and 
strengthening the relationship between the EU and the US, which is the aim of the last twenty 
years’ navigation in troubled waters since the NTA. A simple analysis of NTA agenda shows 
that “in the period between 16 February 2000 and 14 July 2004, the NTA meetings have dealt 
with 102 issues in 8 policy areas (percentage of time devoted to discussions on particular 
policy field in brackets): trade and economic relations (31%), foreign policy (21%), sustainable 
development (13.5%), transport and border security/justice and home affairs (13%), non-
proliferation of WMD (10%), counterterrorism (6.5%), human rights (4%) and other issues 
(mostly institutional aspects) (1%)”52. This is a rather simple way to see how much meetings 
under the strongest transatlantic dialogue mechanism have been “colonized” by economic 
issues and trade-related affairs. No surprise, then, that in a certain manner the NTA can be 
defined as a cornerstone in the EU-US relationship. 
Sub-Chapter 2.1 is the longest one, specifically because it contains excerpts from texts, 
agreements and treaties. A selection of full texts is available in Appendix II. It is structured as 
follows: 2.1 is a brief history of transatlantic economic agreements from 1990 until 2008, 
when the crisis broke out. Main texts are analysed in their structure, content and implication. 
This Chapter does not take an explicit point of view, nor it contains any particular reference to 
some set of established research questions. Its only goal is to clarify the history and status quo 
                                                            
52 See Pawlak, P. (2007), “Form hierarchy to networks: transatlantic governance of homeland security”, Journal of 
global change and governance, Vol. 1, N. 1 
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of a complicated relationship, one that has been for a long time neglected and is now once 
again under the spotlight53.  
2.2 assumes that defining a concept or a very much used term helps clarifying many aspects of 
research. In this case, three terms are defined: coalition, cooperation and networks. Not all of 
them are equally used throughout the present work. Two of them are two different ways of 
looking at the same relationship. The third one equally needs a clarification, since it will be 
used in Chapter 4 to critically evaluate transatlantic relationship from the perspective of 
“networks”.  
Sub-Chapter 2.3 outlines the main dialogues that have been set up since 1990. 2.3.1 focuses 
more on NTA-related dialogues and state-to-state ones. 2.3.2 and 2.3.3 are designed to give a 
rather broad spectrum of views and information on the two main classifications of these 
dialogues. On the one hand, business élites decided to share views and try to shape policies 
before civil society did. On the other hand, non-business organizations were certainly less 
reluctant to expose their view, and influenced the way their relationship has grown up later on. 
Nevertheless, research54 demonstrates that there is now enough material to be brought under 
scrutiny and assessed on both sides.  
 
2.1: History of transatlantic economic cooperation 
To trace a history of transatlantic economic relations may be utterly difficult, especially if the 
aim is to build up a comprehensive framework of what happened since the end of the Cold 
War55. Therefore, the goal of this sub-Chapter, which is sensibly longer than the others, is to 
                                                            
53 This does not mean that this Chapter is avalutative: its main goal is to expose the facts as they happened, but in 
some parts there will be personal accounts mainly on the causes behind certain events  
54 The case of the transatlantic governance of a non-business area, for example, is interesting in defining the how 
and why actors play in a certain way. Savaresi, A. (2013), “The Role of EU and US Non-State Actors in the 
Global Environmental System: A Focus on Climate Change”, Transworld Working Paper 22 
55 In effect, there are no known attempts as such during the past years. Many contributions have focused on 
specific case-studies, such as the NTA implementation, or on specific sectors, such as competition policy. This 
brings additional difficulty to this Chapter, since there is no term of reference in the literature. Or, if there is one, 
is not enough developed.  
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suggest an interpretation and an outline of the facts, without considering the detailed 
implications of each and every policy or agreement. This part merely touches upon three 
different elements: agreements, political leaders, and rationales. Drivers of further integration 
in the transatlantic economic sphere will be analysed in Part 4, where explanations will be 
given on why the EU and the US decided to cope with their own weaknesses in terms of 
regulatory barriers to trade. This sub-Chapter is divided into four parts in a chronological 
order, that reflects the one given by Meyer and Luenen in their collection of official texts on 
the transatlantic economic partnership56.  
Therefore, 1990-1994 represents the very initial stages of the relationship, characterized by 
strong commitment on both parts, constant meetings and exchanges of information, enduring 
efforts to proclaim an alliance and partnership that would have strengthened EU-US relations 
for years to come. 1995-1999 is the implementation period, which suffered from great lack of 
coordination among partners, as it will be shown later on. This period also saw the beginning 
of a phenomenon that would have characterized also the following years, i.e. the overlap 
between the economic and security field. This overlap influenced under many respects both 
the prioritization of issues and the implementation of already existing agreements. 2000-2004 
is certainly the most controversial period, the one in which the great “rift”57 between the two 
partners was born. The Iraq war formed a dividing line within the EU partners, and the 
Coalition of the Willing was an adjuvant in the crisis of transatlanticism58. The consequences 
were clear in 2005-2008, when the security concerns of terrorism and Islamic threats were 
kept under control, but at the same time there was widespread diffidence among transatlantic 
partners and no real constructive dialogue was under way. At the end, a meeting in 2007 was 
convened in order to relaunch the economic side of the relationship, but when the crisis broke 
                                                            
56 Many of the events, agreements and texts which are quoted in this part come from the extraordinary effort by 
these two authors, who have collected in a single Reader the entire amount of texts signed by governmental and 
non-governmental entities since 1990.  
57 Kagan, R. (2003), Of Paradise and Power, Random House Publishing 
58 Much can be said on the role of the Iraqi War in shaping EU and US relationship. In particular, it is hard to say 
whether economic cooperation has been affected by it. Most likely, contacts have not stopped, while they have 
certainly taken different paths  
	   28	  
out there were only few policy-makers that were confident in a positive outcome. These 
events will be covered in the final part of the next sub-Chapter.  
 
2.1.1: 1990-1994 
At the end of the Cold War, influential politicians, policy-makers, and other stakeholders in 
the transatlantic partnership from both sides of the Atlantic became increasingly anxious that 
with the demise of their common enemy – the Soviet Union – the transatlantic alliance had 
also lost its raison d’être and might therefore run the risk of loosening. This fear was based on 
two different but nonetheless interrelated concerns: on the European side, the concern was 
expressed that, since the Soviet threat had subsided and Europe would no longer constitute 
the main theatre in any war which threatened both vital US and European security interests, 
the US might pull its troops out of Europe and abandon its former ally. This view had been 
particularly prominent amongst those who had regarded the US’s role of security guarantor as 
essential in order to prevent the re-nationalisation of European politics – a development that 
could eventually threaten the entire European project59. What alarmed the American side 
instead was that Europe might no longer want to continue the close relationship which it had 
enjoyed with the US, despite occasional differences, for almost four decades and become 
increasingly inward-looking and attempt to construct a ‘fortress Europe’, pursuing a path of its 
own. What complicated matters even further was the likely re-unification of Germany, which 
although supported by the US, caused a great deal of concern among the British, French, 
Poles and Russians.60 
                                                            
59 This was the view also on the other side of the Atlantic. An idea, which was born on the European side, was 
gaining ground also on the other side: see Sloan, S. (1995), “European proposals for a New Atlantic 
Community”, CRS Report for Congress 
60 Devuyst, Y., “Transatlantic Trade Policy: US Market Opening Strategies”, European Policy Paper N. 1, 
European Union Center, University Center for International Studies, University of Pittsburgh, 1995, p. 10, 
available here:  
http://www.ucis.pitt.edu/euce/pub/policypapers/1995-Transatl Trade Policy.pdf 
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US Secretary of State James A. Baker, III, when he addressed the Berlin Press Club in 1989 
soon after the partial dismantling of the Berlin Wall, addressed all these topics in a clear 
manner. In his speech entitled “A New Europe, a New Atlanticism: Architecture for a New 
Era”, he called for the reinvention of the Atlantic Alliance in order to adjust the transatlantic 
relationship to the new international realities. In his speech, he famously called for both 
Europeans and Americans “to work together toward the New Europe and the New 
Atlanticism”, pointing to the need for better and more comprehensive consultation 
mechanisms in order for “trans-Atlantic cooperation to keep pace with European integration 
and institutional reform”.61  Political leaders were then the initiators of the transatlantic 
dialogue, undoubtedly.  
 
2.1.1.1: Transatlantic Declaration 
Resulting from these debates of 1989-1990 was the Transatlantic Declaration (TD), signed in 
December 1990 by the US and the EC. The TD was essentially a statement of principles, 
emphasizing the signatories’ continued commitment to shared norms, values and goals. A 
more measurable result was the institutionalisation of consultation mechanisms, as demanded 
by Baker. The new arrangements were to include: 
- bi-annual consultations to be arranged in the United States and in 
Europe between, on the one side, the President of the European 
Council and President of the Commission, and on the other side, 
the President of the United States; 
- bi-annual consultations between the European Community 
Foreign Ministers, with the Commission, and the US Secretary of 
State, alternately on either side of the Atlantic; 
- ad hoc consultations between the Presidency Foreign Minister or 
the Troika and the US Secretary of State; 
- bi-annual consultations between the Commission and the US 
Government at Cabinet level; 
                                                            
61 Speech by US Secretary of State James A. Baker, “A New Europe, A New Atlanticism: Architecture for a New 
Era” to the Berlin Press Club in Germany, 12 December 1989. 
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- briefings, as currently exist, by the Presidency to US 
Representatives on European Political Cooperation (EPC) meetings 
at the Ministerial level62 
 
The TD, although mainly of symbolic nature, was the first attempt made at dissolving fears 
that the transatlantic alliance might break apart. It was also the first step taken in the direction 
of initiating a new era in transatlantic relations that was to move beyond Europe’s and the 
US’s Cold War relationship, which was first and foremost characterised by its security 
imperative and conducted within the framework of NATO, and come to entail an economic, 
social, and political dimension. As it can be inferred by looking at the small excerpt, there 
were mainly bilateral meetings between the two partners. Not all of them were actually 
realized. An intense exchange of information and expertise took place in early 1990s, but the 
close web of intergovernmental meetings was far from being real.  
The instigation of regular consultations between the US government and the EC Commission 
and Council presidency also meant that the US implicitly accepted that Europe was no longer 
simply an amalgamation of its constituent nation states, but that the EC as such was gradually 
acquiring an identity of its own63, developing slowly but steadily into a serious and potentially 
independent force in international affairs64. What the US liked most of the EU system was the 
Single Market, which was intended as the cornerstone of EU integration and possible leverage 
for further cooperation. Goods imported in the EU had no internal regulatory differences, 
which made the US aware of the unexpressed potential of a possible trade agreement.  
By accepting this new role that Europe would soon come to play through strengthening its 
relationship with the burgeoning European institutions, the US gave further impetus to their 
                                                            
62 The full text of the TD is accessible here: http://eeas.europa.eu/us/docs/trans_declaration_90_en.pdf  
63 Debate on the European identity insulates from the present work, even though some characteristics may 
certainly be related to the shared ideals scrutinized later on in the following Chapters. See the “Living Reviews in 
European Governance”, especially Kaina, V., Karolewski, I.P., (2013), “EU Governance and European identity”, 
Living Reviews in European Governance, Vol. 8, No. 1 
64 European Political Cooperation in 1970 was seen as a major advancement in intergovernmental bargaining. 
The Single European Act in 1986 and the political failures of democratic “EU reforms” (Spinelli Treaty) paved 
the way for a renewed commitment to creating a Europe-wide consensus on the need for a foreign policy. For 
more details on the roots of CFSP and the birth of a European strategic culture, Lianos, P. (2008), “European 
strategic culture: assessing the esdp years (1998-2005)”, Ph.D thesis, University of Leicester 
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continued expansion and consolidation while enabling themselves to remain in a position to 
monitor and to some extent shape Europe’s future development. Despite their initial 
concerns, the French were also quickly persuaded that German reunification did not have to 
result in renewed German aggression and hegemonic aspirations and that any potential re-
emerging unilateral ambitions on behalf of the Germans could be contained by deepening the 
structures of Europe and binding Germany’s fate even closer to that of the new Europe. In 
the end, German reunification served as a powerful catalyst, not just for European, but also 
for Atlantic integration65. 
What forced transatlantic partners to cooperate as economic giants rather than security 
players? Many factors have just been outlined, but they need to undergo a special treatment to 
be understood clearly. They can be classified in a threefold way. First of all, the end of the 
Soviet threat represented certainly the reinvigoration for businesses and enterprises of the will 
to invest in places that could offer cheaper labour and cheaper access to the factors market66.  
Europeans and Americans soon realised that the TD had by no means sufficed to keep the 
alliance together and to ensure the continued relevance of their partnership in the light of the 
demise of their common Cold War enemy, continuous trade conflicts, and EU-US quarrels 
over the handling of the conflict in Yugoslavia. To defuse the strains that had once again 
resurfaced in the transatlantic partnership and to prevent the EU and US from drifting apart, 
many prominent policy-makers on both sides of the Atlantic, including German Foreign 
Minister Klaus Kinkel, British Foreign Secretary Malcolm Rifkind, Margaret Thatcher, Henry 
Kissinger, EU Commissioner Sir Leon Brittan, US Secretary of State Warren Christopher, US 
Secretary of Commerce Ron Brown, and Speaker of the House of Representatives Newt 
Gingrich, amongst others, called at various points during the 1990’s for a serious new 
                                                            
65 Lehmkuhl, U. (2009), “The “Ottawa formula” and transatlantic relations: Politics and Diplomacy of the Two-
Plus-Four Negotiations”, Eurostudia — Transatlantic journal for European Studies, Vol. 5; n°2 
66 Huterer, M. (2010), “The Russia Factor in Transatlantic Relations and New Opportunities for U.S.-EU-Russia 
Cooperation”, Working Paper 4, Brookings Institution, accessible here: 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2010/6/us%20eu%20russia%20huterer/06_us_eu_
russia_huterer (last accessed 18/10/2014)  
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initiative of some sort.67 Among the proposals put forth was a call for a Transatlantic Free 
Trade Agreement (TAFTA), which would not just serve as a mechanism to renew the 
transatlantic bond per se and put it on a new footing, but also serve as a means to respond to 
the rapidly changing nature of the world economy. The Transatlantic Policy Network (TPN), 
a non-governmental organisation founded in 1992 with offices in Washington and Brussels, 
has been one of the more influential proponents of closer transatlantic relations. On its 
website, it states: “From a small base of original support in the European Parliament and US 
Congress, TPN has grown into a broadly based multi-party group of EU and US politicians, 
corporate leaders, influential think tanks and academics”68. Today, it counts 40 multinational 
corporations, some of the most influential European and American think tanks, as well as 
various members of the US Congress and the EU Parliament among its partners69. In 1994 
and 1995, the TPN published two influential reports on the transatlantic relationship, in which 
it made recommendations for deepening the partnership. In its November 1994 report 
“Toward Transatlantic Partnership: A European Strategy”, the TPN renewed the proposal 
made by the Atlantic Union movement in the 1950s and 1960s as well as by Kissinger and 
others in the 1970s, calling for the transatlantic partners to create a linkage between security, 
political and economic issues in order to strengthen the partnership and ensure its success. In 
the report, the TPN further claimed that without the EU speaking with a united voice, not just 
politically but also in the defence realm, the partnership between the EU and the US could not 
be a lasting one. 
                                                            
67 M. Pollack and G. Schaffer, (2001), Transatlantic Governance in the Global Economy, Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, Inc., Lanham, p. 71 and following; and R. Steinberg, “Great power management of the world trading 
system: A transatlantic strategy for liberal multilateralism”, Law and Policy in International Business, available on the 
Internet: http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi qa3791/is 199801/ai n8773912/pg 19 
68 http://www.tpnonline.org/# 
69 The TPN is a remarkable experiment in policy coordination. It has achieved only a small portion of its 
commitments, yet it moved forward many issues on the agenda of political leaders  
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 In its November 1995 report “Toward Transatlantic Partnership: The Partnership Project”70, 
the TPN then laid out an ambitious plan for the future of transatlantic cooperation. It was 
concluded with the following words: 
“- Accelerated convergence of the business environment: to build 
on achievement in the short term, TPN supports efforts to enhance 
the climate for trade and investment on both sides of the Atlantic. 
In the medium term, these efforts could include regulatory 
convergence, elimination of discriminatory taxation provisions, 
national treatment in public procurement, and protection of 
intellectual property rights (notably focusing on their trade impacts). 
- Greater cooperation on competition policy: TPN advocates 
greater US-EU cooperation on competition policy building on the 
EU-US administrative agreement and coordination in recent high 
profile anti-trust cases. This effort could help clarify basic anti-trust 
principles and lead to more predictable and consistent application of 
these principles. Cooperation on this front would also build toward 
future multilateral competition policy coordination. - Multilateral 
and third country cooperation. The EU and the US should strive to 
create processes and mechanisms able to stabilise exchange rates, to 
co-ordinate political and economic efforts in Central and Eastern 
Europe and to evolve a common approach to further opening of 
the markets of Japan and East Asia. They should also work in 
concert to integrate Russia, China and India into the global 
economic system. And they should cooperate to build and 
strengthen multilateral economic institutions, helping to re-engineer 
them to the realities of the 21st century economy”71. 
 
It followed the European Strategy of the previous year, with a striking difference: while the 
transatlantic level had to do with strongly economy-oriented issues, the Europeans, according 
to the Report, had mainly to develop a strong and coherent foreign policy initiative, possibly 
by joining forces into a single policy. Alongside a strong focus on security there was the usual 
reference to common multilateral economic interests.  
This strongly cooperative attitude by NSAa (and mainly business) was tackled by the 
respective governments the same year, with the launch of the NTA.  
What conclusions can be drawn from the early attempts at integrating transatlantic markets? 
First of all, the strategies employed by the EU and the US were respectively short-sighted and 
                                                            
70http://www.tpnonline.org/WP/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/Toward_Transatlantic_Partnership_Project.pdf 
71 For the whole text, see note 15 
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too ambitious. While the EU was discovering the potential of its trade and regulatory 
apparatus72, the US were already insisting in tackling many issues at the same time in order to 
leave no window of opportunity for cheating once the relationship was put in place. The 
consequences of this attitude were to be experimented in the following period. As Meunier 
makes clear, diverging opinions on the conduct of trade negotiations may have been an 
important brake to the development of trade relations until a common understanding, shared 
imperatives and joint facilitating dialogues have been put in place73. 
 
2.1.2: 1995-1999 
This timeframe was characterized by the implementation efforts to make the renewed 
partnership an effective and powerful tool in the hands of policy-makers. Agreements grew in 
magnitude and scope, and two key issues were debated: on the one hand, the need for 
cooperation at the non-state level, which led to the birth of many dialogues, some successful, 
some not (Transatlantic Environmental Dialogue and the Transatlantic Labour Dialogue). On 
the other hand, how to strengthen the push for regulatory convergence. Apparently, not all 
the efforts were directed in the right direction. The differences between regulatory 
achievements and expectations were staggering.  
Six main events were held in this period, all of them were accompanied by texts, legal reviews, 
legal scrubbings, but small substance. Many hopes were on the NTA Senior Level Working 
Group, which worked hard for almost two years before ending up being a failure in the long 
                                                            
72 Many insights can be taken from the most authoritative source on trade policy achievements, namely the WTO 
Trade Policy Review Body, which in 1995 stated that: “Trade data relevant to the period demonstrate that the EC 
has remained one of the most open of all major economies: on the basis of the percentage of GDP contributed 
by trade in goods and services, the EC (with a fairly consistent 22 to 25% of its GDP derived from such trade 
through the last 15 years) is more open than the USA (whose figure rose to just above 20% in 1980, and is still at 
21-22% a decade later) or, above all, Japan (whose figure has sharply declined since the early eighties to a low of 
16%)”. See http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp10_e.htm 
73 Meunier, S. (2006), “What Single Voice? European Institutions and EU-U.S. Trade Negotiations”, International 
Organization, Vol. 54, No. 1, pp. 105 
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run74. The meetings, as it will be outlined in 2.1.2.2, covered a broad range of issues in trade 
and economic affairs, from the most important “Singapore issues”75 to the less relevant 
common initiatives at the business level, such as the TABD76.  
The first real initiative for the launch of the NTA came by Germany and Chancellor Helmut 
Kohl’s proposed comprehensive treaty in 1992. President Clinton, European Commission 
President Jacques Delors and Chancellor Kohl himself launched then “three working groups” 
at the EU-US summit in July 1994 in Berlin. There was no sense yet that the transatlantic 
relationship would have been different from that moment onwards. The groups were 
primarily the creation of Bernhard Zepter, assistant to Jacques Delors, Joachim Bittelrich, 
National Security Advisor to Chancellor Kohl, and Under-Secretary for Political Affairs Peter 
Tarnoff. In order to avoid creating another layer of bureaucracy and to assuage French 
concerns about Washington’s insinuation into EU policy-making, the Commission, the 
German Preisdency and the US agreed that the working groups (WGs) would have the limited 
mandate of preparing the agenda for the following EU-US summit in Washington. After that, 
the WGs would have been disbanded77.  
Some EU Member States had urged that the full troika (Germany, France and Greece, 
rotating Presidencies of the Council of the European Union) represent the EU in the working 
groups; the Commission had put pressure in favour of holding the meetings in a trilateral 
format because it would diminish the representation of the Member States and thereby 
                                                            
74 The events were held in June 1996, December 1996, December 1997, May 1998, December 1998, December 
1999. There were no meetings in the spring of 1996 and 1999. 
75 The first WTO ministerial conference, which was held in Singapore in 1996 established permanent working 
groups on four issues: transparency in government procurement, trade facilitation (customs issues), trade and 
investment, and trade and competition. These became known as the Singapore issues. These issues were pushed 
at successive Ministerials by the European Union, Japan and Korea, and opposed by most developing countries. 
Since no agreement was reached, the developed nations pushed that any new trade negotiations must include 
these issues 
76 The original text was rather brief: “Support our business communities in this important joint endeavor and 
encourage a successful plenary session to be convened in the United States in November”. See 
http://1997-2001.state.gov/www/regions/eur/eu/960606_slgrpt.html 
77 The speech by President Clinton is available here: 
 http://www.culturaldiplomacy.org/academy/index.php?en_tar_bill-clinton-visit-to-berlin. The visit marked also 
the occasion to revive US-Germany relations, which had suffered from various consequences after the fall of the 
Berlin Wall 
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enhance its ability to act as the EU’s foreign policy voice. The NTA was then a reaction to 
these WGs, which were mainly security-focused. Leaders saw and realized that the way 
towards a clearer relationship could not imply a rethinking of security relations. 
How to assess the path towards the NTA then? Was it a positive sign of cooperative 
endeavours or has it be judged negatively? It depends on the point of view: with regards to the 
issue of transatlantic standards, for example, it became more important to firms engaged in 
transatlantic trade to evaluate regulatory inefficiencies for two primary reasons. First, as 
transatlantic tariff barriers decreased, firms became more concerned with what they termed 
duplicative regulatory compliance costs. They pressed for their removal. This pressure 
increased with rising transatlantic investment, since divergent US and EU standards and 
certification requirements most directly affect transatlantic corporate groups, and these groups 
more easily co-ordinate lobbying on both sides of the Atlantic. 
Second, when the EU moved towards a single market, US firms challenged that the EU was 
erecting a “fortress Europe” in which member states would use common “single market” 
standards and certification procedures to prejudice US competition78. US firms feared that 
they would be disadvantaged because, under the EU's “global approach”, only notified bodies 
located within the EC could test and certify products for marketing in the EC. Prior to the 
“global approach”, US-based laboratories acted as subcontractors for the testing of products 
under member state standards, and firms feared that this option might be foreclosed. In 
response to these developments, US and EC authorities began to address seriously issues of 
regulatory co-ordination at the beginning of the 1990s. Therefore, what drove forward 
regulatory integration was fear rather than a real will to lower regulatory burdens. This episode 
will be of particular importance in Part 3. 
 
                                                            
78 See Ellen L. Frost (Peterson Institute for International Economics) testimony before the Subcommittee on 
Trade of the United States House of Representatives Ways and Means Committee: 
http://www.iie.com/publications/testimony/print.cfm?ResearchId=286&doc=pub 
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2.1.2.1: NTA 
In a Communication from the EU Commission to the Council, entitled “Europe and the US: 
A Way Forward” 79 , the Commission also affirmed the importance of linking political, 
economic and security concerns as advocated by the TPN. Therefore, it looked as if the 
European side had been influenced by the US side in the agenda-setting around the proposed 
transatlantic agreement.  
Although in its communication, the EU Commission called for the creation of a Transatlantic 
Economic Space (TES), it stopped short of embracing the proposed transatlantic free trade 
area, arguing that further technical studies have to be carried out and precede any meaningful 
analysis of its feasibility80. Whereas previous transatlantic summits since the adoption of the 
TD in 1990 had not been able to achieve any meaningful results, the Madrid Summit of 
December 1995 saw the adoption of the New Transatlantic Agenda (NTA), which was to lay 
out a blueprint for future EU-US relations in a variety of areas of common concern, covering 
the political, social, security and economic realms81. The NTA, informed by both TPN reports 
and the Commission communication to the Council, set out to advance transatlantic 
cooperation in areas, which needed further clarification to advance in a coherent manner. 
These areas, namely “Promoting peace and stability, democracy and development around the 
world; Responding to global challenges; Contributing to the expansion of world trade and 
closer economic relations; Building bridges across the Atlantic”82, were further delineated by 
the Joint EU-US Action Plan, which consisted of a number of sectors where to intervene at 
the transatlantic level.  
It is important to stress at this stage two main issues: first of all, that the NTA was too broad 
and general to have a real impact on the conduct of transatlantic relations. It required, then, 
                                                            
79 Commission to the European Communities, Europe and the US: the way forward, Communication from the 
Commission of the European Communities to the Council, COM (95) 411 final, 26 July 1995, available here: 
http://aei.pitt.edu/4326/01/001198 1.pdf (last accessed 24/07/2014) 
80 Ibidem, pp. 11-12. 
81 They were also the achievements so far of the Transatlantic Policy Network, as it can be inferred by their own 
words: http://www.tpnonline.org/achievements.html 
82 For the whole text of the NTA, http://useu.usmission.gov/new_transatlantic_agenda.html 
	   38	  
continuous specifications and clarifications. Secondly, the realm of trade was particularly 
tackled: in a dedicated section, there was a reference to a common transatlantic trade area, and 
to the strengthening of the multilateral trading system. This is of particular importance, since 
the beginning of the post-Cold War era had left the international trade system unresolved. The 
launch of the WTO in 1994 marked the momentum it had gained by the mid-1990s. Among 
the provisions enumerated on the topic of trade, there were the revitalization of WTO, a 
constructive engagement in the Uruguay Round and the focus on financial services83. In the 
economic sphere, the NTA called for the creation of a “New Transatlantic Marketplace” 
(NTM) by “progressively reducing or eliminating barriers that hinder the flow of goods, 
services and capital” between the United States and the European Union. It was the first time 
the ambiguous concept of a NTM was introduced within a summit document.  
 
2.1.2.2: Joint Action Plan (JAP) and meetings at the turn of the century 
The resurgence of certain topics in the last twenty years’ official documents shows that many 
issues are far from being resolved84. A Joint Action Plan (JAP) between the EU and the US 
later that year contained other issues such as Government procurement, IPRs and Market 
access. What was new and striking in the NTA was certainly the reference to a New 
Transatlantic Marketplace, an issue that was raised for the first time in 1995. Alongside many 
common references to studies and confidence-building measures that are typical of these 
agreements, there was an important feature that went unnoticed for some time. The role of 
regulatory cooperation was particularly stressed, especially when the text said:  
We will strengthen regulatory cooperation, in particular by 
encouraging regulatory agencies to give a high priority to 
cooperation with their respective transatlantic counterparts, so as to 
                                                            
83 The history of transatlantic cooperation in financial services is noteworthy: nowadays, according to leaked 
documents from the Commission and USTR representatives, the EU refused to advance the topic of financial 
services in negotiations because it was meant to block further negotiations. See: 
http://www.euractiv.com/sections/euro-finance/financial-services-table-next-round-ttip-talks-302808 
84 Documents are now available on both US and EU websites. For a more detailed reflection on official 
documents and single case-studies, see Chapter 6 
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address technical and other nontariff barriers to trade resulting from 
divergent regulatory processes. We will especially encourage a 
collaborative approach between the EU and the U.S. in testing and 
certification procedures by promoting greater compatibility of 
standards and health and safety related measures. To this end, we 
will seek to develop pilot cooperative projects85. 
 
It is clear that hardly few of these suggested measures were implemented. In any case, two 
features may represent a trait d’union in the development of these early attempts of cooperative 
endeavours. 
First of all, the emphasis that was placed on delegation of regulatory authority to specific 
agencies on both sides. This does not mean that real delegation happened. Delegating 
regulatory powers always implies a delegation of leverages. Executives delegate only where 
necessary, and only when forced to do so by compelling arguments and overarching 
interests86. The case of the transatlantic partnership is unique: while the EU shows a much 
stronger sense of responsibility when delegating to regulatory agencies87, the US employs 
many different agencies to carry on both internal and external policies. This means that the 
conduct of the transatlantic relationship entails a twofold distinction: on the one side, 
delegation means the loss of a great amount of knowledge and expertise among those who 
shape policies. On the other side, this loss of knowledge is combined with a push towards 
greater efforts to establish new dialogues. But the main problem remains: tasking regulatory 
agencies with quasi-executive powers creates many troubles for both the agent and the 
principal.  
Secondly, by 1998 the greatest success of the NTA process in the economic sphere had been 
in the field of regulatory cooperation, resulting in a number of agreements in the course of 
1997: an EC/US Agreement on Drug Precursors; an EC/US Customs and Co-operation 
                                                            
85 Joint Action Plan is available at this link: http://eeas.europa.eu/us/docs/joint_eu_us_action_plan_95_en.pdf. 
See Appendix 
86 The European Union is the best example in this case. See Franchino, F. (2004), “Delegating powers in the 
European Community”, British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 34, pp. 269–293 
87 See the case of ACER: Hancher, L., de Hauteclocque, A. (2010), “Manufacturing the EU Energy Markets: The 
Current Dynamics of Regulatory Practice”, Competition & Regulation Network Industry, Vol. 11, p. 307 
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Agreement; and an EU/US General Mutual Recognition Agreements covering 
telecommunications, equipment, electromagnetic compatibility, electrical safety, recreational 
craft, medical devices, and pharmaceuticals88. Bilateral relations between the US and the EU 
had remained strained, however, not least because of a variety of agricultural disputes related 
to biotechnology, and the passing of the Helms-Burton and D’Amato Acts in the US that 
threatened to penalise non-US companies which maintained normal trade relations with Cuba, 
Iran and Libya respectively.  
The “implementation period” can at this point be assessed fruitfully. In order to understand it 
better, it could be useful to use three variables that are interesting for an analysis of 
transatlantic partnership agreements and environments. The first variable is the intervention 
of private actors, while the second one deals with the responsiveness of governmental offices 
and agencies to private actors’ actions. The third one is of different nature and concerns the 
“high-levelness” of political meetings. Therefore, the variables regard the effects of NSAs on 
the interstate relations and, from the opposite perspective, how interstate negotiations shaped 
or helped shaping the attitude of private networks at the transatlantic level. This issue will be 
dealt more specifically in Chapter 4, but it may be useful to start developing here a brief 
elaboration of NSAs activity and influence in order to better understand the following lines.  
As the last paragraphs show, during the early phase of the transatlantic relationship there was 
no strong commitment from private actors. This may seem apodictic, but it is very much close 
to reality. Agreements were signed mostly at the intergovernmental level, between DG Trade 
and United States Trade Representative (USTR), where for the first time special units to deal 
with the transatlantic partner were established89.  
Following the signing of the NTA in 1995, a group of prominent, mainly conservative, voices 
from both sides of the Atlantic, including Kissinger, George Shultz, Thatcher, Helmut 
                                                            
88 Pollack, M., (2005), op. cit., p. 908. 
89 Mueftueler Baç, M., Cihangir, D. (2012), “European integration and transatlantic relations”, Transworld Working 
Paper 05, p. 4 
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Schmidt, and John O’Sullivan made another high-profile attempt to deepen transatlantic ties 
and reinvigorate the partnership that had outlasted the Cold War90. The result was the launch 
of the New Atlantic Initiative (NAI) in May 1996 at the Congress of Prague and its launch as a 
public policy research centre with a base at the American Enterprise Institute later in the same 
year.  
It is particularly significant to notice how the transatlantic partnership underwent a relaunch 
thanks to a politically-oriented coalition of personalities. It may take an entire whole study to 
investigate the ideology of “transatlantic relations”, especially in the 1990s, when the liberal 
ideal seemed at its highest. The patrons of this initiative were Henry Kissinger, Peter Schmidt, 
Margaret Thatcher, José María Aznar, Leszek Balcerowicz, Václav Havel, and George Shultz91. 
Prominent members of the NAI’s international advisory board have included, among others, 
John Bolton, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Josef Joffe, Rupert Murdoch, John O'Sullivan, Colin 
Powell, Peter Rodman, Donald Rumsfeld, William Kristol, and Robert Zoellick. The 
initiative’s goal has been “[…] The establishment of free trade between an enlarged European 
Union and the North American Free Trade Area as a complement to strengthening global free 
trade”92. The regional focus is a recurrent feature in the transatlantic partnership, and a brief 
focus on the influence of regionalism will be in Chapter 3.  
 
2.1.3: 2000-2004 
The 1990s can then be said to have seen both significant advancements on the road towards 
transatlantic economic integration and significant problems. Comprehensive consultation 
mechanisms at all levels of society had been established and existing obstacles to the creation 
                                                            
90 P. Rodman, “Atlantic celebration (Congress of Prague meeting addresses the political climate of Central 
Europe)”, National Review, June 1996, available on the Internet: http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi 
m1282/is /ai 18352667 
91 Some of these personalities are recurring throughout transatlantic relations history, showing a convinced 
commitment on the reasons of fostering trade between the EU and the US 
92 New Atlantic Initiative, based at the American Enterprise Institute: 
 http://www.aei.org/research/nai/about/projectID.11/default.asp 
	   42	  
of an open and barrier-free transatlantic marketplace had been effectively identified. 
Furthermore, some progress had already been made in the field of regulatory harmonisation. 
However, the agreements reached during the 1990s and especially the way in which they were 
reached had highlighted yet again the severity of obstacles that the end of the Cold War has 
created for the transatlantic partnership. As already mentioned, the main criticism that has 
been levelled against the initiatives of the 1990s is the lack of political will displayed on all 
sides. Whereas the Americans were more concerned with advancing regional free trade 
agreements with Mexico and Canada through the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA)93, with most of the Americas through the Free Trade Area of the Americas 
(FTAA)94, and with deepening its ties with East Asia through the Asia Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC)95, Europe was preoccupied with enlargement to the East and with 
deepening its internal structures. In the light of these major policy challenges, the level of 
institutionalisation achieved in transatlantic relations and the groundwork laid for future 
transatlantic economic integration should not be underestimated. In January 2001, George W. 
Bush took over the US Presidency, replacing the outgoing Clinton Administration. Despite 
various skirmishes between Europe and the US during the Clinton Presidency such as over 
the handling of the Kosovo crisis and in the form of various trade conflicts, most notably 
over the Boeing-McDonnell Douglas merger and over the EU’s banana imports policies, 
relations between the EU and the US under Clinton have usually been described as 
cooperative and friendly.  
European attitudes towards Bush had already been negative even prior to him taking office, 
only to further deteriorate in the years succeeding the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. 
In July 2001, soon after Bush was sworn into office, the EU Commission blocked General 
Electric’s anticipated acquisition of Honeywell International, on the grounds that the merger 
                                                            
93 http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/north-american-free-trade-agreement-nafta 
94 http://www.ftaa-alca.org/alca_e.asp 
95 http://www.apec.org 
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would have impeded competition in the aerospace industry, highlighting once more the need 
for closer convergence in antitrust standards on both sides of the Atlantic. At the EU-US 
summit in Washington in 2002, a year after the 9/11 attacks on the United States, the Positive 
Economic Agenda (PEA) was announced96. Based on the Transatlantic Economic Partnership 
(TEP) initiative of 1998, “Guidelines on Regulatory Cooperation and Transparency” had been 
prepared97. The Guidelines, which had been endorsed at the summit, aimed at advancing and 
consolidating consultations between EU and US regulators and “to improve cooperation and 
to promote transparency when developing new and amending existing technical regulations”98. 
The PEA launched regulatory cooperation projects in the fields of cosmetics, auto safety, 
nutritional labelling, food additives, metrology and financial services99. It explicitly focused on 
areas of cooperation where enough goodwill already existed to achieve results. The 2002 
summit and the TEP were thus primarily geared towards achieving small but measurable 
progress and as a symbol for the continued willingness of both sides to work towards the 
                                                            
96 “[The PEA was] designed to promote transatlantic co-operation by focusing on areas where there is goodwill 
on both sides to achieve upstream convergence and/or mutual recognition of rules, standards etc. in areas where 
considerable gains can be sought. This is particularly important at a time of increased uncertainty on the 
international scene. Fundamentally the PEA provides a framework in which the EU and the U.S. can set new 
objectives, start negotiations, or increase the momentum of existing dialogues so as to increase the effectiveness 
of their co-operation”. See here for more information:  
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/june/tradoc_114066.pdf (last accessed 23/07/2014) 
97 DG Enterprise and Industry was in charge of drafting the final text of the Guidelines, that can be accessed 
here: 
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/international/files/guidelines3_en.pdf (last accessed 23/07/2014) 
98 “[The objectives are:] Improve the planning and developing of regulatory proposals, leverage resources for 
regulations development, improve the quality and level of technical regulations, pursue, as appropriate, 
harmonized, equivalent or compatible solutions, and take appropriate steps to minimize or, where appropriate, 
eliminate unnecessary divergence in regulations through a more systematic dialogue between regulators, involving 
increased cooperation at all phases of the regulations development process; Promote public participation through 
disclosure of and access to supporting documents, particularly the timely release of the supporting rationales, 
analyses and data for regulatory proposals, and a timely opportunity for all interested parties, both domestic and 
non-domestic, to provide meaningful comments concerning regulatory proposals, including supporting materials; 
Obtain from each other and interested parties the benefit of the expertise, perspectives and ideas for alternative 
approaches, and of a fuller identification of unintended effects and practical problems associated with regulatory 
proposals, thereby promoting the adoption of technical regulations that are more performance-oriented and cost-
effective and have fewer adverse effects; Provide public explanations for technical regulations, including the 
technical information and major regulatory alternatives considered, the analyses performed, the potential impacts 
on consumers, regulated parties, and others identified, the criteria applied to guide decision-making, and the 
consideration given to the public comments;”. The insistence on the “public” and on the public diplomacy 
efforts to make the endeavours open to everyone are a symptom of the growing involvement of civil society in 
the process. See ivi, p. 23-24 
99 C. P. Ries, (2003) “U.S.-EU Cooperation on Regulatory Affairs”, US Department of State, Testimony before 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Subcommittee on European Affairs, Washington D.C., available here 
: http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/2003/25471.htm 
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further reduction of non-tariff barriers to trade and investment between them. In the two 
years preceding the 2004 EU-US summit, some major developments occurred. In 2003, the 
US-led war in Iraq had broken out, damaging relations between the US and the EU in an 
unprecedented manner. Germany and France refused to back US unilateral actions in Iraq and 
opposed the subsequent invasion within the Security Council. This refusal to back US military 
actions in Iraq led Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld to denounce America’s long-term allies as 
the “old Europe”, while speaking approvingly of states such as Spain and Poland, which had 
backed the US war effort, as the “new Europe”. Rumsfeld was hence indicating that the US 
was to end its historic support for European integration and had set out to divide Europe, 
entering into ad-hoc bilateral alliances with European states holding favourable views of US 
policies. Yet, already in the run-up to the 2004 summit which took place in Ireland, the EU 
and the US seemed willing to improve the strained relationship and move beyond 
disagreements over the Iraq war. Some major attempts were made to inject new life into the 
project of transatlantic economic integration and especially the Atlanticist lobby around TPN 
sought to exploit the momentum, publishing the widely distributed 2003 report “A Strategy to 
Strengthen Transatlantic Partnership”. This report called for the EU and US leaders to revive 
their endeavour to create a transatlantic market, ideally by 2015100. The TPN also tried to gain 
political support for its plan by presenting its report at an event entitled “EU-US Forum: The 
Transatlantic Market by 2015”, which it co-organised with the Centre for European Policy 
Studies101. Furthermore, the European Parliament adopted a draft resolution on EU-US 
relations which was visibly influenced by the TPN report102. The TABD, which had been 
revived prior to the summit after becoming more or less inactive during the preceding years, 
                                                            
100 Accessible here, last accessed 23/07/2014 
http://www.tpnonline.org/WP/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/Strategy_to_Strengthen_TA_Partnership.pdf  
101 http://www.ceps.eu/content/eu-us-forum-transatlantic-market-2015  
102 European Parliament resolution on the state of the Transatlantic Partnership on the eve of the EU-US 
Summit in Dublin on 25-26 June 2004, 22 April 2004, available here: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/omk/omnsapir.so/pv2?PRG=CALDOC&FILE=20040422&LANGUE=EN&
TPV=PROV&LASTCHAP=34&SDOCTA=25&TXTLST=1&Type Doc=FIRST&POS=1 (last accessed 
24/07/2014) 
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had also been asked to prepare a report for the upcoming summit, in which it repeated the call 
for the establishment of a barrier-free transatlantic market. Taking into consideration all these 
initiatives in the run-up to the summit, the summit itself was again characterised by the 
absence of any visionary statements or proposals: “A Roadmap for EU-U.S. Regulatory 
Cooperation and Transparency” was agreed in order to advance the goals laid out in the 
Guidelines on Regulatory Cooperation and Transparency which were introduced during the 
2002 summit103; the attendants repeated their intention to seriously work towards further 
transatlantic economic integration, spurring innovation and job creation, and realising the 
competitive potential of their respective economies; and at the end of the summit, the EU and 
US signed an agreement concerning the compatibility and use of the satellite-based navigation 
systems GALILEO and GPS. Also in 2004, an independent study was commissioned by the 
EU to assess the almost ten year history of institutional relations between the EU and the US 
based on the NTA, and to determine its successes and failures104.  
The study found that the most significant shortcomings of the transatlantic economic 
integration project thus far have been, first of all, a lack of political commitment, which limits 
its capacity to contain issues and means that when major problems arise – such as 
Boeing/Airbus – there is no expectation that they will be addressed in the NTA dialogue. 
Secondly, its low public profile, particularly in the United States, and its image as a 
technocratic exercise. Thirdly and finally, its overabundance of process, which is 
disproportionate to actual output of the transatlantic partnership. The NTA process generally 
and EU–US MRAs specifically highlight problems endemic to transgovernmental institutions 
and networked governance. Implementation failures in several goods sectors covered under 
the 1997 framework MRA, as well as a separate Veterinary Equivalency Agreement (on animal 
                                                            
103 Roadmap for EU-US Regulatory Cooperation and Transparency, June 2004, available: 
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/World Regions/Europe Middle East/Transatlantic Dialogue/asset upload file24 
2 5679.pdf (last accessed: 19/06/2014) 
104 European Commission, (2005), “Review of the Framework for Relations between the European Union and 
the United States, An Independent Study commissioned by the European Commission”, available:  
http://www.statewatch.org/news/2007/dec/eu-us-relations-study.pdf (19/06/2014) 
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standards), demonstrate the veracity of Joshua Cohen and Charles Sabel’s (2006) contention 
that the right actors have to be ‘at the table’. That is, successful regulatory co-operation 
requires that those best equipped to understand what problem they are trying to solve come 
together before they can learn how to solve it. The trade-driven NTA process failed initially to 
consider the friction that would ensue from not bringing independent US regulatory agencies 
to the table from the outset (Steffenson 2005b). More generally, substantive policy 
convergence is by no means the norm or a natural consequence of regulatory processes on 
both sides. As such, many of the so-called ‘deliverables’ produced by the NTA are merely 
joint statements or minimalist acts of co-ordination, such as parallel EU–US information 
campaigns targeting trafficking in persons. The 2005 review of the NTA framework tried to 
determine how much actual policy convergence had been achieved. Using both archive and 
interview material, it concluded that goals had been met on around 45% of all issues outlined 
in the NTA’s original (1995) Joint Action Plan. Some progress had been made on another 
33% of such issues. In particular, competition policy co-operation was hailed as a success (see 
also Kovacic 2005; Whytock 2005). The high-level Political Dialogue on Border and 
Transportation Security (PDBTS)105 created after 9/11 was highlighted as an institutional 
rather than strictly policy success, since it created a more technical and specialised structure 
for information exchange on homeland security issues than previously existed. 
Think tanks, policy-makers, politicians and many other actors tried to coalesce during the early 
2000s in order to influence the way transatlantic relations were evolving106. As it has been 
shown previously, economic and trade relations in this period have suffered from the 
diverging views on the importance to give to certain factors instead of others.  
                                                            
105 http://ec.europa.eu/transport/themes/international/bilateral_cooperation/usa_en.htm  
106 Building coalition among advocacy acotrs is a typical feature of the early 2000s: for a reframing of the issue, 
see the interesting theory of Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF), aimed at grasping the intersection among 
many interacting actors in a given policy field: here the link for all the publications applying this theoretical 
framework: 
http://www.ucdenver.edu/academics/colleges/SPA/BuechnerInstitute/Centers/WOPPR/ACF/Pages/Advoca
cyCoalitionFramework.aspx 
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Three main consequences for the years to follow are particularly relevant: first of all, players 
did not realize completely the advancements they had reached through negotiations and 
agreements107. Secondly, they failed to combine together networks and actors, which shared 
the same interests and goals, mainly due to the fact that they thought of themselves in 
competitive terms rather than cooperative. Thirdly, trade strategies differed too much to allow 
both EU and US to employ common guiding principles and lines in their partnership. What 
really continued to push forward economic integration was the power private actors had 
acquired. In an attempt to shape transatlantic policies that had no comparison whatsoever, 
every forum for dialogue claimed its part in the process. The weakness of WTO bodies, the 
resurgence of trade protectionism in many countries and the attention diverted towards 
security concerns were sufficient to block the entire mechanism. Things would have improved 
a few years later. 
  
2.1.4: 2005-2008 
Setting out to significantly improve transatlantic relations, Chancellor Angela Merkel made it a 
priority of Germany’s EU Council presidency starting in January 2007 to inject new life into 
the transatlantic economic integration initiative. Chancellor Merkel embraced the idea of 
creating a barrier-free transatlantic market to improve the US’s and Europe’s competitiveness 
in the global market108. TPN again seized the moment and made a renewed attempt to push 
for the creation of a barrier-free transatlantic market in its 2007 report “Completing the 
Transatlantic Market”. The TPN took up the idea that a top-down approach was needed to 
complement the bottom-up, building-block approach employed so far, and pleaded once 
more for the completion of the transatlantic marketplace by 2015. TPN members and EU 
                                                            
107 The European Union and the United States Initiative to Enhance Transatlantic Economic Integration and 
Growth, June 2005, available here: 
http://ec.europa.eu/external relations/us/sum06 05/declarations/eco.pdf (last accessed 24/07/2014) 
108 Former US Ambassador to Germany William R. Timken, Jr. addressed the meeting clearly: 
http://germany.usembassy.gov/timken_112607.html 
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parliamentarians Elmar Brok and Erika Mann provided another impetus to the TPN initiative 
through two reports to the EU Parliament in early 2006109. Their reports were subsequently 
adopted by the European Parliament and issued as resolutions later in the same year110. In 
April 2007, the European Union (EU) and the United States (US) agreed a new Framework 
for Advancing Transatlantic Economic Integration (FATEI) at the annual EU-US summit111. 
The framework’s stated aim has been to enhance the global competitiveness of the US and the 
EU in light of mounting pressures of globalisation and to encourage other nations to follow 
their lead towards economic liberalisation. As conventional tariff barriers to trade in the 
transatlantic economy are already decreased – with notable exceptions in the agricultural and 
textiles markets – the main focus of the two economic giants has been on lowering and 
eventually eliminating non-tariff barriers to trade and investment by way of reforming their 
regulatory regimes and working towards the harmonisation or mutual recognition of 
standards. In order to monitor and facilitate progress in these areas, a new institution was 
created – The Transatlantic Economic Council (TEC) – with Günther Verheugen and Alan 
Hubbard as its co-chairs. Moreover, so-called Lighthouse Priority Projects have been 
identified in the FATEI on which the work of the TEC should initially focus112.  
                                                            
109 E. Brok, Report on Improving EU-US Relations in the Framework of a Transatlantic Partnership Agreement, 
8 May 2006, available here: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=- 
//EP//NONSGML+REPORT+A6-2006-0173+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN&language=EN; E. Mann, Report 
on EU-US Transatlantic Economic Relations, 20 April 2006, available here: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+REPORT+A6-2006- 
0131+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN&language=EN (both last accessed on 10/05/2014) 
110 European Parliament Resolution on Improving EU-US Relations in the Framework of a Transatlantic 
Partnership Agreement, 1 June 2006, available on the Internet: http://eurlex. 
europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2006:298E:0226:0235:EN:PDF; and European Parliament 
Resolution on EU-US Transatlantic Economic Relations, 1 June 2006, available on the Internet: http://eurlex. 
europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2006:298E:0235:0249:EN:PDF (both last accessed on 
10/05/2014) 
111 http://www.eeas.europa.eu/us/docs/framework_trans_economic_integration07_en.pdf  
112 Intellectual Property Rights, Secure trade, Financial Markets. Innovation and Technology were the areas. 
“[The two partners shall] 1) Conduct a high-level conference on innovation in health-related industries and a 
workshop on best practices in innovation policies; 2) Develop a joint framework for cooperation on 
identification and development of best  practices for Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) technologies and 
develop a work plan to promote the interoperability of electronic health record systems; 3) Develop a science-
based work plan for EU-U.S. collaboration on innovative and eco-efficient biobased products; 4) Establish a 
joint research infrastructure for mouse functional genomics (following a joint meeting in 2007 in Belgium); 5) 
Sponsor joint workshops or conferences to foster the exchange of information on nanotechnology in areas of 
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The FATEI adopted at the 2007 summit has so far been the last high-level attempt made to 
advance the goal of a barrier-free transatlantic market. Since it has created a new institution 
with the Transatlantic Economic Council, it has also represented one of the more significant 
agreements of recent years and has indeed managed to inject new political momentum into the 
process of achieving an integrated transatlantic market. The agreement coincided with a 
period of intensified transatlantic discord that has its roots in the disagreements over the Iraq 
war and the US “global war on terrorism” policy. 
 
2.2: Definitions: alignment or partnership?  
Which kind of relationship is the one between the United States and the European Union? If 
we want to theoretically define the “alignment” between the two partners, we shall look at 
historically grounded reasons for cooperation. To find an exclusive definition of this process 
is either useless and prevents the researchers from acquiring a better understanding through 
the lens of formal logical reasoning. First of all, I am sketching the differences between terms, 
which are used in the context of interstate cooperation (or, as in this case, cooperation 
between an international organization and a nation-, yet federal, state): alignment and 
partnership. Each of these terms conveys structural analytical tools that may be useful for 
developing a theory of transatlantic governance113. In order to define the range of typologies 
that the term alignment encompasses, it is useful to draw on Adler and Barnett (1998), Walt 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
mutual interest. E. Investment. Establish a regular dialogue to address obstacles to investment”. See Appendix 
for further reference 
113 The term cooperation itself could be defined in many different forms. For the sake of this analysis, I will draw 
on Stein’s account of why nations cooperate. Although theories based on realism and liberalism come to 
contradictory conclusions about the prospects for international cooperation, their analyses are derived from a set 
of shared assumptions about the nature of international relations. Stein argues that these core assumptions about 
the autonomous self-interested behavior of states in an anarchic international system are consistent not only with 
conflict but with cooperation. He reassesses the implications of these assumptions and concludes that stronger 
possibilities for bilateral cooperation exist than would be expected by either liberals or realists. Stein illuminates 
the ways in which strategic interaction analysis may be used to integrate the individual, the state, and the system 
in the study of international relations. See Stein, A. (1990), Why Nations Cooperate? Circumstance and Choice in 
International Relations. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990. But also Stein, A. (1993), “Governments, 
Economic Interdependence, and International Cooperation”, in Behavior, Society, and International Conflict, vol. 3, 
pp. 241–324 
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(2009) and Wilkins (2012). When it comes to collaboration towards a common goal, what is 
the highest achievable level of contacts? What is furthermore the highest desirable? The 
authors try to reach a consensus on an agreed epistemological basis upon which to build up 
their research. I will exclude the term “alliance” from this chapter, since it includes a security 
bias that does not allow for a better framing of the argument114.  
 
2.2.1: Alignment: 
For the sake of this dissertation, two terms need an attempt of definition here: on the one 
hand, I define “alignment” as a “mutually reinforcing and path-dependent strategy established 
by reciprocally trusting partners”115. Even if pursued by actors that share a common goal, 
cooperation has a plain meaning in terms of its “mutual adjustment” rather than simply 
“common interests”. EU-US relations are the typical example of a cooperative environment 
where mutual gains depend on preferences. These preferences have varied little in the last 
twenty years. Yet, transatlantic relations have not been as successful as expected. Alignment 
has been widely used by scholars to tackle hermeneutical difficulties. It has a broad range of 
meanings, yet this subject needs a deeper and more structured reflection. Two characteristics 
of this term are particularly relevant: first of all, its all-encompassing nature. Alignment will be 
used in Chapter 3 and in the empirical parts to address generally a sense of community and 
common positions across the Atlantic. More specifically, in the theoretical Chapter I will refer 
to alignment when dealing with Realism, since it has the general meaning this theory 
necessitates of. When there will be more details on the cooperative efforts by different actors, 
other terms will be used, in order not to create confusion. The Chapter on public opinion 
                                                            
114 Walt defines “alliance” as “[…] a formal (or informal) commitment for security cooperation between two or 
more states, intended to augment each member’s power, security, and/or influence”. Leaving aside the clear 
realist approach of the author, it is clear that “alliances” should not be allowed to enter the already difficult 
terrain of the analysis. For a liberal view of the term alliance, see Ikenberry, G. J. (2001), After Victory. Institutions, 
Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars, Princeton, Princeton University Press 
115  Ikenberry defines cooperation as “’mutual adjustment’ rather than simply ‘common interests’” in the 
masterpiece cited supra. My definition here is more ambitious, even if less exhaustive 
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research will be based upon data and interviews, which come from different sources. This 
definition must be borne in mind, since the term will be used in different senses, but only the 
closest to its meaning will be used. 
 
2.2.2: Partnership: 
On the other hand, “partnership” entails a deeper set of meanings: as pure indicative 
examples, the EU has ongoing strategic partnerships with many actors116, but not all of them 
share the same traits of the one with the US. The use of this term by the EU has typically been 
a sign of a better relationship with the targeted country. The use of strategic partnership 
instead of regional trade agreements is in fact a growing issue117. Therefore, a sole definition 
does not exist. It may be better to find one that comes closer to reality. In this sense, I define 
partnership as a “commitment towards overcoming the transaction costs given by non-
cooperative behaviour”. The simplicity of this definition should not mask its subtlety: the 
need to avoid transaction costs is the main driver of integration. Under some respects, 
partnership differs from cooperation since it encompasses a whole sort of diverse meanings.  
What I intend to advance in this introductory part is a rather eccentric concept that may help 
in grasping the real meaning of what I intend to research: both cooperation and partnership 
have to be defined bearing in mind that the whole issue of achieving a common goal is 
inevitably eager to be transformed into a “trap”. Institutions need private actors in order to 
better enhance their perspectives on cooperation, while private actors need institutions in 
order to have access to information, leverages of power and broader views. By closing their 
ties inextricably, the two seem condemned to infinite tantalizations: the more they need each 
other, the harder it gets for them to really achieve a substantive result. This is the situation 
these definitions try to represent: in both of them, the terminology suggests that the need to 
                                                            
116 A project by Egmont, the Brussels-based think tank on international affairs, tries to map the EU’s relations 
with its strategic partners: http://strategicpartnerships.eu 
117 See Rigner, H., Soderbaum, F. (2010) “Mapping Interregionalism”, EU-Grasp WP series 
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pursue common policy goals is subjugated to trivial contingencies, like overcoming transaction 
costs in the relationship. 
2.2.3: Networks 
A final focus should be on the term “networks”: even though it has nothing to do specifically 
with the definition of “cooperation”, it possesses a strong and clear message, which is useful 
for the purposes of this research. They are related, in the sense that networks can not exist 
without cooperation, and sometimes cooperation implies the existence of networks. How to 
define them? “[Networks are] properties of persistent patterns of relations among agents that 
can define, enable, and constrain those agents”118. But a network is also defined as “a set of 
nodes that designate people, groups, institutions, or states and a rule that defines whether and 
how any two nodes are tied to each other”119 (Watts 2003, 27; Wasserman and Faust 1997, 20). 
We can define a relationship by a statement such as “lives next to,” “speaks the same language 
as,” or—in an international relations (IR) context—“is allied with,” “exports to,” “has 
diplomatic relations with,” and so forth. This relationship can be binary (yes/no), ordinal 
(level of alliance commitment, rank of diplomatic mission), or ratio level (e.g., “proportion of 
gross domestic product [GDP] due to export to,” “number of people killed in conflict with,” 
etc.). Such relationships can be symmetric or asymmetric. Networks can be displayed as 
graphs or as sociomatrices. I will use the concept of structural equivalence in social networks 
analysis to tap dyadic affinity. This concept rests on the distinction between direct similarity—
defined in terms of the links or 
ties between two states—and structural affinity—defined in terms of the similarity between 
the ties each state has with other states in the system.  
Therefore, the term “networks” at first sight might seem too vague, but in reality it comprises 
a good number of different meanings, which will be clearer with the analysis in Chapter 4.  
                                                            
118 Hafner-Burton, E., Kahler, M., Montgomery, A. (2009), “Network Analysis for International Relations”, 
International Organization, Vol. 63, N. 03, pp. 559-592 
119 Wasserman, S., Faust, K. (1994), Social Network Analysis: Methods and Applications, Cambridge University Press 
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2.3. Transatlantic dialogues: perfection as a moving target? 
Only figures and numbers can tell the truth on the magnitude of the EU-US relationship. In 
2012, $1,500.5 billion flowed between the United States and the EU on the current account, 
the most comprehensive measure of US trade flows. The EU as a unit is the largest 
merchandise trading partner of the United States. In 2012, the EU accounted for $265.1 
billion of total U.S. exports (or 17.1%) and for $380.8 billion of total U.S. imports (or 16.7%) 
for a U.S. trade deficit of $115.7 billion. The EU is also the largest U.S. trade partner when 
trade in services is added to trade in merchandise, accounting for $193.8 billion (or 30.7% of 
the total in U.S. services exports) and $149.7 billion (or 35.4% of total U.S. services imports) 
in 2012. In addition, in 2012, a net $150.0 billion flowed from U.S. residents to EU countries 
into direct investments, while a net $105.9 billion flowed from EU residents to direct 
investments in the United States120. These are just some of the figures that can explain the 
relevance of this subject. A diverse variety of new transatlantic institutions operating under the 
shorthand “NTA framework” fostered exchange and policy co-ordination across a range of 
issue areas, bringing governmental and non-governmental actors together at regular intervals 
as well as on an ad hoc basis. A series of agreed policy goals included the promotion of 
economic liberalisation and democracy, especially in central and eastern Europe. 
The NTA set the beginning of a new era in transatlantic relations. As it has been shown 
before, drawing on the TAD, the two partners decided to overcome their respective 
differences and put together a business-driven policy consensus. It escalated until the NTA 
was launched. As the NTA agreement mentions in its third part, “[…] We will strengthen 
regulatory cooperation, in particular by encouraging regulatory agencies to give a high priority 
to cooperation with their respective transatlantic counterparts, so as to address technical and 
                                                            
120 All data come from Cooper, W. (2014), “EU-U.S. Economic Ties: Framework, Scope and Magnitude”, CRS 
Report for Congress 
	   54	  
non-tariff barriers to trade resulting from divergent regulatory processes. We aim to conclude 
an agreement on mutual recognition of conformity assessment (which includes certification 
and testing procedures) for certain sectors as soon as possible”121. The broad range of issues, 
which were covered by the NTA, allows for a suspect into policy-makers’ real and concrete 
ambitions. The first paragraph deals with promoting stability, peace and democracy around 
the world. Why did the events not follow the path traced by the NTA? Was the realm of 
security and prosperity through democracy too broad to be achieved with a mere statement? It 
certainly may be. But once more, what needs to be stressed is that cooperation is neither 
achievable nor desirable if the partners don’t trust themselves enough to build up a 
comprehensive strategy122. Economy and trade turned out to be the most significant tools in 
order to create a longstanding cooperative environment.  
In the same year a Transatlantic Business Dialogue (TABD) was created, which set the pace 
for a rethinking of practices on international cooperation: as it has been noted, “[it] 
symbolizes an official recognition of the importance of the deepening transatlantic economic 
relationship”123. What makes it even more interesting is that the TABD was launched in 1995 
by highest-ranking institutional actors: on the one hand, by the EU Commission, represented 
by Commissioner Leon Brittan (Trade) and Commissioner Martin Bangemann (Industry). On 
the other side, by US Secretary of Commerce Ron Brown. Finally, it evolved and it has always 
lived as a purely private and autonomous corpus. The comparative assessment will deal with its 
specificities. Other dialogues are worth mentioning: the Transatlantic Legislators’ Dialogue 
                                                            
121 For the whole text of the NTA, see here: http://eeas.europa.eu/us/docs/new_transatlantic_agenda_en.pdf 
and notes 35 and 36 
122 An early attempt of this dissertation to evaluate the different institutionalization steps in the realm of security 
and economy was aborted given the scope, which would have been exceptionally too broad to conduct a 
coherent and interesting analysis. For useful remarks and early attempts to discover the relationship between 
security advancements and economic advancements, see Haass (1999) Bronstone (1998), Geipal and Manning 
(1996) and van den Broek (1993) 
123 VV.AA. (2005) The Future of Transatlantic Economic Relations: Continuity Amid Discord, Robert Schuman Centre for 
Advanced Studies European University Institute, p. 41 
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(TALD124, the Transatlantic Environment Dialogue (TAED)125, the Transatlantic Consumer 
Dialogue (TACD)126. A detailed assessment of the main five dialogues (TABD, TEC, TAED, 
TALD, TACD) is shown in the Appendix. The judgments in it are a summary of the three 
papers quoted in the note, and do not pretend to give any powerful explication. However, 
they may be useful to highlight how complex the web of institutions has become after the 
NTA. The main goal of this research can then be clearer with a reference to the main points 
of view of the transatlantic relationship, e.g. the environmental or the consumer ones. As it is 
self-evident from the table, not only business was represented by the numerous transatlantic 
dialogues. If a categorization is needed, it may be claimed that three broad categories are 
represented: civil society, business and legislators. The former two are at the core of this 
research and I will touch upon them later in the comparative analysis.. Aimed at pursuing 
better contacts right after the end of the Cold War, the TAD127 was launched officially as a 
means to propose “[…] policies aimed at achieving a sound world economy marked by 
sustained economic growth with low inflation, a high level of employment, equitable social 
conditions, in a framework of international stability; promote market principles, reject 
protectionism and expand, strengthen and further open the multilateral trading system”. The 
initial intent by the TAD was revived by the NTA in its fourth section, which is worth 
mentioning in (almost) its entirety hereafter:  
“[…] We recognise the need to strengthen and broaden public 
support for our partnership. To that end, we will seek to deepen the 
commercial, social, cultural, scientific and educational ties among 
our people. […] We will not be able to achieve these ambitious goals 
without the backing of our respective business communities. We 
                                                            
124 Established in 1999, it aims at strengthening legislative exchanges of best practices in regulating sectors, which 
were typically out of the scope of the NTA and the TAD. See the dedicated page on the European Parliament 
website: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/intcoop/tld/default_en.htm 
125 Established in 1999, it had a very short life, ending its activities in no more than a year. It collapsed when it 
finished its main function, i.e. presenting recommendations to American and European leaders on issues related 
to the environment. For a short overview of its main achievements, see 
http://ictsd.org/i/news/bridgesweekly/94845/ 
126 Launched in 1998, it has grown up until acquiring a permanent structure and an efficient coordination 
mechanism. It now comprises many consumers’ associations both from Europe and from the US. See the 
website for more information: http://tacd.org/about-tacd/ and also below, par. 5.1 
127 http://eeas.europa.eu/us/docs/trans_declaration_90_en.pdf 
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will support, and encourage the development of, the transatlantic 
business relationship, as an integral part of our wider efforts to 
strengthen our bilateral dialogue”. 
 
 This paragraph is highly related to the topic I am exploring since it contains in nuce the two 
relevant aspects of this analysis. Business community and civil society were then considered 
different, and their respective role in the process was everything but equal. As research on 
these issues has demonstrated128, business and non-state civil actors usually adopt two very 
different approaches, influenced mainly by three variables: capabilities, knowledge, attitude. 
With regards to capabilities, the difference between the two is striking. Business groups have 
totalled the highest amount of investments in lobbying efforts in the EU129, while consumer 
groups such as the TACD have historically granted themselves a voice in the transatlantic 
arena especially because they were “meant to receive some sort of attention”130. Resources are 
not comparable.  
This economic focus has in turn been reinforced by the maturation of the EU, which emerged 
during the late 1980s and early 1990s as the world's largest internal market and the most 
important trading partner of the US. Simultaneously with the development of the EU's 
internal market came the increasing influence of EU political institutions, including the 
European Commission (which plays a vital role in the EU legislative process as well as serving 
as trade negotiator and economic regulator in fields such as competition policy) and the 
Council of Ministers and European Parliament (which collectively adopt an increasingly large 
portion of European economic legislation). Although the powers of the respective EU 
institutions still varies considerably across sectors, the Commission has clearly emerged as the 
Union's primary interlocutor with the US on economic issues, while the legislative activities of 
                                                            
128 Kohler Koch, B., Buth, V. (2009), “Civil society in EU governance: lobby groups like any other?”, TranState 
working papers, No. 108 
129 A simple query on the European Transparency Register can give information on the amount of money spent 
on lobbying activites by the American Chamber of Commerce to the European Union (AmChamEU):  
http://ec.europa.eu/transparencyregister/public/consultation/displaylobbyist.do?id=5265780509-
97&isListLobbyistView=true (last accessed 24/07/2014) 
130 Interview with a senior AmCham policy officer, Brussels, 9/02/2014 
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the Council and the Parliament have the potential to influence economic interests in the US. 
In order to get a more comprehensive overview of this and following fora it may be interesting 
to advance three categorization that encompass almost every characteristic of each forum and 
that can be used to address both civil society and business concerns. These two 
categorizations lie in two continuum: the first one is critique/constructive engagement. The 
second one is exclusive/inclusive. They will be used in sub-Section 2.2.2 and 2.2.3.  
 
 
2.3.1: Business  
The Transatlantic Business Dialogue is the most established of the transatlantic dialogues. It 
was conceived (in 1994) and launched (in 1995) before the NTA, but has been hailed as a 
major success story of the new transatlantic dialogue. The TABD was an invention of the late 
US Commerce Secretary Ron Brown131. A formal business dialogue was seen as a means of 
securing greater US business support for the Commerce department, which was under threat 
from Congress, and a way to boost the impact of European business on EU level 
negotiations. The TABD was also conceptualised as a way to secure greater support for the 
US in transatlantic negotiations. As it has been argued, “US government officials were 
                                                            
131 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-95-1175_en.htm?locale=FR 
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convinced, moreover, that their negotiating position would coincide much more closely with 
the US-EU business communities stance than would that of the European Commission”132. 
Although the creation of the TABD was initially controversial in the US, the main challenge 
was to gain European support for the process. Cowles (2001) notes that European business 
lacked organisation at the EU level. The Commission's DGI initially opposed the creation of a 
business dialogue without labour, consumer or environmental dialogues. The Transatlantic 
Policy Network (TPN) was influential in getting European industry and officials involved, 
since it was able to draw on its extensive European business contacts, and active TPN 
members, such as Ford, Xerox, Daimler Chrysler, EDS and AOL, also became heavily 
involved in the TABD133. In the end, it was the support of US Commerce Secretary Brown, 
Commissioner Brittan (External Relations) and Commissioner Bangemann (Enterprise) that 
facilitated the inauguration of the TABD. They invited industry leaders to comment on the 
creation of a transatlantic business forum. The Commerce Department and the Commission 
also actively participated in the first TABD meeting in Seville. Despite differences European 
and American business approaches to the dialogue. The launch was deemed a success. The 
TABD is not a traditional lobbying organisation. Rather, it is a forum for consensus reaching 
between European and American business with the aim of boosting trade and investment. 
The overall purpose of the TABD is to assist the government in facilitating trade 
liberalisation. Industry consensus is a policy tool. Since its creation the TABD has aimed to 
promote integration between the EU and the US by providing progress reports of where the 
American and European industry feel co-operation is both necessary and feasible. It produces 
biannual recommendations on specific policy sectors. It exerts political pressure on USTR and 
the Commission to follow up on recommendations. Following the EU-US Bonn Summit 
(1999), the TABD also decided to participate in the Early Warning System, expanding its 
                                                            
132 Green Cowles, M. (2001), “Private firms and US-EU Policy-making: the Transatlantic Business Dialogue”, in 
Philippart, E., Winand, P., Ever closer partnership – Policy-making in US-EU Relations, P.I.E. Peter Lang, Bruxelles, 
pp. 229-267 
133 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-95-1195_en.htm 
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policy reach to areas of potential dispute. It is credited with convincing the Commission to 
push back policy changes on metric labelling and a gelatine ban, both of which had the 
potential to erupt into EU-US trade disputes. Despite the insistence by its participants that the 
TABD is a process as opposed to an organisation, it has nevertheless developed into a 
transatlantic “institution”134. It held annual CEO meetings since 1995 established two small 
secretariats (with less than five permanent staff) in Washington and Brussels and appointed 
rotating company chairs (CEOs), one American one European, to lead the dialogue in annual 
terms. The TABD chairs are just a fraction of the many companies who have a stake in the 
TABD. Growing participation, from an initial 60 to 200 CEOs, gave the process broader 
legitimacy. The TABD is carried by a number of companies who, as active members, 
participate more regularly in specific policy sectors through TABD working groups. 
Membership of the TABD is open, but it has been criticised in the past for excluding certain 
sectors - such as generic pharmaceutical firms and small and medium sized enterprises. 
Throughout the 1990s, the TABD became both highly institutionalized and organised.  
Manufacturers noting that the duplicate testing of products by domestic and foreign regulators 
was slowing down the product-approval process, creating extra-costs for exporters and 
effectively creating a barrier to market access decided to come to terms with the TABD, in 
order to make it a concrete tool to address their concerns. The TABD became widely 
involved in the MRAs decision-making process 135 , offering technical support for the 
negotiation process and created the Transatlantic Advisory Committee on Standards (TACS), 
composed of industry experts from the TABD working group on regulatory cooperation to 
suggest measures reducing costs for exporters. Although the main focus of TACS is 
harmonization, the Committee was able to provide EU and US officials with a clear outline of 
                                                            
134 See for example the TABD’s recommendations to the EU and US policy-makers in 2011, on the eve of the 
renewal of the transatlantic partnership. Acessible here: 
 http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2012/july/tradoc_149711.pdf (last accessed 6/10/2014) 
135 See Green Cowles, ibidem, p. 238 
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where EU and US industry felt MRAs would be most feasible and productive136. The TABD 
held frequent meetings with senior officials at the US Commerce Department and publicly 
criticized both sides for missing deadlines and failing to implement the agreements. In 
particular, the TABD Scorecard argued that the problems in both the medical-devices and 
medical safety annexes undermined the credibility of the entire process, because EU and US 
officials could not deliver the implementation of the MRAs once they were agreed.  
The TABD offers a good overview of the positive and negative effects of transatlantic 
institutionalization of practices and institutions. On the one side, it helped businesses to put 
together their expertise and knowledge; on the other side, it lobbied strongly by appealing to 
their contacts among policy-makers and political leaders. 
 
2.3.2: Civil society 
Transatlantic Consumers’ Dialogue is the most important (and still alive) forum for debate in 
the “civil society” transatlantic community137. It has the same raison d’être of the TABD and it 
was conceived as an helping hand of the nascent transatlantic institutional structure. It is itself 
part of that institutional structure, yet it seems to have less relevance in the whole game. This 
is due to its own strategic choices, and to a lack of resources and financing that contributed 
greatly to the demise of many initiatives. In brief,  
 
TACD champions the consumer perspective in transatlantic 
decision making. It is our mission to ensure that EU/US policy 
dialogue promotes consumer welfare on both sides of the Atlantic 
and is well informed about the implications of policy decisions on 
consumers. TACD regularly issues statements and 
recommendations on important food, information society, 
intellectual property, financial services and nonotechnology issues. 
                                                            
136 A first report was issued in 1996. All the relevant information on the TACS can be found in Steffenson, R. 
(2005), “Competing trade and regulatory strategies for the mutual recognition of conformity assessment in the 
transatlantic marketplace”, in Egan, M., ivi, p. 165 
137 One of the most recent examples of its activity is the TABD’s position on the TTIP, accessible here: 
http://tacd.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/TransatlanticConsumerDialogue-response-to-USTR-on-TTIP-
10-05-13.pdf (last accessed 06/10/2014) 
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In doing so TACD provides a common voice for EU and US 
consumer organisations ensuring that key consumer priorities are 
promoted and advocated within EU-US regulatory and 
governmental processes, helping to protect health and safety and 
assure truth and fairness in the marketplace. 
TACD works with stakeholders such as the Transatlantic Legislators 
Dialogue (TLD) and the Transatlantic Business Council (TABC) 
through the Transatlantic Economic Council (TEC), of which 
TACD is a member of the advisory group, to find areas of 
commonality and to seek increased consensus138. 
 
This brief excerpt from TACD’s Secretariat own description can substitute much discussion 
about how consumers organized themselves and how they tried to coalesce together to 
protect their interests. Everything is already in the brief excerpt. If we want to use the same 
three categories which have been applied to the TABD in order to make it more 
understandable, it is straightforward to start notice that the first one, the critique/constructive 
engagement divide, is certainly the most important for the TACD. Being an outsider in the 
whole relationship, the TACD has acquired through time an increasing “protest” role in the 
anarchical transatlantic environment. Not only did the TACD allow US and European 
consumer groups to coordinate their policy better; it also allowed US consumer groups to 
come together in a way that they had not done previously. Unlike the TABD, the TACD had 
relatively limited resources, as it can be easily inferred. It decided to concentrate them on three 
key issues, namely food-safety, e-commerce and a catch-all group for all other issues, which 
determined a degree of inadequacy for TACD Secretariat in the course of time.139 Moreover, 
transatlantic Members of this Dialogue felt as threatened by the growing involvement in 
business environments140, and tried to attach themselves more to the expanding Directorate 
General for Consumers in the European Commission141. This Directorate had a direct interest 
in creating a transatlantic consumer voice in debates over e-commerce, since during public 
                                                            
138 http://tacd.org/about-tacd/ 
139 Interview with TACD Secretariat Member, Brussels, 17/02/2014 
140 Interview with another Member, Brussels, 11/12/2013 
141 http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/archive/empowerment/cons_networks_en.htm#training 
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consultations through the Atlantic they needed a concrete counterpart to deal with, which 
could have the necessary breadth in membership.  
US consumer groups were in fact less eager to engage in transatlantic level negotiations at the 
beginning. Within the e-commerce WG, the proposed Safe Harbor arrangement quickly 
emerged as an important issue. As an example, the Electronic Privacy Information Centre 
(EPIC), a founding member of TACD, which was already an important voice in the debate 
over the Directive, saw it as a possible means to bring US domestic privacy laws and practices 
up to international standards142. This is only one of many divergent regulatory tendencies that 
emerged when the two actors decided to cooperate. Consumers, who are usually staunch 
supporters of negotiating arenas, decided to cope with only few policy areas, due to resources 
and time constraints. By doing this, however, they condemned themselves to low relevance in 
the transatlantic arena.  
The activism on privacy issues was due to two main factors: first of all, consumer 
organizations found it considerably easier than business to agree on privacy principles. The 
TACD, unlike the TABD, worked on a consensus basis, even if in the end certain groups 
tended to take the lead. Secondly, in contrast to business, consumer groups have always 
tended to be facilitated by very contrasted issues, and by very sensitive ones.  
 
2.3.3: Governmental bodies 
The Transatlantic Legislators’ Dialogue (TLD) was meant to assume the role of a mere 
consultative body and ended up being less than a pale success. However, there is still some 
attention to the evolution of legislative dialogues: in this regard, both the European Parliament 
has maintained a Delegation for relations with the United States143 hosted from time to time 
by the European parliament Liaison Office (EPLO) in Washington, while the Congress still 
                                                            
142 An excellent example is the role played by TACD in the Passenger Name Records issue, which saw the two 
partners drifting apart for a long time in 2004. See here for the TACD’s policy paper outlining its position:   
http://www.statewatch.org/news/2004/jun/pnr-resol-action.htm 
143 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/delegations/en/d-us/home.html 
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lacks a seat in Brussels. By the way, according to a recent Congressional Research Service 
(CRS) publication, there is much room for improvement on this issue. The authors suggest six 
measures that could bind more actively together the two legislatures: they should in turn “[…] 
enhance the Transatlantic Legislators’ Dialogue, develop closer TLD coordination with the 
standing committees and promote committee cooperation, utilize European Parliament liaison 
staff deployed to Washington, establish a senior staff “fellowship” exchange, deploy 
congressional staff to Brussels, establish a congressional Commission on the EU” 144. The 
dialogue between legislatures was encouraged by the overwhelming web of contacts that arose 
right after the TAD and the NTA. 
Legislators had a double task. On the one side, they needed to establish their own raison 
d’être. The processes that led to the creation of the TLD were very fast. Very little thinking on 
it had been carried on by both sides of the Atlantic. Legislators then needed to focus on 
possible roles they could assume.  
On the other side, the TLD reflected different majorities, different cultures, different polities. 
With this in mind, it was clear that it rested upon legislators to find a coherence in the 
development of the relations among them. To put it simply, parliamentarians had to work 
hard in order to find out the reason why they worked hard. It may seem trivial, but it is not.  
As time passed by, the TLD transformed itself into a more subtle and loosely structured 
dialogue. As the transatlantic relations makes clear, there have been some contacts145 in recent 
years between EU and US parliamentarians, but any attempt to better structure the whole 
relationship went unresolved.  
After the recent elections for the European Parliament, the Delegation for the Relations with 
the United States has changed its members, but the Committee does not seem renewed. 
                                                            
144 See Arcjhick, K., Morelli, V. (2013). “The U.S. Congress and the European Parliament: Evolving Transatlantic 
Legislative Cooperation”, Congressional Research Service 
145 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/201306/20130612ATT67704/20130612ATT6770
4EN.pdf 
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Having suffered its loss of importance, its meetings with Members of Congress have been rare 
and unproductive146. 
Inter-parliamentary exchanges are a typical tool to address lack of mutual knowledge and the 
need to be informed at each and every stage of decision-making147. Usually, Parliaments are 
loosely informed of trade policies and the advancements of negotiations. Otherwise, there 
could be deficiencies in the negotiating phase, but also leaks that could undermine the 
effectiveness of bargaining.  
 
2.4: Summing up 
This Chapter has aimed at building up a history of the last twenty years in transatlantic 
relations. It has assumed no particular point of view, i.e. the facts have not been analysed with 
a particular theoretical framework. This will be carried on later, through the use of grand 
theories in Chapter 3 and middle-range theories in Chapter 4.  
This part has taken into account a lifespan of almost twenty years, and it has presented the 
background over which the present dissertation aims at building and construct further 
knowledge on the topic. 
The Chapter then addresses two main questions: first of all, can we really talk of a transatlantic 
relationship? If yes, how can we define it and which factors can be taken into account in order 
to evaluate it?  
The first sub-Chapter traces a schematic picture, by pointing at documents and texts that have 
shaped the outcomes of negotiations. Text and content analysis will be also one of the tools 
employed in Chapter 6 to evaluate the impact of NSAs on state-to-state negotiations. An 
                                                            
146 The only tangible result is a Resolution in 2012 on “Trade and economic relations with the United States”, 
which was meant to be a response to the then proposed TTIP. See here for the text: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/201310/20131024ATT73362/20131024ATT73362E
N.pdf 
147  In the EU there is a platform for interparliamentary exchanges among national parliaments. 
http://www.ipex.eu/IPEXL-WEB/home/home.do 
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Appendix with the main agreements in the realm of economic and trade affairs will be 
provided at the end of the dissertation.  
The second sub-Chapter analysed three main concepts plus one, that of “networks”, that need 
a clarification before proceeding with the analysis. They are all different conceptualizations of 
the same element, that of cooperation, but details change among them.  
The third sub-Chapter is a detailed account of all the forms of dialogues that have been set up 
in recent years. Either formal or informal, either structured or loose, either strong or weak, 
they are analysed in their origin, in their mandate and in their scope. They differ substantially 
on the third variable, they are quite similar in the second one, and they coincide with regards 
to the first one. They all depend from the NTA, which is the first attempt to shape 
transatlantic relations by pointing at NSAs and the interactions among them and governments.  
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CHAPTER 3: Theories of transatlantic cooperation 
3.1: Is there a theory of transatlantic relations as such?  
This Chapter addresses the topic of transatlantic economic cooperation from the point of 
view of IR theory. The first Section outlines the main tenets of Realism and Neorealism as 
they are framed in the main contributions so far148, with a focus on the post-Cold War period, 
which is the timeframe of this analysis. Realism has greatly influenced the way IR scholars 
have dealt with many phenomena in international politics, especially those related to great 
power politics, since the end of the Second World War. The tradition of liberal theory, which 
traced back to Kant and utopians from past centuries, revamped when the bipolar structure of 
the Cold War seemed doomed to fall. Constructivism was born as a way to break the 
disenchantment Realism and Liberalism had created among international relations specialists. 
It was a reaction both to the consensus created in post-Cold War scholars that the hegemon 
could stabilize the entire world just by its own means with no help by the other states, but also 
to the strong optimism entrenched in classical liberal theories of international relations. This 
conceptions were proven wrong by many events that followed 1991: wars in the Balkans, the 
rise of new powers refusing the market as it had been conceived in the Western liberal world, 
the rise of religious struggles across many parts of the Middle East. Things were a bit more 
complicated than expected149.  
With regards to transatlantic relations, it is worthwhile to note that many Realist assumptions 
have resisted over time but now they seem to be outdated. Future will tell whether there will 
                                                            
148 Literature used is broad. And yet, it is still a very small part of the literature on IR theory and cooperation. The 
choice for these three theories is easily explained: they are the most exhaustive and the most representative. The 
main goal of the dissertation is not to create a theory of transatlantic politics, which would require far more time 
and space. As the introductory part has explained, the goal is to achieve sufficient knowledge on how certain 
processes are regulated and how certain actors interact. This Chapter finds its raison d'être in the need to explain 
why, rather than how, states decide to cooperate. For this reason, the selection of literature has been rigorous and 
limited to this aspect.  
149 For an interesting review of almost thirty years of IR scholarship (especially in the US), see the Teaching, 
Research and International Policy (TRIP) surveys and datasets, collected in Maliniak, D. et al. (2007), “The 
International Relations Discipline, 1980-2006”, Prepared for the Annual Meeting of the American Political 
Science Association, Chicago Illinois, accessible here: 
 http://www.wm.edu/offices/itpir/_documents/trip/the_international_relations_discipline_2007.pdf (last 
accession: 04/07/2014) 
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be a revanche of Realism over other theories. For the sake of this analysis, I will only touch 
upon some key principles and ideas, neglecting many nuances of Realism, especially the most 
closely related to security and capabilities distribution. Trade has for a long time been 
forgotten by scholars as a subject of transatlantic relations150. Notwithstanding this poor 
opinion, it has become increasingly important in shaping every single decision across the 
Atlantic, as the recent case for a renewed transatlantic partnership epitomizes. Security threats 
and issues have almost entirely faded in their importance within the framework of EU-US 
relations. There are no military troubles between the two “giants”, war seems almost 
impossible, minor struggles very unlikely. 
Section 2 tackles Liberalism and the authors who are now under the umbrella definition of 
“liberal intergovernmentalists”. It is an important step towards a broader comprehension of 
the phenomenon. Liberal ideas in international politics were nurtured by scholars who did not 
share the proclaimed “right way” to look at relations among states. This shows in the 
transatlantic sphere, where modern Realism collides with empirical evidence that contradicts 
it. 
Section 3 adds knowledge on the main Constructivist assumptions on cooperation and EU-
US relations. This part is the most controversial: IR scholars dealing with transatlantic 
cooperation have traditionally focused themselves on distribution of power and capabilities, 
neglecting the usefulness of an approach that brings together other factors such as ideas and 
norms.  
Finally, Section 4 develops a background framework, which combines certain elements from 
previously outlined theories while trying to re-elaborate the best inputs from each of them. It 
is not a reunification or a recollection, it is rather a new theory aimed at taking the best from 
the existent and trying to put forward a useful tool for analysis.  
                                                            
150  Peterson, J., Young, A., (2006), “Trade and Transatlantic Relations New Dogs and Old Tricks”, in 
McNamara, K. and Meunier, S. (eds) The State of the European Union, Vol. 8, Oxford University Press 
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In the following Chapter concepts and definitions taken from IR theory will be used, but also 
public policy and International Political Economy (IPE). The goal is to assess in a 
multidisciplinary way the relevance of certain types of network and governance modes151. The 
field of International Political Economy (IPE) is increasingly dividing between those who 
engage in the more general debates about international relations, such as issues of 
international cooperation, and those who focus the majority of their efforts on the study of 
political economy (including comparative political economy and IPE, with frequent overlaps 
in American politics). Both of these approaches to IPE have contributed useful models and 
methods to the broader study of IPE (Martin et al. 2002)152. More recently, IPE seems to have 
lost some of its appeal in the wider public. While it was greatly used at the outset of the 
“liberal era” to analyse major shifts in the distribution of wealth and resources, its relevance 
has declined in recent years due to a renewed interest from the scholarly community towards 
less general and more micro-level frameworks to analyse politics. Therefore, there will be only 
minor references to IPE tools, and only when necessary. 
I am outlining here the major tenets of each theory as they are applicable to transatlantic 
relations, which make the whole issue even more interesting since, as Steffenson (2001) 
claims: “[…] in contrast to the traditional style of international diplomacy that characterised 
the Cold War, there is now a 'political process' that surrounds EU-US decision-making”153, 
especially at the trans-governmental level. Whenever possible, in this Chapter, the level of 
analysis will be expressed. 
                                                            
151 Suggestions for this particular approach come from Pawlak, P. (2007), “From Hierarchy to Networks: 
Transatlantic Governance of Homeland Security”, Journal of Global Change and Governance, Volume 1, N. 1, Winter. 
The literature on governance is endless. The term itself has undergone many attempts of definition. A brief 
outline of them will be presented in Chapter 4, alongside some explanations on decision-making mechanisms and 
the actors involved in the transatlantic partnership.  
152 For a useful discussion of recent developments in the field of IR/IPE, see Katzenstein, P. et al. (1998) 
"International Organization and the Study of World Politics", International Organization, 52, 4: 645-85 
153 See Steffenson, R. (2001), “The Institutionalisation of EU-US relations: decision making, institution building 
and the new transatlantic agenda”, PhD thesis, Unveristy of Edinburgh, p. 102 
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A major caveat should be considered: the realist, liberal and constructivist views I am sketching 
here are not an outline of why the US lost track after the end of the Cold War154. They are not 
even an attempt to frame the reasons why the EU integrated (even though some parts will be 
devoted to this topic) or how the EU behaves with its main trade partner. This Chapter aims 
at building up the theoretical “stronghold” over which to build the analytical and empirical 
parts. Moreover, most of this part tributes a lot to the liberal internationalist ideals that 
strongly shaped the common vision of the transatlantic governance.  
The end of the bipolar world seemed to turn the world into a free-market haven. Pro-market 
theorists emphasized the role freedom had gained in international relations, a role it had never 
gained in history so far. Relations among powers seemed to be driven by an outmost sense of 
shared objectives and goals, or at least common assumptions on the way to behave in the 
international arena. The reason behind the great step towards a renewed partnership between 
the EU and the US was not due to any particular pro-EU or pro-US attitude among policy-
makers. It was rather a prise de conscience of the power of economic advancements of the Single 
market on the one side and of the shortcomings of a unipolar world on the other. This 
politically influenced environment is epitomized by the term “governance”: “[the term 
governance] embraces governmental institutions, but it also subsumes informal, non-
governmental mechanisms whereby persons and organisation within it purview, move ahead, 
satisfy their needs, and fulfil their wants”155.  
In effect, it is much useful for the sake of my analysis to employ a constitutive analysis in 
order to assess the elements of the Atlantic community, which have helped transatlantic 
partners to overcome their respective mistrusts. As Egan (2005) makes clear, “the impact of 
                                                            
154 Many authors have focused on these issues taking an IR perspective, but it would be redundant for the 
purpose of this research. As a brief suggestion, some readings here can be very useful to dig deeper into this 
subject. See Mearsheimer, J. (1990) “Back to the Future: instability in Europe after the Cold War.”, International 
Security. 15: 1, Van Evera, S. (1990/1) “Primed for Peace: Europe after the Cold War.”, International Security. 15. 3, 
Layne, C. (2006) “The Unipolar Illusion Revisited. The Coming end of the United States’ Unipolar Moment”, 
International Security. 31. 2. Fall: pp. 7–41 
155 Rosenau, J (1992) “Governance, Order and Change in World Politics”, in Rosenau, J. and EO Czempiel, 
Governance with Government: Order and Change in World Politics, New York Cambridge University Press, pp. 1-29. 
Other definitions may be drawn from Steffenson, op.cit. 
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globalization has enhanced pressures for liberalization and market reform and led to some 
common trend”156. Liberalization and market reform can be understood in such a broad 
environment only if we advance and make clear what market itself is, and what lies behind the 
realm of this “need for liberalization”. Applying constructivist lenses to my research adds 
more value to the existing knowledge and to the entire material collected: these relations are 
deemed to be self-evident if the driving forces of cooperation are made clear in advance. IPE 
tools (i.e., for example, the stress on the global impact of processes or the analysis of 
interdependence), however, do not necessarily exhaust the theoretical account of this research. 
As many critiques 157  have highlighted, IPE should not be limited to pure quantitative 
reasoning.  
While realism and neoliberalism offer very different explanations of international cooperation, 
they do share similar simplifying assumptions of rationality and anarchy that are analytically 
attractive for their parsimony and generalizability. Yet, these two advantages can turn out to 
be misleading in research. In fact, if a theory has to be outlined, focusing too much on its 
impact rather than on its formation may be troublesome.  
Until now, a review of possible formal approaches to transatlantic cooperation has been 
sketched. What lacks from this review? Most importantly, a focus on non-traditional factors.  
An enormous help might come from constructivism. It insulates from the other two theories: 
it is an all-encompassing method of looking at events in international politics, rather than a 
strong corpus of fixed assumptions. It is certainly more suited to the topic of this research. It 
contributed greatly at the beginning of the millennium to give voice to the unrepresented ideas 
in world politics. Constructivist scholars started focusing on issues that had always been 
                                                            
156 Egan, M. (2005) “Introduction”, in Egan, M. (2005) Creating a transatlantic marketplace: government policies and 
business strategies, Manchester University Press, p. 6 
157 First and foremost, Keohane, R. (2009). “The old IPE and the new”, Review of International Political Economy, 
16:1, pp. 34–46. Here a significant quote from this seminal work for years to come: “I would urge scholars now 
active in the IPE field to spend more of their time pondering the big questions about change, and asking not 
only what the best existing research tells us about them, but what interpretive leaps may be necessary to point the 
way to more profound and relevant scholarship” (p. 42) 
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behind the curtains of every attempt to theorize the Western world and how it worked158. 
Having been for such a long time away from the spotlight, these issues helped the entire 
discipline to broaden its research interests, open its horizons and be prepared for the post-
2001 découverte of the religious and cultural wars.  This examination of transatlantic cooperation 
in the related IR literature highlights the shortcomings of this literature and points toward 
areas in which it can be strengthened by focusing on elements of agency (choice, reflexivity, 
transformative capacity, and learning) and structure (including material capacities, normative 
structures, and institutions) at several levels. In particular, this review suggests that some 
groundwork for a “new wave” of cooperation theory is emerging, which views cooperation as 
an iterated and nonlinear, decentralized and open-ended process that can have a 
transformative impact both on actors and on the operation of the international system (see 
also Conca 2004). This in turn leads us to a new, empirically grounded definition of social 
change and transformation, concepts so fundamental to the agent-structure debate. 
Contrasting views of social change as driven by either agents or structures have been criticized 
for being unable to explain the properties and causal powers of their units of analysis. The 
difficulty in settling on a definition of social change is that it implies a social ontology, that is, 
a statement about the nature of the social system and the properties of its parts. Agent-
centered (also called individualist or voluntarist) social theories consider structures 
epiphenomenal constructs that can be reduced to individuals and their interactions159. In this 
view, social change consists of changes in individuals’ actions. Structural (or functional) social 
theories argue that individuals and their intentions are generated by their structural location. 
Hence, social change results from systemic transformation, such as in the modes of 
production or political organization.  
                                                            
158 Phinnemore, M. (2001), “Taking stock: The Constructivist Research Program in International Relations and 
Comparative Politics”, Annual Review of Political Science, 4, pp. 391–416 
159 Some good reflections on agent-based theory and how it may be applied to international cooperation may be 
drawn from O’Neil, K., Balsiger, J., Van Deever, S. (2004), “Actors, norms, and impact: Recent International 
Cooperation Theory and the Influence of the Agent-Structure Debate”, Annual Review of Political Science, 7, pp. 
149–75 
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After this brief review of theories, an answer to the question posed by this Section may be 
found. A theory of transatlantic institutional cooperation may be developed, and it certainly 
exists, but only if it is defined according to three main principles. What are then the defining 
characteristics of a theory for the existing transatlantic partnership? 
First of all, it needs to be broad. It can not have strict boundaries, because the subject is too 
broad. For certain issues (like security before the 1990s) a Realist approach could be better: 
the decision by European leaders to rely on the US forces for a long time can be seen as a 
confirmation of the hegemonic stability theory. A counterproof could be the Anglo-French 
initiative to start a new defence policy of the European Union at the end of the 1990s. Despite 
the reluctances by many Member States, it still testifies the validity of Realism. Without the 
withdrawal of the US, probably NATO would still retain the monopoly on the use of military 
assets on the European soil.  
Secondly, the theory has to be innovative. It is almost impossible to look at such variegated 
events, policies and actors from a single standpoint. Previous theories have proven wrong in 
justifying many elements of the transatlantic partnership. A new, fresh and innovative way of 
thinking the Atlantic divide may bring much more knowledge on how the relationship is 
governed than a recollection of empirical facts. This dissertation aims to do so by looking at 
two distinct analytical tools that will be examined in 3.5. 
Finally, the theory must aim at the highest possible degree of predictability160. Even though 
predictability in international relations is almost unachievable, there is a strong need for a 
theoretical account that encompasses a good level of what Derrida called “futurizability”. If 
                                                            
160 Robert Cox's ideas on the purpose of theory in International Relations is not a search to find the truth but it is 
a tool to understand the world as it is, and to change it through the power of critique. According to Robert Cox, 
theory has two purposes: one of them is the problem-solving purpose, which deals with the givens and tries to 
manage the smooth functioning of the system. The other kind of theory is the critical theory, and the purpose is 
to become aware of the situations not chosen by one, and to establish an emancipatory perspective. Once looked 
from the Coxian lens, it is clear that the discipline of international relations were from the very beginning loyal to 
this kind of purpose in theorizing, i.e., the smooth working of the system. As Robert Cox articulates, ‘Theory is 
always for someone and for some purpose’; this statement reflects the context in which the theory is being 
analysed”. See Cox, R. (1981), “Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory”, 
Millennium, Vol.10, 3. A good review of what predictability means for liberal international theory is to be found in 
Puchala, D. (2013), Theory and history in international relations, Routledge, New York, p. 194 
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the theory does not tell anything about what is likely to happen in the future, than it may be 
implied that it is no theory. Only if it adds something to the existing knowledge a theory can 
be defined as such. The present theory develops a different understanding of some existing 
issues by pointing the finger to more variables than those commonly used. The goal is to 
show same phenomena from different perspectives. Results will be evaluated in the end. 
Trade policy formation has for long been a prominent subject in the context of various 
disciplines. International relations, international political economy, public policy and 
comparative politics, in fact, have all tackled the question of how actors define their 
preferences over trade policies. A single theory then needs to answer the criteria outlined 
above161.  
 
3.2: Neorealism  
This Section is structured as follows: first, a brief outline of the most important Realist 
explanations on the transatlantic relationship. Secondly, a review of other fields of study such 
as regionalism and IPE that can be useful to better construct a coherent framework. Finally, 
there is a specific sub-section on cooperation that helps to better grasp why Realists have 
always considered spontaneous partnership as utterly unthinkable.  
Neorealism started dealing with transatlantic relations only recently. Being attracted for a long 
time by power distribution and capabilities, it was frustrated by peaceful EU-US relations. It 
never took into account the relevance of constitutive factors such as beliefs, norms and ideas. 
The most common assumptions for realists dealing with a conundrum such as the EU, for 
example, is that European states integrated to defend themselves. Then, EU interacted with 
the US because it was forced to do so under constraining circumstances. All of them likely to 
be related to security. If we consider the twenty years that followed the end of the Cold War it 
                                                            
161 For further reference on theory building in international relations and the foundations to build a coherent and 
unique theory, McClelland, C. (1960), “The function of theory in international relations”, Journal of Conflict 
Resolution, Vol. 4, No. 3, pp. 303-336 
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is self-evident to realize how easy it has been for both counterparts to react, and how hard it 
has been for them to maintain their “liberal” entrepreneurial spirit with each other in 
international affairs162. This Chapter might require a profound and long analysis: as the goal of 
research suggests, only four main topics will be outlined. They are not necessarily 
interconnected, they simply reflect issues brought under scrutiny by recent Realist scholarship. 
Firstly, it is surprising to see not only that the two partners tried to coalesce against a common 
enemy (the menace of USSR economic attraction in some European countries), but also that 
they were sometimes in conflict against each other. This was a good and sufficient reason to 
share policies in the EU (especially redistributive ones)163, helping the Community to create 
competitiveness through the Single Market and through highly criticized “protectionist” non-
tariffs barriers. There was also the US, which represented under certain circumstances an issue 
for many European leaders. And the relationship, as it has been shown in the introductory 
part of this dissertation, was far from being straightforward. The US provided security and 
protection under the NATO umbrella, trying to cover under the framework of a “Western 
order” what later was negatively termed the “Transatlantic rift”164. Realist critiques of the last 
thirty years of transatlantic relations have proven valid, but sometimes inadequate to explain 
the entire picture. As Rosato said “[…] Institutions largely reflect the distribution of power. 
States confronting a common, powerful adversary can cooperate or integrate. If their 
opponent is a great power and they are also great powers, then they cooperate—they pool 
their assets and coordinate their policies”165. In the early post-Cold War years neorealists 
therefore argued that the transatlantic relationship was not defined by similar cultures, values, 
ideology and historic ties but by the relative distribution of power between the allies (Krasner 
1993). EU-US cooperation was viewed as a reaction to structural shifts which left the 
                                                            
162 The recent disputes over Passenger Names Records (PNR) and the rejection of the ACTA Agreement are 
clear examples of this claim. 
163 See Majone, G. (1994) “The rise of the regulatory state in Europe”, West European Politics, Vol. 17.3 
164 Among many who advanced this term,  Smith, J. (2004) “The future of the European Union and the 
transatlantic relationship”, International Affairs 79, 5, pp. 943-949 
165 See Rosato, S. (2011) Europe’s Troubles - Power Politics and the State of the European Project”, International 
Security, Vol. 35, No. 4 (Spring 2011), pp. 45–86 
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international system less predictable and more dangerous, as Mearsheimer put it166. European 
interest in pursuing the new transatlantic dialogue was seen as a way to keep America engaged 
in European security, amidst rising fears that it would return to isolationism. The US’ interest 
in co-operating with Europe was seen as a way to maintain “a seat at the European table” and 
gain access to European markets in light of the growing threat of “Fortress Europe”.  
Secondly, neorealism has been widely disregarded after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Because of 
its strong focus on security and power in terms of material strength and military forces and on 
the state as primary actor in the analysis, it has lost ground in favour of more “idealistic” 
attitudes in international affairs. In the realm of transatlantic relations, it has acquired a 
standing, which does not exhaust the explanatory nuances tools of a complex “binary” 
partnership, but under certain circumstances brings clarity to the topic. The two main realist 
tenets, which can be applied to the analysis, i.e. the balance of power theory (Walt, 1987) and 
the hegemonic stability theory (Keohane, 1980), are somewhat intertwined and dependent on 
one another167. 
Realist theory implies the use of logic of consequentialism throughout negotiations and 
international transactions. This logic states that all actors, especially states, behave at the 
international level accordingly to their fixed preferences and in order to maximize their own 
goals. On the one side, realism believes that economic cooperation is both loosely desirable 
and achievable, since every step forward in integration is just a mere response to an outside 
threat. On the other side, The role of domestic and transnational actors is poorly researched: 
external influences come to the agenda in so far as they threaten the standardized conduct of 
international relations. Trying to be more optimistic on the employment of this theory for the 
                                                            
166 As he famously put it in a crucial moment in time, “the world is going to miss the Cold War days”. 
Mearsheimer, J. (1990), “Back to the future: instability in Europe after the Cold War”, International Security, 15, n. 
1, pp. 55-56 
167 Balance of power means that both the EU and the US had a successful cooperation because they were 
constrained to do so by the international status quo. Hegemonic stability theory states that the US had the role of 
hegemon in the international arena, due to their capabilities and structural strengths. For further reflections of 
these two Realist facets, see Byrne, A. (2013) “Conflicting Visions: Liberal and Realist Conceptualisations of 
Transatlantic Alignment”, Transworld Working Paper, 12 
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sake of my analysis, it may be certainly put forward, recalling Putnam’s two-level diplomacy168, 
that the US and the EU do behave very differently on the international scene. And this can be 
a cause of the need for certain actors to pursue their own policy-goals outside of the main 
framework given by inter-state relations. With regards to this issue, America’s position in 
international negotiations is the outcome of a single national interest filtered by legislatures 
and states. European Union's position needs to be a reconciliation of the global, the Union 
and the national levels (Putnam 1993: 80). This is the main lesson to acquire from the Realist 
school, i.e. that actors, even if unitary, do represent a summary and reconciliation of different 
sub-actors that pursue the same goal but usually possess strong singular views. 
Thirdly, another useful element to assess the cooperative behaviour between the two partners 
is to look at their regional status169. While there can be a dispute on whether the EU is a real 
regional power or hegemon or rather a sui generis entity, it is undisputed that the US represents 
a regional hegemon, if we define the “hegemon” as a state that contributes to nearly 50% of 
its own region’s GDP. The importance of regional powers for the integration of their 
respective world regions is derived from hegemonic stability theory (Gilpin, 1981; 
Kindleberger, 1973; Krasner, 1982), which has already been mentioned and can somewhat add 
an interesting shape to the analysis. According to such realist reasoning, international co-
operation will only occur if a benevolent hegemon has interests to provide a collective good 
on behalf of a group of states. Mattli (1999a) has applied this argument to the regional level 
and has pointed out that a regional benevolent hegemon is necessary to supply the collective 
good ‘regional integration’. Such a benevolent hegemon needs to provide leadership and it 
needs to act as a paymaster in order to compensate smaller member states for distributive 
losses due to regional integration (Mattli, 1999b). Whereas the importance of regional powers 
                                                            
168 Putnam, R. D. (1988), “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games”, International 
Organization, Vol. 42, No. 3., pp. 427-460 
169 Realist scholars focusing on “regionalism” have interpreted transatlantic relations as a struggle to become 
regional hegemons. Regional actors compete in order to achieve hegemony in an area, and they try to achieve 
that goal by proactively spend efforts on that or leave the other hegemon insulated. Liberal view is much less 
researched, since the regional perspective is not related to typical liberal traits, which apply much better to the 
state or global level.  
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for regional integration is undisputed, their interest in providing regional leadership is less 
clear. Schirm (2010), for instance, argues that regional powers need to behave benevolently in 
order to institutionalize regional fellowship. Concepts on co-operative hegemony (Pedersen, 
2002) share the argument that regional powers should behave supportively towards their 
followers. What are the implications of being a regional power on state’s cooperative 
endeavours? There is a profound influence from the status of the state on its own behaviour: 
it may be either clear or hardly recognizable, but it depends on two key variables. On the one 
side, its historical fondness to behave in a certain way when being a hegemon. Some states are 
more likely than others to treat neighboring states as “land of conquer”, while other regional 
hegemons may be more likely to be defensive “positionists”170. The former is the case of the 
US, the latter being more similar to the case of the EU. On the other side, the behaviour of 
the regional hegemon depends on the external environment. If there are threats, according to 
Realism, it will be much more likely that two regional hegemons will cooperate for the higher 
good. If there are none, it is more likely that two regional hegemons will try to balance rather 
than entering into conflict. One must be aware of the fact that this is not only security-related. 
These same assumptions apply to economic cooperation: a regional hegemon will end up 
cooperating with its neighboring hegemon if it feels threatened or risks being overwhelmed by 
other powers’ growth in economic terms. 
Finally, a brief elaboration on how realist IPE theories deal with cooperation needs to be 
outlined. These theories tend to be applied to transnational and transgovernmental relations, 
sometimes more often than Realism itself, because IPE has to do with very broad 
phenomena, like financial crisis or defence expenditure in the world. A “realist” IPE theory is 
that of Gilpin, which stresses the role of politics in determining the economic relationships of 
a State: “”Politics determines the framework of economic activity and channels it in directions 
                                                            
170 Contributions on regionalism tend to be structured in a rather simple way: for a seminal introduction and 
insights from a famous early symposium on the subject, Puchala, D. (1970), “International Transactions and 
Regional Integration”, International Organization, Vol. 24, No. 4, Regional Integration: Theory and Research 
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which tend to serve the political objectives of dominant political groups and organizations”171. 
This paradigm can in many ways be tailored also to transatlantic relations: “[…] the main 
actors in international relations are sovereign states whose most fundamental motive is to 
ensure their own survival; […] most states have the ability to inflict physical harm on and, in 
some instances, to destroy one another; […] the basic organizing principle of the international 
system is anarchy; and states can never be certain about the intentions or capabilities of 
others”172. 
 
3.2.1: Neo-realism and cooperation 
International cooperation is not typically a high-interest item for the research agenda of 
neorealism (Mearsheimer 1995). Not even institutionalization, namely its consequence 
according to my hypothesis. In addition, realists rely on a unitary actor model of the state, 
typically arguing that the unitary actor assumption is necessary for parsimonious analysis. For 
example, Waltz argues that relaxing the unitary actor assumption “will lead to the infinite 
proliferation of variables” (1979, 65), which lessens the power of theory by unnecessarily 
complicating the analysis. This is certainly true, especially if we situate in time the Waltzian 
idea of Realism. Moreover, realist explanations are state-centric, arguing that non-state actors 
are less (or not at all) important for understanding international politics. As such, domestic 
politics, international institutions, multinational corporations and nongovernmental actors are 
typically absent or considered epiphenomenal in realist explanations of international 
cooperation. Some questions have to be addressed in this part, in order to show the 
weaknesses of this theory and to advance in the understanding of the topic.  
First of all, what does cooperation mean in Realist terms? Can we define cooperation in a 
single manner, or is it a multifaceted conundrum that is exposed at the risk of becoming too 
                                                            
171 Gilpin, R. (1971) “The politics of transnational economic relations”, International Organization, Vol. 25, No. 3 
172 Duffield, J. S. (2001) “Transatlantic relations after the cold war: Theory, evidence, and the future”, International 
Studies Perspectives, 2(1), 93-115 
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broad? What effect, if any, do patterns of cooperative behavior among states in particular 
issue areas have on the conduct of international relations? Maybe these questions are too 
daring. The only explanation of a possible research agenda on cooperation for Realism has 
been advanced by its opponents, and not by many Realists themselves. A recent contributon 
by Glaser173 explores the possible advantages for Realism to focus on cooperation and try to 
“steal” this concept from the hands of liberal scholars. Given the scarce attention of recent 
years on this topic, it is straightforward that a renewed attention would attract much interest 
from the IR world.  
The problem with cooperation and institutionalization for Realism is that they do not fit into 
any particular pre-existing theoretical frame. This does not allow to explore in a Realist 
fashion the way states prefer to share commons rather than to fight for them. Early Realist 
scholars that tackled this concept tried to focus more on how states cooperate, while neglecting 
why they do. By doing this, they made great use of microeconomics and game theory. 
Descriptively, they had a huge impact on related research. But when it came to have a 
predictive power, and to move further their explanatory assessments, Realists had a weak 
impact and their models turned out to be almost useless.  
With Waltz, Realism challenged the way scholars had looked at international relations until 
that very moment. Waltz gave birth to two different waves after casting a stone into the 
troubled sea of IR theory: the first one generated neo-liberal institutionalism, which will de 
dealt with in 3.2. The second one generated the agent-structure debate, which throughout the 
                                                            
173 Glaser, C. (2010) Rational Theory of International Relations: The Logic of Competition and Cooperation, Princeton 
University Press. See also the words by Ikenberry in his review: “[…] Glaser attempts to reassemble the various 
realist pieces into a new comprehensive theory of conflict and cooperation. He focuses on three sorts of factors 
shaping security strategies: the motives of a state, its material capabilities, and the information it has about the 
capacities and intentions of others. Out of these variables, he fashions a rationalist theory that deduces the 
circumstances under which states will seek to cooperate or compete”, Ikenberry, J. (2010), "Rational Theory of 
International Relations: The Logic of Competition and Cooperation." Foreign Affairs. 1 Nov. 2010. Web. 28 June 
2014. <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/66944/charles-l-glaser/rational-theory-of-international-politics-
the-logic-of-competiti>. 
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Eighties and some major contributions 174  reached the rationalist vs constructivist (or 
reflectivist) querelle of the 1990s. One must be careful at this very stage: it is wrong to claim 
that Waltz “invented” these two waves. He simply wrote a contribution that could not be 
neglected by others.  
With this in mind, it may be useful to recall the main contributions of Realism to search for a 
significance of the term cooperation. The evolution of cooperation theory roughly mirrored 
(and sometimes drove) theoretical and epistemological shifts and tectonic movements in IR 
theory. Waltz elaborated his central question in strict terms, i.e. why states, existing in an 
atomistic, anarchic, “Hobbesian” international system (characterized by a “war of all against 
all”) would cooperate with each other in the first place. Cooperation was therefore intended to 
be a reaction to a malevolent nature in the outside world. This genuinely new idea of why 
states start behaving according to an idem sentire was particularly felt at that time, since the 
Reagan era was at the gates. There was a natural need to go beyond purely competitive 
relationships, since the counterhegemon was losing ground in favour of the US and economic 
affairs were substituting security threats. The widely used metaphor of the Prisoners’ Dilemma 
Game captured this view quite well, albeit only the negative side of it - states would be 
deterred from long-term cooperation, thus failing to realize potential gains, because the 
possibility of defection by partners in the first round could leave them far worse off than 
before175. This view reflects certain underlying assumptions by realist and neorealist theorists 
                                                            
174  Carlsnaes (1992), Dessler (1989), Wendt (1987) triggered the way positivists had looked at the prism of 
foreign policy, by dismantling one piece at a time the core of what was at that time meant for “agent” and 
“structure”. Carlsnaes, in particular, introduces comparative foreign policy analysis as a tool to better understand 
the complexity of decision-making in cooperation. See Carlasnaes, W. (1992), “The Agency-Structure Problem in 
Foreign Policy Analysis”, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 36, No. 3 (Sep., 1992), pp. 245-270 
175 The debate generated by Oye in 1986 was huge. Oye’s initial comment is striking: “Nations dwell in perpetual 
anarchy, for no central authority imposes limits on the pursuit of sovereign interests. This common condition 
gives rise to diverse outcomes. Relations among states are marked by war and concert, arms races and arms 
control, trade wars and tariff truces, financial panics and rescues, competitive devaluation and monetary 
stabilization. At times, the absence of centralized inter- national authority precludes attainment of common goals. 
Because as states, they cannot cede ultimate control over their conduct to an supra- national sovereign, they 
cannot guarantee that they will adhere to their promises. The possibility of a breach of promise can impede co- 
operation even when cooperation would leave all better off. Yet, at other times, states do realize common goals 
through cooperation under anarchy. Despite the absence of any ultimate international authority, governments 
often bind themselves to mutually advantageous courses of action. And, though no international sovereign stands 
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about the international system: that states (rational, unitary actors) were primarily concerned 
with their own survival in the international order (thus, security concerns dominated), that the 
Great Powers dominated the system, and that anarchy - the absence of sovereign global 
authority - was the key ordering principle that structured state behavior. It was not even 
conceivable, under this light, that cooperation could exist in a non-interested manner. What 
does this imply? First of all, that all multilateral economic institutions and regimes had been 
established by each state only as a way to restrict the room for manoeuvre of potential rivals. 
Secondly, that the interconnectedness the world had experienced until that date was only part 
of a bigger picture where, despite all, states could not secure themselves from being 
threatened.  
Can this vision be realistic? Surely it was not. Under this view, military alliances for example, 
i.e. short-term cooperation among a limited number of states intended to counter an 
immediate threat to them all, could be easily explained under the rubric of national interests 
(Jervis 1983). Once the goal was reached, or national interests changed, the alliance would 
dissolve. Also economic partnerships, then, could only be explained by looking at these very 
issues. 
A final note on relative gains is necessary: the realist argument is guided by an intuition that 
relative gains transform issues into highly conflictual – even zero-sum - situations where 
cooperation is not viable. A game theory approach to cooperation according to international 
theories will be developed further on in the Section 3.3.1. Here it must be noted that gains in 
interactions involving two states depend on whether the output of the agreement is 
cooperative or not. When two states care only about relative gains, their relations can be 
modeled as a zero-sum game with no room for cooperation. When states are largely, though 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
ready to enforce the terms of agreement, states can realize common interests through tacit cooperation, formal 
bilateral and multilateral negotiation, and the creation of international regimes. The question is: If international 
relations can approximate both a Hobbesian state of nature and a Lockean civil society, why does cooperation 
emerge in some cases and not in others?”. Excerpt from Oye, K. (1986) “Explaining Cooperation under 
Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies,” in Cooperation under Anarchy, in Oye, K. A. (ed), Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1986, pp. 1-24. 
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not exclusively, motivated by relative gains, their relations are shown to be equivalent to the 
prisoner's dilemma (PD) regardless of the structure of the underlying absolute gains game. 
This supports the standard realist construction of international anarchy as PD and suggests 
why cooperation is problematic. If the initial absolute game is not PD, however, the relative 
gains PD will be fairly mild and susceptible to decentralized cooperation. But if the absolute 
gains game is already PD, then incorporating relative gains considerations makes this PD 
more intense and decentralization cooperation more difficult176. 
 The assumption that states seek relative gains influences a wide variety of scholarship on 
international politics. A number of scholars have discussed the inhibiting effect of relative 
gains on cooperation (Gilpin 1981, 1987; Gowa 1986; Grieco 1988a, 1988b, 1990; Jervis 
1988). The intuition is correct when there are just two states. Grieco (1990)177 argues that the 
possibility of some states' seeking relative gains leads all states to forgo cooperative 
opportunities out of fear that others will take advantage of them. He labels this defensive 
positionality. But relative gains need not have this effect and instead can lead states to 
defensive cooperation. 
 
3.3: Liberalism and the “Neo-Neo debate” 
This Section addresses the core assumptions of Liberalism and its most contemporary strands 
by pointing at the differences with Realism. The more relevant focus on regimes and 
cooperative environment is particularly stressed. As in the previous Section, there is an ending 
sub-Section on the configuration of cooperation and institutionalization according to this 
theory.  
Two main contributions from Liberalism are useful for the purposes of this analysis: the first 
                                                            
176 An early attempt to discuss relative gains with Realist lenses comes from Waltz himself. See his Theory of 
international politics, Addison-Wesley Pub. Co., p. 195: “In self-help systems, as we know competing parties 
consider relative gains more important than absolute ones. Absolute gains become more important as 
competition lessens” 
177 Grieco, J. Cooperation among Nations, Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990 
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one is Moravcsik’s (least helpful)178, the other one is institutionalists’ (most helpful)179. This 
Sub-Section addresses both, with a clear preference for the latter. 
Realism and liberalism meet together at the contact point between neo-classical realism and 
(neo)liberal intergovernmentalism. This is a fundamental passage to understand the 
development of theory and how it is related to this research. Moravcsik, the most renowned 
scholar when it comes to the role of state preferences in cooperative endeavours in 
international affairs and supranational integration, looked at foreign policy (even between 
actors which are different in their definition such as the EU and the US) as a bottom-up 
process: foreign policy choices are aggregate outcomes, resembling a scale from micro-actors 
at the domestic level, whose preferences are in the end filtered by systemic factors, i.e. the 
preferences of the other units in international relations. Interdependence becomes the real 
explanatory variable in the “grand theory” (Moravcsik, 1997). And interdependence is also the 
most important factor for liberals, which are at the conjunction between modern realists and 
liberal institutionalists. Starting with Moravcsik’s approach may be confusing. His interests are 
more focused on supranational integration and do not share many of the “positive” liberal 
assumptions. Nevertheless, he can be the best element of connection between core realist 
ideas that were presented in the opening Section and the liberal ideas that will be presented in 
this Section. 
Neo-classical realists are interested in some of these same domestic variables but they take a 
top-down structural approach, analysing the macro-political structure of world power as a 
determinant for which actions domestic actors can take. The liberal approach has 
demonstrated the unique nature of the Western political sphere, identifying domestic factors 
such as liberal ideology, democratic political structures and transnational elites as variables 
                                                            
178 This contribution is mainly drawn from Moravcsik, A., “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of 
International Politics”, International Organization 51, 4, Autumn 1997, pp. 513–53 
179 See 3.3.1 for an analysis of regimes. Institutionalism is studied throughout each Sub-Section as the term of 
reference for every liberal strand of theory assessed in this dissertation 
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permitting the genesis of a uniquely stable, post-anarchic Western world180. “In this vein, 
much of transatlantic alignment is explained by reference to the domestic, societal context for 
international cooperation” (Byrne, 2013). Neo-liberal institutionalists then study functional 
cooperation as a result of (also informal) institutions managing tensions produced by modern 
struggles in many subjects. It should also be noted that, “unlike liberals, neoliberal 
institutionalists take state preferences as fixed and exogenously given and explain state policy 
as a function of variation in the geopolitical environment rather than the transmission of 
domestic preferences and the resulting interaction among single state interests” 181 . At 
transatlantic level, the need for collaboration has fostered many EU-US dialogues, especially in 
the sector security; cyber-security WGs, bank and passenger data sharing arrangements (PNR), 
CSDP-NATO cooperative agreements.  
In the economic field, what really is striking when it comes to institutionalizing processes that 
do not conduct to formal international institutions is the abused concept of “regimes”. Setting 
the standards in fields so different such as mutual recognition of conformity assessments, 
common guarantees and trade barriers means not only fostering a bold policy-shifting 
initiative, but also giving rise to a completely new “regime”. This implies that new formal rules 
are ineffective if norms, ideas and habits are not changed. As it will be shown later in the 
chapter, business dialogues and informal governance are key liberal features of international 
relations. Managing foreign policy through relatively stable non-governmental structures may 
be desirable for liberal theorists, even though their approach deserves some deeper thinking182. 
This will no doubt be a lengthy process with no guarantee of success. Nevertheless, these real-
life examples provide support for scholars arguing that the multi-faceted nature of EU-US 
                                                            
180 A good paper assessing the domestic sources of regulatory standards and how they impact on the transatlantic 
relations is the one by Luetz, S. (2011) “Back to the future? The domestic sources of transatlantic regulation”, 
Review of International Political Economy, 18:4 October, pp. 3-22 
181 Moravcsik, A. (1997), “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics”, International 
Organization, Vol. 51, No. 4 (Autumn), p. 513-553, accessible at 
http://www.princeton.edu/~amoravcs/library/preferences.pdf (last accession 03/20/2014) 
182 I am not going into further details in this part of the dissertation. It should only represent a configuration of 
the explanatory power of different theories when it comes to the transatlantic partnership. Nevertheless, theorists 
have analysed the role of informal networks of private actors in policy-making as sub-units of government.  
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collaboration should be acknowledged as given, and not merely as an accident of history. 
Neorealist and neoliberal theories cannot explain why EU-US cooperation is largely 
discretionary instead of based in treaties signed by “the states”. Therefore, while the rationalist 
systemic explanations can explain the EU-US transition to cooperation in their own terms, 
they fall short of convincingly explaining a crucial element of the resulting cooperation. The 
problem follows from two central assumptions of the rationalist systemic approaches—states 
are unitary actors and states are the most important units of analysis. Before discussing this 
problem, two other shortcomings unique to each of these approaches must be addressed. 
First, cooperation in transatlantic economic policy does not seem the likely result of 
calculations by unitary states operating in a neorealist, self-help world. When the result of 
cooperation is an unbalanced (relative) loss of sovereignty over a respective domestic market, 
why would a self-interested, unitary state allow foreign intervention in the way it decides to 
manage the very structure of its domestic market183? This reality of domestic policies operating 
in an international system characterized by EI presents a fundamental challenge to the 
neorealist emphasis on the importance of national sovereignty and relative gains. Second, a 
crucial problem also exists for the neoliberal regime theories. Neoliberal explanations of 
transatlantic cooperation, which claim that overcoming information shortages are a crucial 
reason for creating regimes, would likely predict a regime in many trade-related policies for the 
exchange of information and the establishment of a bilateral dispute settlement mechanism. In 
reality, the transatlantic cooperation regime prohibits the exchange of confidential business 
information due to protections afforded by domestic law and lacks a dispute settlement 
mechanism, as in the case of competition policy.  
Therefore, common liberal views of trade as the most important thing in the EU-US bilateral 
                                                            
183 This is the argument used by Damro when addressing the issue of Market Power Europe. For an even more 
detailed account and a legal point of view, see Fahey, E. (2014), “Damro’s 'Market Power Europe': A Legal 
Perspective”, Discussion remarks: University of Luxembourg Faculty of Law 'EU in the World Lecture Series' 12 
June 2014, accessible at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2457810 (last accessed 
06/10/2014) 
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partnership may be not entirely true. Economic interdependence and the idea that trade is the 
only way for states to avoid wars were seen as a panacea by many twenty years ago, while now 
they seemingly look outdated. A growing literature has tried to challenge this view184. Rather, 
the regime focuses on the exchange of non-confidential information and dispute prevention. 
In the transatlantic competition regime, for example, the only recourse to dispute settlement 
seems to be (the decreasingly likely) intervention by domestic politicians threatening to 
exercise unilateral extraterritorial measures. While the neorealists and neoliberals suffer from 
what has just been said, they also share problems that arise from their mutual reliance on a 
unitary actor assumption and state-centric focus. By assuming a unitary “state” as the unit of 
analysis, systemic explanations often overlook and/or disregard crucial sub-systemic actors 
that may contribute significantly to compelling causal explanations of international 
cooperation. The acceptance by neoliberals that collective action might be possible through 
institutions- albeit qualified - helps explain why the EU and US would undergo a process of 
institution building (through the TAD, the NTA and the TEP) and institution enlargement (of 
NATO and the WTO). 
A final contribution which should be accounted before proceeding towards summing up the 
whole theoretical framework is the one by Ikenberry. A leading advocate of the liberal 
approach, Ikenberry notes that a liberal international order has changed over time in its ideas 
and real-world formations. Not embodied in a fixed set of principles and practices, its main 
aspects, such as open markets, international institutions, cooperative security, a democratic 
community of states, progressive change, collective problem-solving, shared sovereignty and 
the rule of law, have appeared in different combinations. (Ikenberry, 2009). Identifying liberal 
                                                            
184 Doyle, M. (1997), Ways of War and Peace: Realism, Liberalism, and Socialism, New York: Norton; McMillan, S. 
(1996) “Interdependence and Conflict,” Mershon International Studies Review 41: pp. 33–58; Stein, A. A. (1993) 
“Governments, Economic Interdependence, and International Cooperation,” in Behaviour, Society, and Nuclear 
War, vol. 3, ed. Philip E. Tetlock et al., New York: Oxford University Press; Nye, Jr., J. (1988) “Neorealism and 
Neoliberalism,” World Politics, 40: pp. 235–51. Also see Rosecrance, R. (1986), The Rise of the Trading State: 
Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World, New York: Basic Books; Rosecrance, R. N. (1999), The Rise of the Virtual 
State: Wealth and Power in the Coming Century, New York: Basic Books; Mueller, J., (1989), Retreat from Doomsday: The 
Obsolescence of Major War, New York: Basic Books; and Friedman, T. (2000), The Lexus and the Olive Tree, New 
York: Anchor Books 
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aspects in changes in international orders, Ikenberry distinguishes three versions or historical 
manifestations of liberal internationalism, based on scope (selective or global participation), 
sovereignty (degree of restrictions on state sovereignty), hierarchy (degree of equality in rights 
and authority among actors), rule of law (legally binding or ad hoc norms) and policy domain 
(breadth and depth, narrow or expansive)185 . Ikenberry finally addresses the issue of a 
transformed, post-hegemonic liberal international order that would be more universal in 
scope, with expanding participation of rising non-Western powers in core governing 
institutions. It would lead to the adoption of post-Westphalian sovereignty, reconciling more 
intrusive rules and institutions186. It would be less hierarchical, with the US playing a less 
dominant role and ceding authority and control to a wider set of leading states in various 
combinations. The rule-based system would be expanded, with more authority shifted to 
multilateral and universal institutions, coupled with network-based cooperation. Moreover, 
policy domains covered by the liberal order would be expanded further. This prediction, 
which is now almost entirely outdated because of the financial crisis, sets the bar for an 
interesting rethinking of the issue of cooperation as known until nowadays. As it will be 
shown in the sub-section below, cooperation in liberal terms means much more than pure 
avoidance of troubles like it was in Realist terms and much less than shared and common 
understandings as it was for constructivists.  
 
3.3.1: Regimes and institutional cooperation 
Regimes are another important feature of liberal theory, at least for the last twenty years. Their 
study took off in the late 1970s, challenging the realist orthodoxy, emphasizing the importance 
of transnational actors, interdependence and “low” politics, namely the three most important 
                                                            
185 This approach by Ikenberry echoes his longstanding commitment to strengthening the liberal approach to 
international relations. He identifies a “Liberal internationalism 3.0” that reflects the current status quo. Its 
predecessors are Wilsonian liberalism and Cold War liberalism. In order to distinguish among them, he develops 
a model with the aforementioned variables.  
186  Ikenberry, J. (1999), “Law in an Emerging Global Village: A Post-Westphalian Perspective”, Foreign 
Affairs;May/Jun99, Vol. 78 Issue 3, p132 (book review)  
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elements of transatlantic relations. The most widely used definition of regimes comes from 
Stephen Krasner, who described them as “sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms and 
rules and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given 
area of international relations”187. The explicit purpose of regimes is to enhance the capacity of 
international actors to cooperate in specific domains. The transatlantic one is certainly very 
keen, as it will be shown in the case studies, to apply these assumptions into practice. Some, 
alleging that the concept needed to be refocused in order to avoid tautological reasoning, 
suggested to restrict the definition of international regimes to their measurable dimensions 
and to include only “international institutions with explicit rules, agreed upon by governments, 
that pertain to particular sets of issues in the international arena”188. 
Regime theory is certainly one of the most used analytical frameworks for the study of 
international institutions, international law and international cooperation. It allows scholars to 
adopt a coherent view on phenomena, which sometimes fall short of being categorized189. Of 
course, as M. J. Peterson notes, there is no such thing as regime “theory”190.  Rather, there are 
multiple “theories of regimes”191. Robert Keohane applied economics to understand the 
demand for regimes in IPE.  John Ruggie applied a structural ideational concept of embedded 
liberalism to account for notable continuities in post-World War II regimes. Oran Young 
applied systems theory and public choice theory to explain the dynamics of regime creation.  
Donald Puchala and Ray Hopkins applied a liberal view of regimes as a whole.  However, as 
                                                            
187 Krasner, S. (ed., 1983), International Regimes, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY  
188 Rittberger, V. (ed., 1993), Regime theory and International Relations, Oxford, Clarendon Press, p. 205. More 
recently, Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger also rightly underlined that international regime and international 
organization are neither synonymous nor co-extensional, “even though in many cases regimes will be 
accompanied by organizations designed or employed to support them”. See Hasenclaver, A., Mayer, P., 
Rittberger, V., Theories of international regimes, Cambridge University Press, p. 10.  
189 Early attempts to focus on the role of regimes and the economic consequences of entangled institutional 
mechanisms are still valid nowadays. Russett, B. and Oneal, J.R., (2001) Triangulating Peace: Democracy, 
Interdependence, and International Organizations, New York: Norton; Hegre, H. (2000), “Development and the Liberal 
Peace: What Does It Take to Be a Trading State?” Journal of Peace Research, 37, no. 1: 5–30; Oneal, J. R. and Lee 
Ray, J. (1997), “New Tests of the Democratic Peace: Controlling for Economic Interdependence, 1950–1985,” 
Political Research Quarterly 50, no. 4  
190 Peterson, M. J.  (2012). “International Regimes as Concept.”  e-International Relations; avaialble from 
http://www.e-ir.info/2012/12/21/international-regimes-as-concept/. 
191 Haggard, S. and B. A. Simmons (1987). “Theories of International Regimes.” International Organization 
41(3), pp. 491-517 
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Ruggie and Kratochwil noted, liberal and rationalist approaches to regimes are incapable of 
accounting for the full transformative effects of regimes192 (Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986). 
The original 1982 International Organization (IO) special issues on regimes193 and the research 
programs they generated are important for a number of reasons. As Peterson notes, they 
brought international institutions back into the fold of legitimate scholarly inquiry.  They 
showcased the early chops of a number of rising mid-career scholars and more senior figures. 
It supplemented the old style IR focus on power to explain collective outcomes and 
international law with a focus on institutional design, norms, and causal beliefs. With hindsight 
we can see how it anticipated meta-theoretical moves in the field as well, while still being 
bound by the paradigms frame of the third debate in IR.  Beyond the paradigmatic 
perspectives expressed by Susan Strange in her IO special issue role as the iconoclastic not so 
loyal opposition, Krasner and Ernst Haas foreshadowed some pragmatism194 and analytic 
eclecticism195 in their efforts to find mid-level interparadigmatic findings. 
Still, the 1982 IO issue developed a common definition involving persistent negotiated 
agreements that are made up of “implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-
making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international 
relations” (Krasner 1983).  The definition opened doors for the study of IR. The dual focus 
on ideas – norms and principles – and on more material aspects of regimes – rules and 
decision making procedures – enabled the study of ideas’ influence on collective outcomes as 
well as the role of material capabilities and formal institutional arrangements. 
Empirical work on regimes flourished, leading to applications across the substantive fields of 
IR including such areas as IPE, security studies, the environment, human rights, arms control, 
nuclear proliferation, shipping, air transport, telecommunications, postal services, trade, 
                                                            
192 Kratochwil, F. V.,Ruggie, J.V., (1986), “International Organization:  A State of the Art on the Art of the 
State.” International Organization 40(4): 753-775. 
193 See Table 1 for a scheme on different theoretical approaches to regime theory 
194 Bauer, H., Brighi, E., (2009), Pragmatism in International Relations, London, Routledge 
195 Sil, R., Katzenstein, P., (2010), “Analytic Eclecticism in the Study of World Politics.” Perspectives on Politics 
8(2), pp. 411-431; Sil, R. Kazenstein, P.J., (2010), Beyond Paradigms:  Analytic Eclecticism in the Study of World 
Politics. London, Palgrave Macmillan 
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money and finance, development, labor, drugs, and food. Norms proved to be important 
independent variables for the study of human rights, foreign aid (Lumsdaine 1993), and such 
arms control regimes as the land-mine ban. Causal ideas were important independent variables 
as well for explaining regime creation and regime persistence. 
Regimes were also found to have transformative effects, challenging Strange’s contention that 
regimes are merely epiphenomenal.  As Krasner claimed, the power shifts engendered through 
the operation of regime rules may lead to a realigned balance of power, and to new power 
based explanations of cooperation and behavior.  Regimes also contributed to the 
involvement of new groups of non-state actors with their own causal beliefs and norms196. 
By the 1990s, work had moved on to the comparative study of international regimes, finding a 
powerful role for causal ideas and epistemic communities in a number of substantive areas 
including but not limited to the environment 197  (Braithwaite and Drahos 2000; Miles, 
Underdal et al. 2002), while some more recent work has picked up on the interactive effects 
between regimes and highlighted the nature of regime complexity198. 
Regime study also provided a vehicle for more fruitful theoretical fermentation. The common 
referent offered the promise of mid-level theorizing across research traditions.  Ernst Haas 
wrote in the IO issue, in a singularly neglected piece, that a common focus on regimes could 
provide an opportunity for developing interparadigm consensus – and also presumably an 
understanding of differences – by focusing on a clear empirical referent of interest to all and 
establishing the domains in which particular factors (or independent variables) or even social 
mechanisms played a significant role, and in what combinations. 
Regime analysis still promises fruitful insights into IR199.  While much of the work has focused 
                                                            
196 Haas, P., (1989), “Do Regimes Matter? Epistemic Communities and Mediterranean Pollution Control.” 
International Organization 43(3), pp. 377-403; Finnemore, M., Sikkink, M. (1998), “International Norm 
Dynamics and Political Change”, International Organization, 52(4) 
197 Braithwaite, J., Drahos, P., (2000), Global Business Regulation, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
198 Aggarwal, V. K., Ed. (1998). Institutional Designs for a Complex World. Ithaca, Cornell University Press. 
Alter, K. J., Meunier, S. (2009), “The Politics of International Regime Complexity.” Perspectives on Politics 7(1), 
pp. 13-24 
199 Neuman,, I., Waever, O. (2005), The future of international relations: masters in the making, Routledge, New York 
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on descriptive and institutional based accounts, which are ultimately incapable of asking the 
more fundamental questions regarding the transformative potential unlocked by regimes, 
further lines of inquiry are still available through studies of the reflexive dynamics within 
regimes, and of the interparadigmatic lessons gleaned from the large array of research to 
date200.  Reflexive dynamics can be fruitfully studied through panel studies (qualitative or 
quantitative) that link ideational and normative change to changes in state practices, as 
mediated by formal regimes.  In particular attention should be paid to the types of states and 
countries that are subject to various regime informed dynamics. 
In turn, cumulative knowledge that cuts across theoretical approaches to regime analysis is 
possible as well based on such studies.  For instance, power based analyses expect regimes to 
have greater impacts on weaker parties, whereas institutional analysis with its emphasis on 
resolving transaction costs and structural impediments to cooperation would be more likely to 
expect more uniform effects.  In turn, constructivists expect to see more normative change 
and learning; the variation in target states and parties is a fruitful avenue for further regime 
based analysis. Thus, common studies of a shared empirical referent can provide for 
reconciling theoretical differences regarding the principal political dynamics of world politics, 
and the substantive, historical, geographic and analytic domains in which they operate. 
The central question, then, is to assess whether the output of US-EU relations can be 
explained by existing international regimes201. US-EU relations are indeed surrounded by, or 
even embedded in, many regimes that could affect, actively or passively, transatlantic 
cooperation. These regimes can be facilitating elements, targets, alternatives, obstacles or 
sources of emulation. Explanatory propositions for each of these five variants are offered 
below.  
                                                            
200 Strange, S. (1982), “Cave! hic dragones: a critique of regime analysis.” International Organization, 36(2), pp. 479-
496 
201 Damro’s view on this issue is quite clear. See Damro’s latest commentary on the TTIP negotiations: 
http://www.europeanideas.eu/pages/economics/international-trade/market-power-europe-and-the-
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The first proposition is building on the core assumption that international regimes foster 
cooperation202. It implies that the degree of US-EU cooperation should be greater in issue 
areas where solid regimes pre-exist and can be exploited as building blocks for the 
partnership. In other words, international regimes should facilitate the development of US-EU 
cooperation by providing a number of multilateral principles, which apply to bilateral 
relations. Strong regimes can also contribute to increase the level of cooperation by the 
lowering of transaction costs (among other things, they foster contacts and facilitate the 
exploration of possible package deals); by reducing uncertainty and risks (they enhance mutual 
understanding of the international context, increase mutual transparency and structure mutual 
expectations); and by lengthening “the shadow of the future” (they create an incentive to 
abide by agreements, since, in a repeated game, credibility is a valuable asset which is worth 
more than the immediate gains from defection. Finally, regimes can foster cooperation by 
their action at a cognitive level. The development of regimes has a lot to do with ideas, 
ideologies or intellectual fashions and representations of the past and the future. It is in this 
regard that constructivism could turn out to be useful even if regime theory was developed by 
liberal theorists203. The difference between the two sets of propositions is that ideas shape 
regimes in a voluntary manner, i.e. states decide autonomously to create certain binding 
constraints that with due course of time transform themselves into regimes. However, they do 
not reflect any particular spontaneous status. In the case of constructivism, there is no reason 
to create regimes as such, since (unwritten) norms already regulate the transatlantic 
relationship. This vision will be better articulated in the following Chapter, but it is important 
to make clear the rationale of regimes and outline its difference with constructivism. If 
international regimes suggest or reinforce positive images about US-EU cooperation, 
underline its healing potential and historical necessity, they help to lower transaction costs 
                                                            
202 Hasenclever, A., Mayer, P., Rittberger. V. (2000), “Integrating theories of international regimes”, Review of 
International Studies 26 (1), pp. 3-33 
203 Kratochwil, F. V. (1989), Rules, norms, and decisions on the conditions of practical and legal reasoning in international 
relations and domestic affairs. Cambridge [Cambridgeshire] ; New York: Cambridge University Press 
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very substantially and therefore facilitate joint developments204.  
The second proposition looks at regimes as possible targets for US-EU cooperation and 
directly related to the shared interest argument outlined in the previous section. Cooperation 
should increase when and where there is a need to join forces to defend, amend or create 
international regimes. The analysis should examine if cooperation in these domains was higher 
than in areas where there is no need for an international regime.  
The third one posits that the degree of US-EU cooperation should be negatively affected by 
the existence of regimes, which offer better alternatives for one of the partners. One 
illustration of this possible effect is the phenomenon of “institutional shopping”: when 
agreement seems too difficult, costly or time-consuming at US-EU level, the interested party 
starts looking for solution in other international fora. By moving the issue on the agenda of 
the OECD, WTO, IMF, NATO, WEU or OSCE (with a varying degree of importance 
throughout history), it becomes possible to circumvent recalcitrant actors or take advantage of 
specific cleavages in the coalition of the opponents (the particularly saturated European 
institutional architecture – especially the economic one – and the multiplication of 
international organizations should increase the probability of such a scenario.  
The fourth proposition states that proponents of an international regime could target the EU-
US relationship if the latter undermines, among other things, their institutional raison d’etre or 
short-circuits their normal procedures. For instance, parts of the bureaucratic élite, of an 
international organization like the United Nations’ ECOSOC or Geneva-based WTO could 
see themselves as engaged in direct rivalry with other organizations dealing with similar issues 
and be tempted to damage a competing bilateral relationship. In this case, it seems that NSAs’ 
institutions created by the NTA and with following agreements represent a sui generis 
                                                            
204 This view can be challenged by Realist scholarship on the economic causes First World War. Contrary to the 
common assumption that the WWI was caused by divergent interests, a strand of theory recently pointed its 
finger to the established knowledge about international economic growth and the globalizing effect it had on 
many states before the WWI. See Rowe, D. (2005), “The Tragedy of Liberalism How Globalization Caused the 
First World War, Security Studies, 14:3, pp. 407 447 
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phenomenon. Institutions as conceived by regime theory have a rather strict definition, and 
clear borders. The creation of formal dialogues or the “outsourcing of institutions”205 may not 
been considered similar to transatlantic institutions related to security matters such as NATO. 
Their structure is loose, as it has already been demonstrated in Chapter 2, and does not retain 
any real coercive power on the associates. Businesses and consumers get together 
autonomously and do not concede any power to the institution. Moreover, the institution 
itself is not a supranational entity, with its own statute and its own rules. It is usually an 
organization based in either the EU or the US, subject to the law of either the former or the 
latter.  
The final proposition revolves around the possible impact of the booming development of 
region-to-region relations and regional regimes. If regional organizations are conceived as 
competing and mutually exclusive entities, the development of other instances of regional 
cooperation should be a source of emulation and have a positive impact on US-EU 
cooperation. In what may be defined as an arms race without arms, such a context should 
indeed drive actors to deepen their regional privileged relationship defensively.  
 
3.3.2 Liberalism and cooperation 
Liberalism itself is historically based on cooperation as a means to achieve peaceful relations 
among nations206. This sub-Section focuses on two kinds of liberal theories, which have 
already been outlined in the previous part as the most interesting ones, deriving from 
                                                            
205 Ahearn, R. (2011), “Rising Economic Powers and the Global Economy: Trends and Issues for Congress”, 
Congressional Research Service 
206 Heerbert, A. L. (1996), “Cooperation in International Relations: A Comparison of Keohane, Haas and 
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institutionalists’ point of view.  
Both the “micro-level” liberal theory, which has a focus on preferences, and the “macro-level” 
institutionalism, which employs a more sophisticated and game theory-based way of looking at 
international politics, are related to the study of cooperation within a framework of 
competition and anarchy among states. This anarchy does not have anything to do with the 
Realist one: it is not a state of nature, but a simple recognition of a status quo207. While 
Realism has always attempted to explain without having any claim to suit a moral dress, 
Liberalism has stressed since the beginning the need to foster cooperation in order to achieve 
peaceful stability. The dog bites its tail: does cooperation come first or is stability necessary to 
achieve cooperation in a second stage? The liberal answer is not clear. If, like liberals do, 
cooperation is conceived only in material terms, it may be hard to clearly identify what drives 
it and how it is carried on.  
In this Sub-section three points will be touched upon, in order to find out the commonalities 
between the two theories. First, which kind of cooperation is being dealt with. Is it a one-
sided cooperation? Can there be other qualifications added to it? Second, how neoliberals and 
institutionalists have dealt with it. It rests upon them the best classification of cooperative 
environments, which has been put forward so far. Finally, which lessons can be drawn from 
the liberal conception of cooperation. 
An attempt to explain “cooperation” in liberal terms has been advanced by Keohane, which 
proposed a basic definition, largely accepted until now: “[Cooperation] requires that the 
actions of separate individuals or organizations – which are not in pre-existent harmony be 
brought into conformity with one another through a process of negotiation”208. While there 
are many reasons why actors cooperate, the concrete objective of cooperation is mainly to 
                                                            
207 The most exhaustive definition was given by Axelrod and Keohane: “[Anarchy is] a lack of common 
government in world politics, not to a denial that an international society-albeit a fragmented one-exists”, see 
Axelrod, R., Keohane, R. (1985), “Achieving cooperation under anarchy: strategies and institutions”, World 
Politics, Vol. 38, No. 1 (Oct., 1985), pp. 226-254 
208 Keohane, R. (1984), After Hegemony: Cooperation and discord in the World Political Economy, Princeton University 
Press, pp. 51-52 
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deal with externalities (i.e. minimize disturbances caused by policies) or make policies mutually 
reinforcing. There are many forms of international cooperation. Some of them are 
intertwined, and where one fails, there the other(s) intervene. They range from simple 
information sharing (like Passengers names’ records) in order to narrow down the range of 
“acceptable” options by pressure or persuasion, ex ante consultation and negotiation of mutual 
reinforcement (i.e. adopting identical, complementary or subsidiary policies), ex post 
adjustments through mutual concessions (avoid or repelling antagonistic policies), up to joint 
actions. This varying degree of forms of cooperation justifies the broad use of this term, and 
the need for a specific qualification of its different elements. Being entangled in the 
interdependent international order established by the end of the Cold War means for many 
states the need to rethink the conduct of their respective foreign policies and a renewed trust 
towards each other. Cooperation allows some of them to divert public spending from some 
particularly demanding policy and to share expenditure within, for example, a multilateral 
organization. The clearest example of this phenomenon is the World Trade Organization 
(WTO), which was born in the mid-1990s as a response to aspirations by certain states to 
create a new way of competing in the international sphere by having shared and agreed rules. 
The EU and the US had some very important struggles within the WTO framework209 but in 
the end it turned out to be one of the most relevant tools to create a leverage for liberal 
principles to spread210.  
The qualification of cooperation, which is of particular interest for the sake of this analysis is 
certainly that of institutional cooperation. With a strong caveat to bear in mind: usually, 
institutional liberalism is referred to states getting together and binding themselves by 
establishing norms and a supranational authority (the institution) which prevent them from 
cheating and receding from the cooperation. Therefore, it has nothing to do with the 
                                                            
209 Petersmann, E.U., Pollack, M. (2003), Transatlantic Economic Disputes: The EU, the US, and the WTO, 
Oxford University Press 
210 Chorev, N. (2005) ‘The Institutional Project of Neo-Liberal Globalism: The Case of the WTO’, Theory and 
Society, 34 (3): 317-355 
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particular case of cooperation between two entities (the EU and the US), which did not either 
“regionalize” or “institutionalized” at the state-level their relationship. The transatlantic 
partnership is not like NAFTA, or MERCOSUR, or ECOWAS. The choice for a weakly 
institutionalized relationship has been an almost self-imposed binding constraint, in order not 
to allow anyone the status of major power or the role of leader.  The focus, as it has been 
mentioned in the Introduction, is on NSAs and how the institutionalization of their exchanges 
and relationships shaped transatlantic decision-making and was shaped by it. The creation of 
fora for a constructive dialogue influenced greatly the conduct of transatlantic relations from 
the point of view of the will to cooperate. Institutions are believed to be a way for leaders to 
make the international environment more predictable.  
The second question for this part addresses the issue of how neoliberals theorists have tackled 
the issue of institutions. Early Realist did not even take into consideration the role of 
international institutions. The bipolar world and the failures of the UN in Congo, Korea or 
South-East Asia were too strong an example against the feasibility of a world where there 
were many centres of power dispersed. Institutionalists question Waltz's emphasis on the 
structure of the international system, preferring instead to concentrate on the process of 
international politics, which they see as a process for the management of conflict (Keohane 
and Nye 1993). Where mutual interest exists, international institutions acting as “brokers and 
negotiators” serve state interests by mediating policy coordination among powerful actors. 
They influence the policy agenda by opening channels of communication, creating value 
networks between states and providing focal points of co-ordination 211 . International 
institutions also reduce the likelihood of conflict by creating opportunities for negotiations, 
reducing uncertainty about others’ policies and affecting leaders’ expectations of the future212. 
                                                            
211 Keohane, R (1989), “Neoliberal Institutionalism: A Perspective on World Politics”, in Keohane, R. (ed), 
International Institutions and Stale Power - Essays in International Relations Theory, Boulder, CO: Westview 
Press 
212 This is a typical liberal focus on the transaction costs in international politics. As Milligan states, “Keohane’s 
answer to these questions, which employed insights from the work of Coase (1960), Williamson (1983) and 
others, pointed to the importance of transactions costs as an independent variable in understanding international 
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The acceptance by neoliberals that collective action might be possible through institutions- 
albeit qualified - helps explain why the EU and US would undergo a process of institution 
building (through the TAD, the NTA and the TEP mentioned in Chapter 2) and institution 
enlargement (of NATO and the WTO). 
Finally, how can this theorization be useful for the following analysis? It has two main 
implications: the first one is a contrario: institutional cooperation in liberalism does not 
completely fit into the research question of the present study. It does not help explaining why 
two “states” decide to cooperate for the enhancement of their respective economic ties, nor 
why they institutionalize existing economic relationships. It has a more general fashion, and it 
is strongly related to broader mechanisms in international politics. The second one is that 
liberalism can be useful because at least it considers cooperation as a vital feature in 
international affairs, but it does not contain all the nuances this concept brings with itself. It 
does not include the role of shared norms, nor it entails deep reflection on the issues behind 
the curtains.  
 
3.4: Constructivism and the logic of institutionalization 
This third Section deals with the final theory outlined in this dissertation, by pointing at the 
role of usually ignored variables, which instead contribute highly to constructivist IR theory. 
The final sub-Section, which is slightly more relevant (and incidentally more difficult) than the 
others, aims at explaining the concept of cooperation as a result of communicative actions 
among states and other actors.  
An early constructivist approach to world politics can be traced back to the mid-1950s, after 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
cooperative phenomena. Keohane’s approach explicitly focused on the institutional features of international 
cooperation, which distinguishes it from the more abstract game-theoretic treatments of the subject. The 
standard game-theoretic account of international cooperation, which Snidal (1996) and Abbot and Snidal (1998) 
call “decentralized cooperation theory,” cannot answer Keohane’s questions because in that theory institutions 
are not necessary to facilitate international cooperation”. For further reference, see Gilligan M. (2011) “The 
transactions costs approach to international institutions”, Unpublished manuscript, accessible here: 
http://politics.as.nyu.edu/docs/IO/2601/TransactionsCostsApproach.pdf (last accession 04/07/2014) 
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the end of the war. Even if the reference to a “constructed reality” has only recently been 
advanced, scholars like Karl Deutsch have for a long time thought of world politics and 
especially relations among similar countries as something that went beyond purely cost-benefit 
behaviour. It became clear, at a certain point in time and when IR theory was being driven by 
statisticians and mathematical models in resourceful research centres like the Rand 
Corporation, that international politics was far beyond the simple possession of nuclear 
weapons and/or money. The original idea by Karl Deutsch, who was a Czech immigrant in 
the US and had known the perils of suspect and fear among friendly nations, was a rather 
simple one. Its major contribution has been to set the bar one step beyond the typical 
reflections of that time on international relations. While the focus of early IR scholars like 
Morgenthau was on the friend/foe divide, Karl Deutsch’ one was rather an insider/outsider 
approach. To put it more clearly, he aimed at studying “social groups with a process of 
political communication, some machinery for enforcement, and some popular habits of 
compliance”213. The theory of “Political Community” aims to introduce a theory of political 
integration: the theory of transactionalism. The explicit assumption is that political integration 
is a means to stabilize the nation-state system in order to prevent war. The central object of 
the historical-comparative analysis is the creation of security communities (defined as political 
communities without internal wars)214. Yet, the theory focuses not exclusively on political, but 
also social and economic processes. Three conditions need to exist for a stable pluralist 
                                                            
213 Deutsch, K. W., et al. (1968). Political Community and the North Atlantic Area. Princeton, New Jersey, 
Princeton University Press. 
214 The definition of these “communities” is in fact quite complicated and assumed many other variables. This 
brief excerpt may clarify some points: “[…] by ‘amalgamation’ we mean the formal merger of two or more 
previously independent units into a single larger unit, with some type of common government after 
amalgamation. This common government may be unitary or federal. The United States today is an example of 
the amalgamated type. It became a single governmental unit by the formal merger of several formerly 
independent units. It has one supreme decision-making center. The ‘pluralistic’ security-community, on the other 
hand, retains the legal independence of separate governments. The combined territory of the United States and 
Canada is an example of the pluralistic type. Its two separate governmental units form a security-community 
without being merged. It has two supreme decision-making centers. Where amalgamation occurs without 
integration, of course a security-community does not exist. Since our study deals with the problem of ensuring 
peace, we shall say that any political community, be it amalgamated or pluralistic, was eventually successful if it 
became a security-community-that is, if it achieved integration-and that it was unsuccessful if it ended eventually 
in secession or civil war”. See ivi, p. 3 
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regime: 1) compatibility of major values, 2) response to each others’ needs without recourse to 
violence, 3) and mutual predictability of societal, political and economic behaviour. 
Communications between states will lead to a sense of community between them. Thus, 
transactionalism contends that an increase in transactions of a communicative nature would 
lead to levels of trust necessary for political integration into a security community. The 
communicative action and the “communicative turn”215 in IR theory are certainly an important 
feature of contemporary world politics. The more actors that interact on the international 
arena can be defined similarly by what they say, think and learn, the more it can be predicted 
on how they will behave on the international stage.  
As Deutsch himself puts it,  
“The populations of different territories might easily profess verbal 
attachment to the same set of values without having a sense of 
community that leads to political integration. The kind of sense of 
community that is relevant for integration and therefore for our 
study, turned out to be rather a matter of mutual sympathy and 
loyalties; of “we-feeling,”, trust, and mutual consideration; of partial 
identification in terms of self-images and interests; of mutually 
successful predictions of behavior, and of cooperative action in 
accordance with it - in short, a matter of perpetual dynamic process 
of mutual attention, communication, perception of needs and 
responsiveness in the process of decision-making. “Peaceful 
change” could not be assured without this kind of relationship”216. 
 
Transactionalism might well be relevant also to the contemporary debate on the EU polity, 
even though it does not serve the purpose of this dissertation. An influential federalist/post 
sovereign position may be characterized as follows: Europe’s peoples will or should become 
loyal to the ‘European regime’, since European integration furthers their interest and its 
institutions embody core values, such as democracy and human rights. Transactionalism 
acknowledges the importance of shared interests and values, which is a core assumption of 
                                                            
215  Albert, M., Kessler, O., Stetter, S. (2008), “On order and conflict: International Relations and the 
‘communicative turn”,  
Review of International Studies, Vol. 34, S1, pp 43-67 
216 Deutsch, K. (1957) “Political community and the North Atlantic Area”, in Deutsch, K. et al., op. cit., Princeton 
University Press 
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constructivism217. However, these non-material factors function as background conditions for 
integration, but they do not lead to integration per se. Communications through transactions 
are the key to sustained (and further) integration. This perspective might help explain for 
example Europe’s elites pushing integration without always clear rational national interests 
(contra intergovernmentalism), besides a simultaneous lack of popular support despite shared 
interests and values. The elites communicate often (many transactions), but the populations 
do not (few transactions). The legitimacy discrepancy becomes a ‘function’ of the high levels 
of trust and willingness to cooperate between elites and the lower levels among the 
population. With this in mind, it might be self-evident to explain transatlantic relations as the 
result of continuous interactions and exchange of frames and norms among actors. But is 
constructivism sufficient to explain why there are so many discrepancies in the transatlantic 
relationship? Surely not, since the “constitution”218 of authority is dispersed at so many levels 
that it becomes difficult to find out who does what and more importantly who leads whom. 
Nevertheless, the conceptual tools it employs are certainly more apt to investigate the role of 
private networks in fostering trade, and, more generally, in establishing causal relationships 
among issues.  
Constructivist theory became a widely used tool to assess almost every single trend in 
international relations at the end of the millennium219. Transatlantic relations could not escape 
                                                            
217 Among many others, see Wendt, A. (1995) “Constructing international politics”, International Security, Vol. 20, 
No.1, pp. 71-81 
218 Wendt claims that “[…] ’Constitute’ is an important term in critical theory, with a special meaning that is not 
captured by related terms like ‘comprise’, ‘consist of’, or ‘cause’. To say that ‘X [for example, a social structure] 
constitutes Y [for example, an agent]’ is to say that the properties of those agents are made possible by, and 
would not exist in the absence of, the structure by which they are ‘constituted’. A constitutive relationship 
establishes a conceptually necessary or logical connection between X and Y, in contrast to the contingent 
connection between independently existing entities that is established by causal relationships”. See ivi, p. 72 
(footnote) 
219  Constructivist international relations theorists draw heavily from Anthony Giddens’s theory of 
“structuration”. See e.g. Wendt, A. (1992), “Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of 
Power Politics”, International organization, 46, 391-425; Onuf, N. (1989), A world of our making: rules & rule in social 
theory & international relations, University of South Carolina Press. Constructivists argue against perceiving 
international relations exclusively from either a systemic level perspective (top-down) or a state unit level or 
individual level perspective (bottom-up). Instead, constructivists, such as Haas in beyond the nation-state and in 
his more recent writings, are intrigued by how the interplay between these various levels of international relations 
can operate to generate change in the bahaviour of international actors, and potentially change in the structure of 
the international system itself. 
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from being subject to scrutiny by scholars devoted to constructivism. What did they focus on? 
Mostly on the causes and consequences of cooperation, from a very different angle. They 
didn’t analyse existing cooperation as a positive-sum game, that leads states to further 
strengthen their ties. They more broadly conceived cooperation as the realm of shared ideas 
and characteristics for actors. Milner (1997), Risse (1995a) and Putnam (1993; 1998) stressed 
the importance of multiple actors and multiple levels in international negotiations after the 
end of the Cold War. This new scholarship was entrenched in the assumption that the neo-
neo debate was not enough to understand the polyedric nature of transatlantic relations. 
Moreover, it was clear to almost everyone that the assumption of states as purely rationalist 
actors – albeit influenced by many sources – was a limit rather than a guidance in research. 
This change in assumed knowledge was certainly due to the influence of the growing 
“constructivist turn” in IR theory. This profound change220 The idea that domestic and 
international politics were not separable, and that domestic agents- be they political 
institutions, domestic groups, state or non-state actors- influenced international negotiations, 
united a number of emerging IR theories. According to sociological institutionalism or social 
constructivism, the transatlantic order is based on more than contingent overlaps of interests, 
and also constitutes more than just a traditional alliance (Risse 2002 & 2008). The classic 
reference to a major opus in developing scholarship on transatlantic cooperative behaviour is 
to Deutsch et al. (1957). National policy-makers and political, economic and social élites are 
more and more in touch with each other in the modern world, and their relationship is shaped 
not only by external factors such as economic liberalization, but (at the transatlantic level) also 
by ideals and attitudes, which have been developed jointly during decades of continuous 
exchanges.  
Both policy-makers and private actors share some common assumptions (and states are part 
of this “great game” of accepted social norms leading to the conclusion that not only 
                                                            
220 See Guzzini, S., Leander, A. (eds.), (2006), Constructivism in International Relations: Wendt and his critics, London, 
New York: Routledge 
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institutions matter). “In a globalized international arena, common interests encompass a whole 
range of actors and processes, so that it can be claimed that the “pluralistic community” has at 
the same time enlarged and weakened”221. As Risse interestingly points out, transatlantic 
relations are shaped by four concepts that can either have explanatory power or raise more 
questions in the researcher: identities, interests, interdependence but most importantly 
institutions are undoubtedly the raison être of this relationship. I only give a brief account for 
each of them, and explain why they can be interesting to my analysis. First of all, identities are 
the self-consciousness effects that actors unconsciously possess. It may seem awkward at first 
sight, but following Simoni (2013) we may define it quite interestingly: “[…] the evolution of a 
state’s identity carries onto the international arena and affects state relations because these 
changes in identity are constantly and correspondingly reformulating their interests” 222 . 
Interests are not only the factors behind every rational decision, but also the boundaries 
behind which the rules of the game are written. Interdependence has already been mentioned 
in 3.2, while institutions are at one side of a continuum that ends in a no-institutional and 
totally informal setting. 
While constructivist approaches like Wendt’s do consider the domestic politics of identity and, 
thus, preference formation, their explanation of international political change—based on 
states accepting changes in an international norm of what is appropriate behaviour—is not 
convincing in some regards. To keep a balance among the theories presented above, it is then 
useful to analyse the pros and cons of this theory, and test their relevance and usefulness 
against this backdrop. In trade policy, for example, the “state” (i.e., politicians) is likely to 
cooperate with other states due to some norm of appropriate behaviour. Indeed, politicians 
will still intervene in trade policy, and decrease the likelihood of cooperation, whenever they 
are compelled by perceived threats to national and/or constituent interests. Rather than 
                                                            
221 See Risse, T. (2012), “Determinants and features of international alliances and structural partnerships”, 
Transworld Working Paper, 02 
222 Simoni, S (2013) Understanding transatlantic relations: whither the West?, Routledge, p. 198 
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politicians, it is the regulatory authorities’ behavior that has changed due to the impact of 
Economic Internationalization (EI) on their interests—interests that are ever-present because 
they are formally specified in domestic institutions of power-sharing arrangements. Thus, 
constructivism—like neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism as discussed above— focuses 
on traditional forms of international cooperation that change the nature of “the state” while 
overlooking the new forms of discretionary cooperation that change only the nature of 
regulators’ behavior, not their incentives for behavior. In short, constructivism identifies 
actors in networks who gradually change their understanding of what behavior is appropriate 
for states, which ultimately changes the beliefs and values (i.e., identities) of politicians and the 
content of policy.  
This is not what occurred, for example, in the case of transatlantic competition policy. Instead 
of changing the identities of states and the content of foreign policy, EI is causing 
competition authorities to follow their interests and adjust their behaviour to increase 
discretionary cooperation223.  
Having outlined the main assumptions drawn from theory, it may be useful to assess whether 
constructivism can be considered a good starting point or not, and what makes it so different 
(and better) to explain the topic of this research. A strong theoretical analysis needs a 
rethinking of the existing knowledge and a continuous struggle to deciphrate newly established 
ways of thinking at problems. The following part will be devoted to enucleating directions that 
can be taken from the same theoretical corpus of constructivism. 
Three factors can be considered: first of all, what are the “norms” that are fostered by 
transatlantic cooperation? Secondly, is there a single norm or are there many conflicting (or 
overlapping) norms? Finally, how can these norms be translated into action and particularly 
into transatlantic decision-making improvements? 
                                                            
223  Damro, C., (2011), "Regulators, Firms and Information: The Domestic Sources of Convergence in 
Transatlantic Merger Review," Review of International Political Economy, 18, 4: 409-435. For an authoritative insight 
on transatlantic competition policy, this speech by Mario Monti is remarkable: 
http://www.piie.com/publications/pb/pb.cfm?ResearchID=74  
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A definition of “norms” is then required in order to proceed throughout this analysis: a norm 
may be defined as  
“a set of rules with a prescriptive character for a defined scope of 
application. Norms are codified through treaties or conventions, yet 
they can also be uncodified, as seen with customary rights. Within 
the international system, international norms regulate states’ 
behaviour by enabling certain actions in accordance with the norm, 
and in prohibiting other actions that may violate or juxtapose that 
norm”224. 
 
By using this very broad definition, the intent is to show how thin is the line between a good 
theory and its negative versions. According to the abovementioned definition, norms can be 
almost everything. They can be codified or uncodified. They allow states to behave in a certain 
way and they prohibit other states certain behaviours. It could seem useless to ground an 
analysis on such poorly defined and unstable grounds. Yet, what seems weak in this case turns 
out to be the only way to go deep into the issue without trespassing the wide borders of the 
term.  
Quite obviously, norms are customary. They are widely accepted, and there needs to be a 
consensus on them. The word “widely” is used to indicate depth rather than breadth. They 
need to be profoundly internalized (third Wendtian image225) but there is no limit on the 
number of people that behave accordingly. For the sake of comprehension, I outline here what 
I believe to be the key norms driving transatlantic integration.  
First of all, the belief in free market principles. A caveat must be advanced: not all EU Member 
States share the same degree of free market support. Many of them still prefer social 
democratic policies with redistributive outcomes, while other are concerned with post-
Communist hybrid economies. But it is hard to confute the view that the Single Market, the 
Common Commercial Policy and especially Neighborhood Policy are entangled in what can 
                                                            
224  Panke, D., Peterson, U. (2012), “Why international norms disappear sometimes”, European Journal of 
International Relations, 18: 719 
225 Wendt, A. (1995), “Constructing International Politics”, International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1. (Summer, 1995), 
pp. 71-81 
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be termed a “free market norm”226. These three elements, which are at the core of EU 
integration in recent decades, must be taken as examples of a “tacit agreement” in favour of 
free market. The Single Market was an example of the prevailing argument of economic 
integration before monetary integration that was at its highest with the Delors I Commission. 
Trade policy, on the along the lines When an internalized norm is created, it means that each 
state sharing that norm has a sense of duty towards fulfilling the prescriptions of that norm, 
and it does not behave in a self-interested way, but rather as if it was the state itself 
establishing the norm.  
A second norm that has certainly lead transatlantic relations for over twenty years is that of 
“interdependence”: even though it has already been touched upon in the previous part, 
interdependence represents not simply an asset that has explanatory power according to liberal 
theory. In fact, many liberal institutionalists and constructivists insist that the very notion of 
multipolarity fails to reflect the interdependence and interconnectivity brought about by 
globalization. Some prefer the term “interpolarity”227, which acknowledges that multipolarity is 
on the rise but in a context of deep – and deepening – interdependence (Grevi 2009). Still 
others claim that the emerging system is “nonpolar,” insofar as the declining power of the 
former hegemon (the US) is not offset by the parallel rise of other poles with comparable 
military might, economic resources, political leadership, and cultural outreach (Haass 2008). 
Therefore interdependence is an answer to an existing situation, which threatens to weaken 
the self-defence of each country.  
 
3.4.1 Constructivism and cooperation 
In order to assess the relevance of “cooperation” with constructivist lenses it may be useful to 
underline which elements of this enormously variegated theory can be applied to this concept, 
                                                            
226 For a good explanation of the neo-liberal bias in EU politics, see Moravcsik, A. (2002), “In defence of the 
democratic deficit”, JCMS, Vol. 40, N. 4, pp. 603-624 
227 The word “interpolarity” was also used by Daniel Hamilton in a speech at the Heinrich Boell Foundation, in 
2011: http://www.boell.de/en/2011/07/05/transatlantic-2020-us-and-europe-interpolar-world  
	   107	  
particularly when it comes to “institutionalization”228. A good starting point could be to point 
out that the rationalist-contructivist divide is summarised by the distinction between the logic 
of consequentialism - associated with rationalists - and the logic of appropriateness - used by 
constructivists (who have 'borrowed' the concept from institutionalism: see March and Olsen 
1999; Peters 1999; Boekle et al 2000). The two logics offer competing explanations for why 
the EU and the US chose to establish new transatlantic institutions, and why under those 
institutions dialogue has been encouraged between policy makers as a means of attaining 
interest convergence or norm compliance in a number of policy sectors.  
However, both constructivists and rationalists concede that institutions and communication 
'matter' between agents but they offer different explanations as to why they cooperate 
(Checkel 1998,1999). This should not be a surprise. Rationalist theories employ very peculiar 
methodological instruments to achieve their goals229. They analyse the positum, what is already 
existing in the international arena, while they neglect to explain how certain elements got 
together and formed the existing structures. In Section 3.2.1 there was an outline with the 
main characteristics of the liberal conception of cooperation in regimes. Albeit almost totally 
included within those borders, the discussion on the relevance of cooperative and 
institutionalized dialogues has resulted arid. It has not achieved a single tangible result in 
explaining the identification of élites’ interests, in analysing the causes and consequences of 
certain behaviours. They followed a simple logic of consequentialism, where Y follows X. The 
advantage of this logic is that it gives a sound correlations between events. If simplicity is what 
is looked for, this theory can certainly contribute much to the development of knowledge in a 
certain field. By the way, it has some disadvantages that make most researchers tilt towards the 
other logic. What are they? First of all, a simple logic of consequence follows rational premises 
                                                            
228 Many ideas from this paragraph pay tribute to Young, O. R. (ed., 1996), The International Political Economy and 
International Institutions, Vol. 2, Cheltenham, U.K.: Edward Elgar; Ruggie, J. "Embedded Liberalism Revisited: 
Institutions and Progress in International Economic Relations," in Adler, E. and Crawford, B. (eds., 1991) 
Progress in Postwar International Relations, New York, Columbia University Press 
229 Henderson, D. (2007), “Rationality and Rationalist Approaches in the Social Sciences”, in Outhwaite, W., 
Turtner, S.P., The SAGE Handbook of Social Science Methodology, Routledge, London, pp. 282-301 
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and can be useful heuristically only if there are strong causation relations. A spurious 
correlation is not enough to predict one’s behaviour according to this logic. Its predicting 
value is, therefore, strongly attacked.  
Constructivists then argue that the logic of consequentialism oversimplifies the decision 
making process. While rationalists tend to focus on the behaviour and policy outcomes, social 
constructivists tend to concentrate on the larger process characterised by communicative 
action and discourse between actors (Risse 1995). The transatlantic arena is a perfect terrain to 
test their assumptions. 
Constructivists argue that self-interest is not the sole instigator of international politics, rather 
they emphasise common values, norms and institutionalised decision- making procedures that 
determine the way democracies interact in the international system (Lumsdaine 1998)230. The 
logic of appropriateness suggests that actors are guided not by material gain but by a desire to 
adhere to 'rule-based' systems. The rules that actors follow are directly tied to their identities, 
which are determined by shared ideas and norms. Like institutionalists, constructivists argue 
that norms and shared information can foster co-operation. Norms are not a product of 
actors' interests but rather precede them, and states' interests are defined through social 
communication (also Boekle et al 1999; Ruggie 1998). Under the logic of constructivism, 
policy transfers - through the exchange of expertise and ideas - are part of a process of policy 
learning where agents' beliefs may be altered through the dialogue process (Stone 2000)231. 
This will be clearer in Part 4, when dynamics of policy transfer, policy clusters and policy 
networks will be discussed. 
Constructivists emphasise the importance of communication and Risse (2000) argues that 
“communicative action” extends beyond the logic of appropriateness to encompass a “logic 
                                                            
230 An early example of constructivist reasoning is to be found in Ruggie, J. G., (1975) “International Responses 
to Technology - Concepts and Trends”. International Organization, 29 (3), pp. 557-583 
231 Norms are defined by Peterson and Bomber as “principles of 'right action' saving to guide, control or regulate 
proper and acceptable behaviour in a group”. See Peterson, J. and Bomberg, E. (1999) Decision Making in the 
European Union, London and New York: Macmillan and St. Martin's Press, p. 53 
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of truth seeking or arguing”. He argues that “international institutions create a normative 
framework structuring interaction in a given issue area. They often serve as arenas in which 
international policy deliberation can take place”232. The transatlantic community is viewed as 
sharing a collective identity, as well as values and norms, which arguably constitute the 
“common life world” discussed by Risse. Transatlantic institutions, such as the NTA, which 
act as policy forums, make up the structured “normative” framework and the “new 
transatlantic dialogue” fulfils a number of conditions which precede “truth seeking” 
behaviour. One is the institutionalisation of issue areas: a conscious effort by actors to 
construct a “common lifeworld” through the build up of dialogues. These dialogues seek to 
compensate for the uncertainty of interests or a lack of knowledge between actors in certain 
policy sectors and the build up of non-hierarchical relations within dense, informal, network-
like settings (Risse 2000).   
Reaching firm conclusions about transatlantic identities constitutes a methodologically rather 
difficult endeavour, since there is little agreement in the literature about what can be used as 
valid indicators for a “sense of community”233. Moreover, it is rather unclear how much 
collective identity is necessary for a security or economic community to work. How to assess 
the necessary degree of “collectivity” that suits the development of positive economic 
relationships? Studies of the EU have shown, for example, that identification with Europe as a 
“secondary identity” (nation first, Europe second) is sufficient to ensure strong support for 
European integration (Risse 2010). We lack comparatively sophisticated data on the 
transatlantic community to be able to reach firm conclusions. Yet, there is plenty of empirical 
evidence pointing to both lingering commonalities and potential cracks in the common value 
base. 
                                                            
232 Risse, T (2000) “Let's argue! Communicative Action World Politics”, International Organization, 54 (1): 1-39, 
MIT 
233 The “sense of community” literature is ample and wide. Some key references will be exposed in the dedicated 
Chapter. For what matters, one of the most important accounts so far is Herrmann, K., and Brewer, M. B. (2004) 
“Identities and Institutions: Becoming European in the EU”, in Herrmann, R. Risse T. and Brewer, M. B.. (eds)., 
Transnational Identities. Becoming European in the EU, Lanham, Rowman & Littlefield, p. 1-22. 
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3.4: Developing a common ground: a reappraisal  
Neorealist and neoliberal theories cannot explain why EU-US cooperation is largely 
discretionary instead of based on treaties signed by “the states”. Therefore, while the 
rationalist systemic explanations can explain the EU-US transition to cooperation in their own 
terms, they fall short of convincingly explaining a crucial element of the resulting cooperation. 
The problem follows from two central assumptions of the rationalist systemic approaches—
states are unitary actors and states are the most important units of analysis. Before discussing 
this problem, two other shortcomings unique to each of these approaches must be addressed.  
First, cooperation in transatlantic decision-making does not seem the likely result of 
calculations by unitary states operating in a neorealist, self-help world. This, as said previously 
in this Section, creates a whole range of troubles if we need to conceptualize and coherently 
define cooperation for the sake of the analysis234. When the result of cooperation is an 
unbalanced (relative) loss of sovereignty over a respective domestic market, why would a self-
interested, unitary state allow foreign intervention in the way it decides to manage the very 
structure of its domestic market? 
Second, a crucial problem also exists for the neoliberal regime theories. Neoliberal 
explanations of transatlantic cooperation, which claim that overcoming information shortages 
is a crucial reason for creating regimes, would likely predict a regime in transatlantic economic 
relations for the exchange of information and the establishment of a bilateral dispute 
settlement mechanism 235 . In reality, the transatlantic cooperation regime prohibits the 
                                                            
234 Thomas Frellesen and Roy Ginsberg have, for instance, proposed four variants of foreign policy cooperation 
between the EU and the US, ranging from “coordinated action in pursuit of common objectives either through 
joint or separate means; coordinated declarations in which statements are issued in pursuit of common objectives 
either through joint or separate means; and complementary declarations, in which statements are issued 
separately in pursuit of common objectives”. See Frellesen, T., Ginsberg, R. (1994), “EU-US Foreign Policy 
Cooperation in the 1990s. Elements of a partnership”, CEPS Working Paper, No. 58, Brussels 
235 The rejection of the ACTA Agreement on the edge of fierce and widespread public rage against it may be a 
proof against this assumption. For example, a good starting point would be Greens-EFA’ 50 reasons to reject 
ACTA: http://www.greens-efa.eu/50-reasons-to-reject-acta-7398.html 
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exchange of confidential business information due to protections afforded by domestic law 
and lacks a dispute settlement mechanism. Rather, the regime focuses on the exchange of non 
confidential information and dispute prevention. In the transatlantic trade regime, the only 
recourse to dispute settlement seems to be (the decreasingly likely) intervention by domestic 
politicians threatening to exercise unilateral extraterritorial measures. While the neorealists and 
neoliberals suffer from the preceding shortcomings, they also share problems that arise from 
their mutual reliance on a unitary actor assumption and state-centric focus. By assuming a 
unitary “state” as the unit of analysis, systemic explanations often overlook and/or disregard 
crucial sub-systemic actors that may contribute significantly to compelling causal explanations 
of international cooperation, as it has been already advanced. To understand the domestic 
politics that may explain the discretionary nature of EU-US cooperation, the analyst must 
relax the unitary actor assumption. Anticipating criticism for relaxing this assumption, Milner 
argues “abandoning the assumption of a unitary state need not condemn one to hopeless 
complexity nor to a lack of parsimony. Once one leaves the world of states as unitary actors, 
one can use the concepts and theories from American and comparative politics, some of 
which provide powerful, parsimonious tools for understanding strategic interaction in 
different institutional environments”236. Related to the unitary actor assumption, the systemic 
approaches encounter an analytical problem due to their state-centrism. According to the 
systemic IR theories, states are the most important and analytically necessary units of 
analysis 237 . Therefore, these approaches typically overlook the causal impact of other 
international actors, such as self-interested international organizations, multinational 
corporations and non-governmental organizations. It should be noted that neoliberalism does 
                                                            
236 Helen Milner, "International Political Economy: Beyond Hegemonic Stability," Foreign Policy, No. 110, Spring 
1998 
237 “In a world of states, power disparities generate both security and insecurity and have an impact on what 
states want and what they can get. Few scholars embrace theories of world politics that rely exclusively on the 
structural circumstances created by material capabilities of states and its distribution within the international 
system. But it is also widely agreed that one ignores such factors at one’s explanatory peril”. Quite surprisingly, 
this quote comes from Wohlforth, W., Mastanduno, M., Ikenberry, G. I. (2009), “Introduction: Unipolarity, State 
Behavior, and Systemic Consequences”, World Politics, Volume 61, Number 1, January 2009, p. 25  
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consider the role of international organizations, but typically as a forum through which states 
operate, not as independent and causally significant actors with interests separate from their 
member states. As a result, the state-centrism of systemic IR theories encounters some 
difficulty when trying to incorporate a self-interested, non-traditional governmental actor like 
the EU. This flaw is particularly noticeable in trade policy, where the European Commission 
wields one of its greatest supranational authority238. The interaction between EI and national 
interests suggested by the rationalist systemic IR theories may help to explain why a 
cooperative regime has been created, but it cannot explain the crucial characteristic of that 
cooperation—its discretionary nature. In order to explain why EU-US cooperation in 
economic policy is largely discretionary, the analysis must consider the behaviour of actors 
within the process of policy coordination identified by Keohane (1984) as an essential 
component of international cooperation. The domestic politics that led economic decision-
making authorities to try to isolate other domestic actors from the cooperative process are lost 
or made trivial when the research is limited to unitary, state-centric analyses. In the current 
case, the domestic EU and US regulators play an important role in international cooperation 
because their preferences are more similar to each other than to other actors in their 
respective domestic environments239. 
As it will be clear at the end of the theoretical exposition, my preference is clearly on the 
constructivist approach to transatlantic politics. On the one side, it cannot be neglected that 
the first attempt is to understand the role of structural factors in the transatlantic relationship. 
Not only capabilities or economic strengths, but also the “material differences” around which 
a good share of transatlantic relations evolve. On the other side, I maintain that the role 
played by ideas and roles is substantial, both in terms of expectations and analysis. There is a 
                                                            
238 Elsig, M. (2010), “European Union trade policy after enlargement: larger crowds, shifting priorities and 
informal decision-making”, Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 17, Issue 6 
239  See Alemanno, A., Parker, R. (2014), “Towards Effective Regulatory Cooperation under TTIP: A 
Comparative Overview of the EU and US Legislative and Regulatory Systems”, CEPS Special Report, accessible 
here: http://www.ceps.eu/book/towards-effective-regulatory-cooperation-under-ttip-comparative-overview-eu-
and-us-legislative-(last accessed 06/10/2014) 
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substantive corpus of literature analysing both qualitatively (Leeds, 1999; McGillivray and 
Smith, 2008; Mansfield and Milner, 2010; Mansfield et al., 2002; Martin, 2000) and 
quantitatively (Baccini, 2014) the role played by democratic institutions and government in 
advancing cooperative economic behaviour (trade agreements, economic exchanges)240. Even 
if the units of this analysis are not typical nation states, there can be more than one reference 
to the concept that domestic institutions shape international negotiations and decisions. This 
is partly related to what has already been made clear in other sections241. The need for clarity 
nevertheless requires that a certain path has to be chosen. In my research I will conduct the 
analysis of the policy-making mechanisms and institutionalization practices by highlighting the 
shared norms and values. By doing this, it may be helpful to apply the liberal “optimism of the 
will” as advanced by Ikenberry (2009), at least to clear the path for future thinking on the 
issue. 
The task is daunting: in what follows I outline the main features of my approach. As already 
mentioned, the aim of this research is to understand transatlantic trade relations from a 
positive perspective, underlining the interconnectedness of actors and processes, and how this 
framework shaped the development of trade itself. Realist IR theory tells an interesting story 
about the role of structural factors in determining the conduct of foreign policy. What Realism 
does not capture is essentially the multifaceted inputs of international politics, and how they 
impact on the transatlantic economic partnership. Even the most nuanced versions of Realism 
tend to exclude non-materialist factors from the analysis. When they include them, they seem 
to pay tribute to the now predominant non-rationalist vision (and fashion) rather than really 
engaged in forming another kind of way of thinking242.  
Transatlantic relations during the Cold War were certainly driven by Realist feelings, such as 
fear and need, rather than being influenced by a positive attitude of cooperative behaviour. 
                                                            
240 See Note 24  
241 Especially par. 2.1 
242 Barkin S.J. (2003), “Realist Constructivism”, International Studies Review, Vol. 5, No. 3, pp. 325-342 
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Nevertheless, a coherent analysis of post-Cold War transatlantic relations cannot be prone to 
the past in a way that prevents the analysis to develop comprehensively. I am therefore adding 
two variables in my theory that have been researched in the past years to explain more 
thoroughly the relationship between the US and the EU. On the one side, the role of the so-
called “transatlantic public sphere”243. On the other side, the role of “transatlantic élites”244. As 
it can be drawn from the introduction, I attach great relevance to these two elements in the 
main picture of the ongoing economic partnership.  
First of all, it is hard to conceive transatlantic policy-making without analysing the influx 
public opinion had on its development. The real question is whether actors have “fixed” 
preferences in negotiating agreements under the NTA or whether the output of policy 
agreements under the NTA is actually shaped through transatlantic dialogue. I answer to this 
research question with a strong preference for the second variable. The concept of a 
transatlantic public sphere will be outlined and explained further on in Chapter 5, which 
highlights the role of public opinion studies to understand why the business community 
decided to cope with certain insecurities or transaction costs by generating a common 
understanding and shared practices of their own everyday business-making. The same 
happened to consumers and to non-élites: they realized the only way to shape transatlantic 
policy was to be part of that, to influence decision-makers rather than to clash with them. The 
moment when public opinion became relevant in this field was when scholars found out that 
it was no more a question of “hard” or “soft” power, it was rather a matter of cooperative 
environments and how people thought of each other. A very interesting research design is 
being carried out by the World Values Survey245, a research consortium that aims at building 
                                                            
243 An interesting concept in itself, the “transatlantic public sphere” (TPS hereafter) represents an attempt to give 
theoretical relevance to an underdeveloped empirical material, the one on public opinion formation. The 
Transworld project, whose data will be considered in Chapter 5, represents one of the most recent attempts to 
give transatlantic public opinion and public sphere a greater standing in the theoretical elaboration.  
244 The results of a discussion Section at the ECPR General Conference in Bordeaux was very helpful to 
elaborate on this part. For further reference, see 
http://www.ecpr.eu/Events/SectionDetails.aspx?EventID=5&SectionID=86  
245 See http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/wvs.jsp  
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up a majestic database on the “values” ruling international politics. The realization of this goal 
seems useful at first sight, because it employs a methodology that is at the same time new and 
already experienced246.  
Finally, this same process can not be understood without making a reference to the role of 
non-state actors. Theory about them will be once more explained in Chapter 6, when their 
role will be advanced and they will be investigated in their activities and implications. In this 
brief Section, it is interesting to point out that while the non-governmental dialogues have 
varied enormously in their effectiveness and impact on the policy process, it is clear that the 
role of firms has become the most institutionalized and visible in shaping policy discussions. 
Coordination among private firms and government authorities working on trade and 
regulatory barriers has enabled commercial interests to provide information and establish fora 
for business executives to articulate their preferences. To form a theory of NSAa contribution 
to transatlantic economic policy-making requires a degree of flexibility in defining NSAa 
themselves and also in assessing their role and relevance. Past contributions overlooked “the 
impact of governmental structures on the development of national interest group systems”247. 
This means that NSAa on the two sides of the Atlantic have had varying degrees of ties with 
their respective governments. Paradoxically, the US ones have tended to be more 
government-related than the EU ones. Support to trade investments has always been higher in 
a federal polity with a centralized trade agency rather than a quasi-federal polity without a 
centralized trade promotion agency. Competition between DGs has always been present in 
the EU when it came to trade-related promotion activities. SMEs internationalization, 
trainings for national officials in domestic trade agencies have indifferently been carried out by 
DG Enterprise (especially in recent years) and by DG Trade. A model of bureaucratic 
decision-making would explain this particular situation by pointing at officials’ rivalries to gain 
                                                            
246 More details on why this survey is relevant alongside other similar ones will be presented in Chapter 5 
247  Mahoney, C., Baumgartner, F. “Converging Perspectives on Interest Group Research in Europe and 
America”, West European Politics, Vol. 31, No. 6, 1253–1273, November 2008 
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more power and leverage in the direction of trade policies. NSAs were relegated, then, to a 
minor role in the development of a coherent EU trade policy, while their role was much 
stronger in the US. 
These elements can then be judged as the guiding lines of the theoretical background for this 
dissertation. The case studies will reflect then three points outlined before: the role of norms 
“internalization”, “transatlantic public sphere” and NSAa in shaping the transatlantic alliance.  
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CHAPTER 4: Actors, analysis and decision-making 
 
In order to assess the “government” at a transnational level, it is necessary to find out the 
motivations to govern, the actors who want to govern and the processes that lead to 
government. The decentralisation of global governance248 means that many public and private 
networks of actors perform the functions of governance, as already said. The policy networks 
literature249 tries to come to grips with the shift from a strong executive to a more segmented 
mode of governance characterised by bargaining within and between networks (Rhodes 1997), 
at the national and international levels. Policy networks and social networks analysis will be 
useful especially in the empirical part to understand why certain coalitions are put together in 
the society among businesses or civic movements in opposition to the proposed reforms of 
the transatlantic system. 
In this case, the transatlantic level represents a N=1 phenomenon, since there are no other 
regional entities that share the same amount of ties and relations as the two economic giants. 
A policy network is a “forum where numerous actors, all of whom have the ability to affect 
policy outcomes, exchange resources and information in order to facilitate reconciliation, 
settlement or compromise between different interests”250. Policy networks are based on the 
premise that agents, be they regulatory agencies, interest groups, enterprises, think tanks or 
academics, participate in the policy process by working as partners on joint problem-solving 
(Jachtenfuchs and Kohler Koch 1995). A variety of specialised “communities” of agents may 
form alliances and collectively try to control or influence decision-making within policy 
networks. 
                                                            
248 I use in this part the terms “government” and “governance” to express the idea of an authority shaping the 
conduct of transatlantic relations. Further clarifications on the two terms will be expressed later on in the 
Chapter 
249 Literature is limitless: for a good overview see Jakobi, A. (2009), “Policy Networks in Comparative Politics 
and International Relations: Perspectives, Typologies and Functions”, TranState Working Papers No. 94 
250 Rhodes, R., (1997) Understanding Governance: policy networks, governance, reflexivity and accountability, Buckingham: 
Open University Press. 
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What makes this Part different from the previous one on theories? First of all, the focus here 
is on who and how cooperates. There is no attempt to bridge a cognitive gap in the 
understanding of why certain processes occur, not even an attempt to produce sufficient 
knowledge to explain the rationale of particular phenomena251. The real issue at stake here is 
the definition of the modus operandi in transatlantic decision-making. There can be many 
models that operationalize what has just been mentioned, and they will be dealt with in 
Section 4.2.  
Secondly, there will be very little focus on “theories” as such in this Part. While the previous 
one had a strong and clear bias towards paying a tribute to past theories by developing a new 
one, as if it was a dwarf on the shoulders of giants, this part addresses more material factors 
and players, and discusses their relevance by pointing to the effectiveness of their actions 
rather than to their suitability for particular theories. Actors, processes and networks are 
treated as given, and there is no need to conceptualize them252. They exist outside of a 
framework of theories, they represent the multifaceted nature of transatlantic partnership.  
Finally, the lessons that can be drawn from this Part are certainly more relevant and numerous 
than those of the previous one. This does not mean that theories do not purport any 
explanatory power, but rather that they can only help scholars to interpret with a sound 
epistemological basis the empirical material they need to categorize. Instead, this Part is 
focused on giving a much higher degree of knowledge on the functioning of EU-US relations. 
Assuming a particular theoretical framework as given, the purpose of this Part is to show how 
the ups and downs of transatlantic institutional integration can be effectively explained by 
looking at the interactions among certain actors, that act in a certain manner, according to 
certain rational expectations.  
                                                            
251 Even the most systematic research so far has produced a great empirical material but few real innovations on 
the way to think at transatlantic relations. See Winand, P., Philippart, E. (2000), op. cit. 
252 Under certain regards, this task has already been advanced in the previous Part. See 3.3, for example. 
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Even if this part is meant and conceived to be theoretical (at least in its intentions), there will 
be much more explicit references to the real world than in the previous one. Actors will be 
delineated and processes outlined. Even though the “systemic” nature of the whole Chapter 
may seem too vague, there are no reasons to doubt about its usefulness in order to approach 
the empirical part.  
 
4.1: Drivers of integration at non-state level - a “governance” approach to EU-US trade 
relations 
The “Euro-American system”253 can be conceived of as a supranational system, or as a system 
of EU-US relations with a mix of intergovernmental and “supranational” participation. It is a 
system in which there is, as said, a strong and flourishing element of private relations between 
ranges of non-governmental actors. Since the beginning of the European integration process, 
in fact, there has been a notable involvement of private investors, producers and others with 
essentially economic interests254. What were the main characters in driving integration towards 
the new phase we are currently experiencing? In this section I do not want to name the actors, 
but preferably the aim is to single out some typologies that may be useful in the following 
parts.  
The new challenges that arise from globalisation have led some to argue that state is 
“shrinking”, (Sbragia 2000) or being hollowed out (Strange 1996). The reality is that individual 
states are becoming increasingly unable to govern alone in a world characterised by rising 
transnational challenges and increasing economic interdependence. Political integration is one 
way to secure collective action: however, state reluctance to give up sovereignty means formal 
integration arrangements- except and even in the case of the EU- are limited. Looser forms of 
“governance” at an international, regional or plurilateral level are a way of coping with 
                                                            
253 Is it a real system? If yes, how can it be conceived realistically? For a reflection on the systemic nature of 
transatlantic politics, see Andrews, D., Pollack, M., Shaffer, G., Wallace, H., (2005), The Future of Transatlantic 
Economic Relations: Continuity Amid Discord, European University Institute, conference volume 
254 See Part 2.2 and relevant sub-Sections 
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external challenges that the state cannot manage alone255. International governance denotes a 
shift in authority from the state to the international level, but where is authority transferred to 
and what decision-making forums serve as means of governing? How do different 
institutional arrangements allow actors to perform the functions of governance at a global or 
transnational level? It is argued that global or transnational governance is conducted on three 
main levels, first through formal international institutions, second through government-to-
government networks and finally through private and public policy networks.  
Drawing elements from each of these disparate uses, Rhodes defines governance in terms of 
“self-organizing, inter-organizational networks” that may include, but are not limited to, 
organs of government256. More specifically, Rhodes lays out four basic characteristics of 
“governance”, which distinguish the term from the traditional notion of “government”: first 
of all, the interdependence between organizations. Governance is broader than government, 
covering also non-state actors. Changing the boundaries of the state means that the 
boundaries between public, private and voluntary sectors become shifting and opaque. 
Secondly, continuing interactions between network members, caused by the need to exchange 
resources and negotiate shared purposes. Thirdly, game-like interactions, rooted in trust and 
regulated by rules of the game negotiated and agreed by network participants. Finally, a 
significant degree of autonomy from the state. Networks are not accountable to the state; they 
are self-organizing. Although the state does not occupy a privileged, sovereign position, it can 
indirectly and imperfectly steer networks. In this view, governance through networks 
complements Williamson's (1985) traditional classification of markets and hierarchies as the 
two alternative governing structures for “authoritatively allocating resources and exercising 
                                                            
255 According to Rosenau, the concept of governance is more inclusive than government as it embraces 
“governmental institutions and informal, non government mechanisms whereby needs and wants are fulfilled”. 
For him, governance is a system of rules accepted by the majority. The key components of governance are: rules, 
roles, responsibilities and accountabilities and processes. See Rosenau, J. (1992). “Governance, Order and 
Change in World Politics”, in Rosenau, J. and Czempiel, E-O. (eds.), Governance without Government: Order and 
Change in World Politics. Cambridge University Press. Chapter 1, pg. 1-29 
256 Rhodes, R.A.W. (1996), “The New Governance: governing without Government”, Political Studies, 44 (4), 
1996: pp. 652-67 
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control and co-ordination” (Rhodes 1996, 652). Understood in this sense, governance has 
arguably always existed, insofar as governments cooperate with networks of public and private 
actors in the provision of services. However, the adoption of neoliberal policies in the United 
States, Britain, and elsewhere has led to a general movement toward governance by networks, 
as state governments have attempted to shrink the size of the public sector and shift 
responsibility for service provision to the private and voluntary sectors. The shift to the term 
“governance”, according to Rhodes, is not simply a semantic one. Rather, it points to 
distinctive features of the new governance, which blurs the traditional distinctions between 
public and private and raises pressing normative issues of fragmentation, steering, and 
accountability257. Fragmentation may result when centralized bureaucracies are replaced with 
independent agencies or quasi-nongovernmental organizations (the so-called quangos), or when 
services are contracted out to the private and voluntary sectors, all of which reduce central 
government control over policy outcomes. This points to a second problem, namely, the 
difficulty that governments may encounter in controlling the implementation of public 
policies. At best, governments may “steer” public policy in certain directions, but the 
implementation of those policies rests with a multitude of actors that governments can control 
only imperfectly. Finally, the contracting-out of public functions by governments to 
independent agencies and to the private and voluntary sectors raises questions of democratic 
accountability to the electorate, which have as yet found no satisfactory solution.  
It is clear from this analysis that governance has a lot of meanings. It has been used in the 
previous Chapter as an hermeneutical tool employed by a certain theory in analysing the 
                                                            
257 As he himself makes clear: “[…] (a) Any organization is dependent upon other organizations for resources. (b) 
In order to achieve their goals, the organizations have to exchange resources. (c) Although decision-making 
within the organization is constrained by other organizations, the dominant coalition retains some discretion. The 
appreciative system of the dominant coalition influences which relationships are seen as a problem and which 
resources will be sought. (d) The dominant coalition employs strategies within known rules of the game to 
regulate the process of exchange. (e) Variations in the degree of discretion are a product of the goals and the 
relative power potential of interacting organizations. This relative power potential is a product of the resources of 
each organization, of the rules of the game and of the process of exchange between organizations”. See Rhodes, 
R.A.W. (2007), “Understanding Governance: Ten Years On”, Organization Studies 2007 28: p. 1246  
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conduct of transatlantic relations. In this first part, I have used it to dig deeper into the 
concept and present it in more practical terms.  
This dissertation evolves around trade relations in the last twenty years. Governance is the 
best term to address negotiations and processes: in fact, it has three major advantages. First of 
all, it has a focus on the interactions among actors, on the preferences and the negotiating 
positions of each of them. Secondly, the governance approach can understand the allocation 
and distribution of conflicts, identify them and understand them. Thirdly, its output is 
formally much more detailed and gives much more details than other approaches. For all these 
reasons, it has been used to assess transatlantic trade and economic relations. 
 
4.1.1: Actors 
Participants in the “Euro-American system” have grown enormously in terms of numbers and 
relevance. A good way to categorize them could be to look at their inherent interests and aims. 
At the international level, the Euro-American system has increasingly been focused on the 
“low politics”258, i.e. social, economic and cultural concerns that exist among states but also 
among the wide range of NSAs. Moreover, there has been an intense development of what 
can be termed “sectoral politics”, with political activity and preferences centred on specific 
areas of activity that often carry high stakes and the potential for significant costs and/or 
benefits to both states and non-state groupings. 
EU-US relations are then a result of a “web”259 of different actors that are brought together by 
different interests through various processes. This sub-section will focus on the first part of this 
equation. Not all actors are concrete: especially in economic and trade relations, it is very 
common to find blocks of actors that interact, or rather groups of individuals that do share 
common characteristics and features. This part addresses both of them, from a meta-
                                                            
258 Ripsman, N. (2004), "False Dichotomy: When Low Politics is High Politics" Paper presented at the annual 
meeting of the International Studies Association, Le Centre Sheraton Hotel, Montreal, Quebec, Canada 
259  Frost, E. (1997), “The New Transatlantic Marketplace”, Washington DC: Institute for International 
Economics 
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theoretical point of view. I develop three categories that encompass all the different players in 
the game, pointing out their differences and common traits. 
One key type of sub-system in the EU-US relation is markets. Markets, as it has already been 
mentioned in other parts, have been a substantial part of the “Euro-American system”. In the 
immediate post-1945 period, the need to recover the European market, both as a source of 
demand, was a key element in many US policies. Likewise, the foundation of the European 
Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and then the European Economic Community (EEC) was 
explicitly about the need to instil economic recovery and to do it by re-establishing strong and 
developing markets in Western Europe260. At the beginning, single units in this sub-system 
were weak and poorly organized. The reason why there was no cooperative effort at all 
between the economic actors on the two sides of the Atlantic was the disproportionate status 
quo created by the Cold War. So the “Euro-American system” is in part a market system, 
engaging those with economic interests to pursue and linking the regulatory and social systems 
of those involved on both sides of the Atlantic.  
Another interesting category to address transatlantic actors can be that of hierarchies. Being not 
only a system of institutions, but also states, there can be many different hierarchies among 
them, depending on the point of view we take to frame them261. This means that not only the 
advancement of integration at the supranational level needs to take into account the issue of 
hierarchies, but also that there can not be a defined system of states if there is no hierarchy 
among them.  
Finally, a third categorization can be that of networks, which have already been addressed from 
different angles throughout the dissertation.  
 
                                                            
260 O’Donnell, R. (1999), “Characterising European Market Integration and Economic Policy”, Paper presented 
at the Sixth ECSA Biennial International Conference, Pittsburgh 
261 T., Johannes, (2005), “What really matters in transatlantic relations?”, Diskussionspapier, Forschungsgruppe 
Amerika, Stiftung Wissenchaft und Politik  
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4.1.1.1: Networks  
The experience of intensive development of private patterns of commercial exchange has 
generated a wide-ranging set of commercial networks spanning the Atlantic. While one key 
component is clearly the multinational corporation, with its networks of internal trade, 
investment and production, this is not the only commercial networking that can be seen 
within the system. Transatlantic alliances of companies, through licensing arrangements or 
strategic partnerships fortified by cross-investment, have been a key part of the commercial 
developments within the system, to such an extent that is sometimes difficult to say with 
certainty what is a “European” or an “American” company262. Alongside these private 
commercial arrangements, there has also grown up a series of networks sponsored by 
governmental authorities on both sides of the Atlantic263. Thirdly, a type of networks is maybe 
less accessible and public: the range of contacts between the US and EU individual Member 
States’ policymakers in a wide variety of areas.  
What is the role of networks then? Are they the most important part of the EU-US 
relationship? Is their role oversimplified or overrated? It is hard to answer these questions, but 
it could be useful to point out three key variables that characterize networks in order to show 
why it may be claimed that they are the most relevant shapers of the transatlantic partnership. 
First of all, their comprehensiveness: they bring together a wide variety of actors, some of 
whom sometimes do not want to talk with each other in order not to give away precious 
information on their own activity. Secondly, their definition is definitely clearer than that of 
hierarchies and markets264. Their explanatory value is certainly higher if compared to other 
                                                            
262 Damro, C., Guay, T. (2012), “Transatlantic Merger Relations: The Pursuit of Cooperation and Convergence”, 
Journal of European Integration, 34:6, pp. 643-661. In their own words: “The challenges of economic 
interdependence and the responses needed are clear to competition regulators who wish to avoid political 
intervention in their review of mergers (Damro 2006, 82–3; European Commission 2001; ICPAC 2000, 63). This 
preference, which is shared by competition officials in both the EU and US, is reflected in the desire to achieve 
compatible enforcement results (i.e., convergent decisions) in individual cases that are investigated 
simultaneously. Such claims benefit from further clarification of the precise reasons why, in an interdependent 
environment, EU and US competition authorities will choose to pursue cooperation and convergence. First, 
competition authorities will seek to increase cooperation in order to increase information acquisition”. See  
263 See Chapter 2.3.2 
264 Chapter 2.2.1 addresses this topic by proposing and advancing an exhaustive definition of networks  
	   125	  
variables introduced in this Chapter. As it will be shown in Part 6, what really makes networks 
unique forms of cooperation is often their intrinsic goal: to address a topic by involving all 
relevant stakeholders, in a business-to-business (B2B) or business-to-consumers (B2C) 
constructive relationship.  
Finally, they represent the ideal platform to combine the drivers of integration outlined 
previously, namely shared interests and ideas. Networked governance has grown in 
importance throughout past years: the interconnectedness of the world fosters a 
“networkization” 265 of interstate relations.  
Network theory provides a way to describe social relations that are neither hierarchies nor 
markets. This approach is associated with some works on advocacy networks266 and continues 
to benefit from much respect among “network analytic” scholarship267. This approach has its 
counterarguments, obviously. Furthermore, networks can be hierarchical rather than flat. 
Markets are distinct not in terms of structure but substance. Network theory provides 
different conceptual tools for measuring (and visualizing) “structure.” IR theorists often study 
the structure versus agency and yet have tended to have a very thin understanding of what 
structure is, generally arrived at deductively and treating it as a constant rather than measuring 
how it may vary by context. Previously cited research distinguishes this approach explicitly 
from the “networks as organization” approach outlined above. The problem with this 
approach, I think, is that it equates network “theory” with “network analysis tools” and that 
the use of the tools as a method for measuring or visualizing often doesn’t involve very 
sophisticated theorizing about what those relationships mean and how they relate to the 
agency of actors embedded in network structures.  
                                                            
265 Held, D. (2008), Cultural politics in a global age: uncertainty, solidarity and innovation, Oneworld, p. 23 
266 Keck, M., Sikkink, K., (1999), Transnational advocacy networks in international and regional politics”, 
International Social Science Journal, Vol. 51, Issue 159, pp. 89–101 
267 Seybolt, T. (2009), “Harmonizing the Humanitarian Aid Network: Adaptive Change in a Complex System”, 
International Studies Quarterly, Volume 53, Issue 4, pages 1027–1050 
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Network theory provides a set of propositions about the sources of political outcomes that 
are relational rather than intrinsic to actors. This approach both limits network theory to 
something analytically useful and broadens it to include many methodologies besides social 
network analysis (SNA). For example, one could take the theoretical propositions associated 
with SNA (such as “actors with a high level of betweenness centrality will have the ability to 
function as brokers”) or “actors with high in-degree centrality within a network will exert 
greater influence over the categorical meanings within a network” and then examine the extent 
to which these insights hold true in different network settings by using more qualitative 
methodologies including comparative case studies, process-tracing, elite interview or focus 
groups. This dissertation is also an attempt to use case studies research and process-tracing 
through public opinion in order to find out the networked nature of transatlantic governance.  
The pluralist paradigm contributes to the conceptualisation of global governance an 
understanding of agency beyond the state and the notion of interests and actors as 
determining the state and the international system. Mansbach et al. (1997) identify six types of 
actors that create a conglomerate system: interstate governmental, interstate non-
governmental, nation states, governmental non-central, interstate non-government, and 
individuals. Turner (1998) posits global civil society as an alternative to state-centered realism, 
including international institutions such as the United Nations, multinational corporations like 
General Motors, and international non governmental organisations like Amnesty 
International. According to Turner, global civil society is mobilised around issues that the 
state and market systems have failed to address268. Turner notes that global civil society is 
enabled by new technologies. Indeed, in The Rise of Network Societies, Manual Castells 
(1996) asserts that network logic has been greatly assisted by and organised around the 
“revolution in information technology”, resulting in the decline of states as the primary 
                                                            
268 Turner, S. (1998), “Global Civil Society, Anarchy and Governance: Assessing an Emerging Paradigm”, Journal 
of Peace Research, Vol. 35, no. 1, pp. 25-42 
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political entity. Turner notes that although global civil society actors may be interrelated and 
interact with states, they are increasingly independent from states. 
Moreover, O’Brien et al. (2000) introduce the concept of complex multilateralism to denote 
the emergence of civil society and transnational social movements (in the case of transatlantic 
relations, TACD and TAED) from below that aim to enhance the transparency and 
accountability of global governance through transforming global economic institutions. 
Additionally, Kenichi Ohmea (1995) looks at the global production of goods and services and 
contends that it is increasingly problematic to trace them back to the national level. 
Consequently, people, markets and firms are increasingly important agents that are no longer 
necessarily tied to a particular country as a result of an increasingly borderless economy. This 
paradigm contributes to our understanding of global governance by emphasising the 
significance of non-state actors in shaping the international system and the increasing 
prevalence of global networks. Nevertheless, this paradigm tends to overlook critical issues of 
the asymmetric distribution of power and elitism in the international system.  
 
4.1.1.2: Is there a main character? 
For the US, a great role was played by the responsible government Departments (especially 
US Trade Representative269) and by Congress. For the EU, drawing on McGuire and Smith 
(2008), it may be claimed that things are a bit more unclear. In the case of trade negotiations, 
for example, the Parliament is likely to gain more power in the course of the new Transatlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP)’s political debate, also if we look at the role it 
played in the ratification of the ACTA agreement. But since the NTA was launched, 
institutional entrepreneurs were especially Member States, waving the flag of cooperation with 
the Atlantic ally to re-establish a world order that had experienced a strong recalibration. 
                                                            
269 See the Section of EU relations on the USTR website: http://www.ustr.gov/countries-regions/europe-
middle-east/europe/european-union 
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During the mid-2000s, the Commission took the lead, as for the US did the Department of 
State. A “shift of competence” from some actors to others has opened the way to 
differentiated outcomes (victories but also long-term failures). A few questions arise at this 
point: have the institutional innovations and the policy commitments by state actors achieved 
tangible and credible results? Have private factors played a major or minor role shortly after 
the discussions on the newly established transatlantic partnership in the mid-1990s? 
Drawing on a table designed by Pollack and Shaffer (2001), three levels may be identified270. 
The relevance of actors depends on their distance from each other, in terms of capabilities and 
self-consciousness. State leaderships share governmental responsibilities, and behave 
accordingly. Contacts among them represent a tacit implication that heads of the executive 
power may be extensive supporter of further integration. The other two levels exemplify the 
interrelatedness of these cooperative endeavours. The most interesting one for the sake of this 
analysis remains the third. However, the path dependency from the first to third is not 
negligible: especially with reference to sectorial and specific policies271, many contacts have 
tended to result in a stone rolling from the first to the third level. As it will be highlighted in 
the last part through empirical comparative analysis, two fora such as the TABD and the 
TACD have managed to deal with policy proposals on their own or in cooperation with other 
actors simply because they were following the path traced by first-level actors. The incentives 
for US and EU regulators to engage in formal and informal co-operation vary across different 
issue areas, but can generally be classified into two broad categories.  
First, regulators may co-operate because they view such co-operation as useful in carrying out 
their essential rule-making responsibilities in an increasingly integrated transatlantic and global 
marketplace. Such co-operation needs not, and typically does not, involve joint rule-making 
                                                            
270 See [Fig. 1] 
271 As indicated before, policies are not considered in this dissertation in their thorough details. A comparative 
assessment of certain policy areas and their relevance for transatlantic exchanges may be found in EUI’s series on 
this topic: see the Transatlantic programme’s past and archived research activities here:  
http://www.eui.eu/DepartmentsAndCentres/RobertSchumanCentre/Research/InternationalTransnationalRelat
ions/TransatlanticProgramme/TransatlanticResearchActivities.aspx 
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activities, but focuses instead on exchanges of information, identification of best practice, and 
early notification of new regulations being considered within either polity. In the area of food 
safety, for example, the European Commission and the US FDA have not identified or 
implemented common standards, for the reasons discussed above, yet the two regulators do 
engage in an ongoing dialogue both bilaterally and within the Codex Alimentarius (the global 
body for the establishment of food safety standards)272, and the Commission consulted 
extensively with its US counterparts in the design of the European Food Safety Authority. 
Similar bilateral exchanges occur regularly in other issue-areas, as well as within multilateral 
standard-setting bodies such as the International Standards Organization (for industrial 
standards) 273  and the International Conference on Harmonization (for registration of 
pharmaceuticals)274.  
 
4.1.2: The processes governing a complex relationship 
What do the participants in these dialogues want from decision-makers? To take part in the 
“great game”. What can decision-makers offer to them? Policies. In this section I will focus on 
a specific level of policy-making, i.e. the transatlantic one. It differs both from the EU US’ 
policy and from US EU’s policy (Pollack & Shaffer, 2005). In order to answer the research 
question of this work, it is useful to give an in-depth reasoning on the institutional interactions 
between the two actors at play. As already said, there is nowadays no consistent mechanism 
for the coordination of policies at a comprehensive level between the EU and the US. The 
open and fluctuating nature of the whole framework is nevertheless influenced by some 
general trends and organized systems of policy-making, which are likely to be at the core of 
reflection for future and further improvement, provided that policy-makers decide to act 
                                                            
272 http://www.codexalimentarius.org 
273 http://www.iso.org 
274 http://www.ich.org 
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accordingly275. Taking note of the already quoted work by McGuire and Smith I define three 
“mechanisms”, as they are called, that govern transatlantic policy-making. They are 
transatlantic governance, hard and soft balancing and crisis management. I am adding to these 
three key issues a fourth one, which derives from an older (yet, equally valuable) contribution 
by Philippart and Winand (2001), i.e. inclusion. For a wider reflection on the concept of 
governance, I will draw on Mayntz and Scharpf (1995; Scharpf, 2000; Mayntz, 2004) and on 
previously outlined research.  
The four highlighted dimensions serve as guiding principles before moving to the next part. 
They represent the facets that the relation between the two partners can assume. Governance 
is the most typical concept used in this kind of situation. It encompasses a broad definition of 
interactions among the authors, and therefore does not exclude from the analysis any further 
attempt to define it. Balancing is another interesting issue: despite the Realist premises, it 
brings a different  
Pollack and Shaffer (2001)’s model, which is a threefold combination of intergovernmentalism 
(high-level meetings between chiefs of government), transgovernmentalism276 (lower-level 
contacts among officials) and transnationalism277 (private actors and civil society), is a good 
starting point to evaluate the complex positions on the continuum between “only 
governmental contacts” and “intense and frequent public-private relations”. I claim that the 
first one is the least open to external pressures by private actors. The second one is a bit more 
open to lobbying by companies and civil society (and the effectiveness of lobbying is therefore 
much more ample), while the third one is the typical “networked approach” of non-state 
actors and businesses, which nevertheless represents a weak tool when it comes to shaping 
complex processes at such a high-scale (the transatlantic one).  
                                                            
275 These trends can be represented as sub-theories, and I define and apply them by taking my theoretical 
assumption as starting ground. The plurality of processes and actors that characterize the following analysis 
denotes a path dependency from the theory i have briefly outlined. 
276 Wegrich, K. (2007), “Trangovernmentalism”, in Bevir, M.(ed.), Encyclopedia of Governance, Sage, pp. 982-
983 
277 Huff, R. (2007). Transnationalism. In M. Bevir (Ed.), ibidem, p. 985-987 
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Form of governance and “relations management” within the EU-US space can then be 
generally divided into three levels in which transatlantic institutions operate, as said. They can 
be easily be drawn from the previously cited authors but can be recognized in many other 
contributions278.  
Intergovernmental contacts have continued at the highest levels of the European 
Commission’s Directorates General (DG) and the US responsible Departments and the US 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC). These have occurred in a variety of contexts that go 
beyond the regular, formal EU/US bilateral consultations. For example, the EC 
Commissioner for Competition, the DG Comp Director General, DOJ’s Assistant Attorney 
General for Antitrust, and the FTC’s Chairman played pivotal roles in the formation of the 
International Competition Network (ICN) in 2001 and have cooperated extensively in the 
design and implementation of the ICN’s working plan. Contact among this high level EU and 
US officials is also commonplace at conferences and in discussions about specific policy 
matters. Measured either by the sheer volume of contacts or the breadth and depth of 
discussions, the intergovernmental level of discourse in competition policy is more robust 
today than at any period of the EU/US relationship. 
In the regulatory field, the European Commission with its Directorates, and the US Cabinet 
play a most important role here — through policies, which are implemented through Mutual 
Recognition Agreements and Positive Comity Agreement (PCA)279. The transnational level - 
forums based on debates within private sector, here “non-governmental actors influence 
transatlantic decisions taken at the top by exerting pressure through the domestic process and 
                                                            
278 Howorth, J. (2009), “A New Institutional Architecture for the Transatlantic Relationship?”, Europe Visions – 
5, Institut Français des Relations Internationales 
279 The PCA had the aim “to establish cooperative procedures to achieve the most effective and efficient 
enforcement of competition law, whereby the competition authorities of each Party will normally avoid allocating 
enforcement resources to deal with anti-competitive activities that occur principally in and are directed principally 
towards the other Party's territory, where the competition authorities of the other Party are able and prepared to 
examine and take effective sanctions under their law to deal with those activities. See here for the full text:  
http://ec.europa.eu/world/agreements/prepareCreateTreatiesWorkspace/treatiesGeneralData.do?step=0&redir
ect=true&treatyId=310 (last accessed 24/07/2014) 
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participating in institutionalized networks.”280. These three levels need a threefold explanation 
in order to make the theorization much clearer and apt for further research. 
Firstly, the intergovernmental level is an admittedly expanding and diverse system. Despite the 
growing relevance of NSAs in the whole process, it has been noted that the resurgence of 
transatlantic economic talks with the Transatlantic Economic Council (TEC) owes much to 
the intergovernmental bargaining efforts by Member States. It needs to be stressed that almost 
always EU policies themselves are the product of intergovernmental processes at the level of 
states. In some areas, these processes are the exclusive way of dealing with policies. Member 
States have retained a great deal of the initiative, albeit with an increasingly “Europeanized” or 
“Brusselized” policy process281. Moreover, in areas such as transatlantic security relationships 
there is still a great deal of intergovernmental dimension in the development of the policy 
process.  
Secondly, trans-governmental relations include contacts among officials and departments 
within national governments (sometimes also including elements of sub-national or regional 
governments as well), which come to constitute semi-permanent networks and shape the 
behaviour of their members both at the transatlantic or EU level and at the level of national 
governments.  
The transatlantic partnership in the 1990s has been researched not only from the point of 
view of a need for a renewed Atlantic chain of command in the world, but also for its 
implications on theoretical assumptions given as acquired until then. Informal governance or 
“networked governance”282 have become normal research guidelines, and their impact on the 
existing knowledge mechanics is now established. In the next Section I am conducting a 
                                                            
280 Steffenson, R. (2005), Managing EU-US relations: Actors, Institutions and the Transatlantic Policy Process, Manchester 
University Press (UK)/Macmillan (US) 
281 Thomas, D., Tonra, B. (2012), “To What Ends EU Foreign Policy? Contending Approaches to the Union’s 
Diplomatic Objectives and Representation”, The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, 7 (2012) 11-29 
282 A concept that would need more attention and here is only mentioned briefly in the first sub-Chapter. For 
further reflection on its future, see Huppe, G., Kreech, H., Knoblauch, D. (2012). “The future of networked 
governance”, International Institute for Sustainable Development – Report, accessible at  
http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2012/frontiers_networked_gov.pdf (last access 02/28/2014)  
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review of the various meanings and uses of the term “governance”, trying to dig out the 
aspects, which can be more suitable for my research.  
 
4.2: Existing economic cooperation and the role of the financial crisis 
This sub-Chapter aims at highlighting the current status quo in economic figures.  
Although both the US and the EU economies were hardly hit by the crisis, data show that the 
two regions’ experiences were different, and highlighted already existing discrepancies in 
growth performances. While the US managed to recover from the hard landing of 2009 and 
recorded an average annual growth of 2.3% from 2010 to 2012, the EU experienced two 
recessions, in 2009 (-4.4%) and 2012 (-0.3%). The perspectives for the two areas also look 
quite different. According to IMF estimates (2013c), the US will grow on average by 3.1% 
from 2014 to 2018, while the recovery in the EU will be weaker, with an annual growth of 
1.6% in the same period. The prolonged economic crisis in the EU, which unveiled underlying 
structural problems in the construction of the euro area, forced EU institutions to give 
priority and to dedicate significant resources policies to the solution of its internal weaknesses. 
Macroeconomic adjustment was critical both in the EU and the US, but the latter reacted 
swiftly and recovered growth in the immediate aftermath of the crisis thanks to the massive 
injection of money in the banking sector and the stimulus package283. The divergence in 
growth performance has become structural. For instance, the rise of structural unemployment 
in peripheral countries of the euro area such as Spain and Greece284 signals a reduction in 
capacity utilization and in the activity rate of the economy. Structural unemployment in the 
euro area is currently at 10.2% but is much lower in the US at 6.1%285.  
                                                            
283 Suominen, Kati (2013), “Counterproductive Adjustment? United States After the Great Recession”, in 
Transworld Working Papers, No. 11 (March), http://www.transworld-fp7.eu/?p=1054 
284 Respectively from a 13.3% and 10.3% during the period 1999-2008 to 21.5% and 16.8% in 2014. OECD 
Statistics: Structural unemployment, forecasts (EO95, May 2014), http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933052270. 
285 ibidem 
	   134	  
This has significant implications on the evolution of the EU-US relationship. A vicious circle 
linking unemployment and weak domestic demand would reduce the scope and the 
attractiveness to boost trade and investment with the EU, and also in the eyes of its 
transatlantic partner. A weaker EU might become less attractive for the US, which would 
increasingly turn towards other regions. The transition process towards a technology-driven 
economy is another case in point of the diverging routes the EU and the US are taking. The 
US is still the main non-EU R&D investor in the EU: EU-based companies account for 
30.6% of the top R&D companies in the world, compared to 34.3% for the US and 22% for 
Japan286. However, the EU is lagging behind the US and other developing regions in terms of 
innovation and performances in higher and scientific education (Renda 2013). The annual 
expenditure per capita on R&D activities is 534 euro in the EU, while it is 944 euro in the 
US287. Disparities in R&D performance are also evident within the EU itself between northern 
and southern EU countries: for instance, in southern Europe, R&D intensity is less than half 
of Scandinavian countries, Germany and Austria (Erber and Hagemann 2013). 
A bigger effort would be required by the member States, in coordination with the EU 
institutions, in order to successfully implement the EU 2020 Agenda, which set the target of 
achieving investment in innovation equal to 3% of the EU GDP by 2020. 
Moreover, domestic factors impact on the future of the economic relationship. The EU, in 
particular the euro area, is engaged in moving towards more integration, in primis with regards 
to steps towards a Banking Union. It is a major opportunity and challenge at the same time 
for the Monetary Union. A positive outcome would reduce financial fragmentation in the euro 
area and keep it safe from risks of collapse (although it is unlikely that a complete Banking 
Union is enforced in the short term). It would also help reduce the risk of new economic and 
                                                            
286 Hamilton, Daniel S., and Joseph P. Quinlan, eds. (2014), “The Transatlantic Economy 2014. Vol. 1: Headline 
Trends”, Washington, Centre for Transatlantic Relations,  
http://transatlantic.sais-jhu.edu/publications/books/TA2014/TA2014_Vol_1.pdf 
287 Eurostat, Total intramural R&D expenditure (GERD) by sectors of performance and NUTS 2 regions, 
http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=rd_e_gerdreg. 
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financial crises, but as a “side effect” it might exacerbate the “two-speed” integration trend, or 
even trigger more dramatic divisions in case a “Brexit” (i.e., Britain leaving the EU) should 
take place. The status of the UK within the EU12 but also in the broader transatlantic alliance 
is particularly “sensitive” with respect to the completion and current status of the single 
financial market. The potential renegotiation of the UK’s membership or its potential exit 
could be a blow to the relationship between the US and the EU from the economic (and 
especially financial) point of view. A recent survey of a hundred business leaders demonstrates 
that they want the UK to be in the Single Market - an overwhelming 84% indicated that they 
wanted the UK to remain a member of the EU and agreed that EU membership economically 
benefits the UK as a whole 288 . In a different survey by TheCityUK, decision makers 
specifically cited access to markets in the EU as a core reason for choosing the UK over other 
financial centres (TheCityUK 2012). 
As it has been pointed out in the previous part, trans-governmental and transnational policy-
making represent rather different mechanisms. On the one side, actors are clearly definable, 
variables are identifiable and processes are linear. On the other side, actors are much more 
blended, as far as the actions they perform. In order to get a clear picture of what constitutes a 
policy-making arena, it is compulsory to consider all these factors in the analysis. By creating 
an index that assesses how much effective a policy has been, this section aims at corroborating 
the idea that policy-effectiveness may be measured, and the impact of regulatory measures 
too289.  
Drawing on the insights of previous authors and their precious experiences on transatlantic 
policy-making, figures and numbers display the outcome of policy decisions on certain 
                                                            
288 The survey was undertaken with Ipsos MORI, interviewed 101 UK based CEOs, chairmen, CIOs, board 
members, directors and partners of firms from across the sector. 
289 The existing literature on Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA) is outstanding, and has grown up during 
recent years enormously: a good example of its relevance in the policy world is the world by Renda (2011) and 
Radaelli (2009). The task of using RIA approaches to evaluate the impact of policy processes in the transatlantic 
sphere would be too difficult and also most likely without tangible results: the RIA has sets of units that interact 
with each other too quite hardly on the domestic level, and the current imbalances in policy-making attempts are 
quite obvious if put in relation to the ghostly nature of public policies.  
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sectors. Was it all successful? How to trace back the influence of private actors on the 
transatlantic economy? The figures I am presenting are derived from a load of information 
that comes directly from different authors and European Commission official documents. 
The greatest amount of information is taken from another series of studies, published by 
Johns Hopkins University’s Center for Transatlantic Relations290, undoubtedly the most 
important think-tank for the study of transatlantic economic partnership. The “Transatlantic 
Economy” survey, published since 2009, represents a major tool to gain knowledge on the 
achievements of common cooperation. With regards to services, for example, the study shows 
that “[…] The EU ranks number one in each major category of global services trade in 2012, 
but exports of services from Europe declined by 2.3% due to depressed economic conditions. 
Services exports plunged 5.7% from France; 3.3% from the UK; and 1.1% from Germany. 
U.S. services exports, in contrast, rose 5.5% in 2012. Five of the top ten export markets for 
U.S. services are in Europe. Europe accounted for 38.1% of total US services exports and for 
41.6% of total U.S. services imports in 2012. US services exports to the EU more than 
doubled between 2001 and 2012, from $102 to $240 billion. US services exports to Europe 
grew 3.8% to total $239 billion in 2012 and grew 5.3% to total $187 billion in first nine 
months of 2013”291. On innovation economy, figures are encouraging: “In 2011 US affiliates 
invested $27.7 billion in R&D in Europe, roughly 61% of total global R&D expenditures by 
US foreign affiliates. […]R&D spending by European affiliates in the US totalled $33.4 billion, 
$2.1 billion more than in 2010, and representing three-fourths of all R&D performed by 
majority-owned foreign affiliates in the United States”292. 
But “not all that glitters is gold”. Acknowledging the broad range of topics covered and the 
need for a (at least partial) generalization, these are unquestionably the most important 
variables to be brought into consideration.  
                                                            
290 See website here: http://transatlantic.sais-jhu.edu/transatlantic-topics/transatlantic-economy-series.htm 
291 See the latest version of the publication, namely the 2014 issue 
292 This excerpt is taken from “The Transatlantic Economy 2014”, whose Executive Summary is accessible here: 
http://transatlantic.sais-jhu.edu/publications/books/TA2014/TA2014_executive_Summary.pdf  
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Two questions have to be asked when it comes to transatlantic economic relations: first of all, 
how deeply integrated is the transatlantic economy, both in historical comparison and 
compared to other inter-regional relations? What about trade, investments, and capital flows 
as well as transatlantic supply chains? Can economic interdependence provide the “super 
glue” that keeps the political relationship together? While there is indeed continuing economic 
interpenetration across the Atlantic293, US dependence on transatlantic trade was much higher 
prior to World War I than in this age of globalization. And the growth rates for transatlantic 
trade pale in comparison with both US and EU trade with China and East Asia. In contrast, 
mutual foreign direct investment (FDI) has reached unprecedented high levels and the same 
holds true for capital flows. But FDI constitutes an ambiguous indicator for interdependence. 
On the one hand, deep commercial engagements of US firms in Europe and of EU firms in 
America increase the mutual stakes into each other’s well-being. On the other hand, the 
motives for FDI - gaining market access and insuring against currency changes - indicate a 
lack of economic integration rather than proving it (Scherpenberg 2008). In a single and 
deeply integrated market such as the EU and increasingly, the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA), FDIs are less necessary 294 . In sum, transatlantic economic 
interdependence and interpenetration, while strong, has not led to deep economic integration. 
The second question - whether economic interdependence leads to peace or is irrelevant for 
security - is at the origin of an old battle between interdependence theorists and (neo-) realists, 
the former arguing in favour of the interdependence-peace correlation and the latter 
dismissing it (Waltz 1979). Unfortunately, we can draw few conclusions for our “super glue” 
question from this debate. First, the breadth and depth of “interdependence” and “level of 
conflict” are such macro-variables that the statistical results are highly dependent on the 
                                                            
293 Apart from the already quoted works, there are interesting remarks by Bank of Italy’s Governor Mario Draghi 
in 2008, during the Conference “Italy, Europe and the US: The transatlantic link and its future”, accessible here: 
http://www.bancaditalia.it/interventi/integov/2008/aspen_010708/en_aspen_1_07_08.pdf  
294 See the Economic Snapshot of the Economic Policy Institute on FDIs in NAFTA, 
 http://www.epi.org/publication/webfeatures_snapshots_archive_10271999/, and Waldkirch, A. (2008), “The 
Effects of Foreign Direct Investment in Mexico since NAFTA”, MPRA Repository, University of Muenchen 
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precise indicators that are chosen. Second, and more importantly, the “super glue” question is 
not really about war and peace, but about whether a strong economic relationship can prevent 
a political crisis from provoking the breakdown of a security community. It is vital to specify 
the dependent variable here. The functionalist interdependence argument concerns war and 
peace, while my dependent variable concerns the future of a much tighter cooperative 
relationship, namely an “institutionalized community”. 
Fig.1
 
 
4.3: Problematizing 
Alongside the two hypotheses there are also two images emphasizing the complex scenarios 
that are likely to shape the future of transatlantic relations. These “images” encompass a 
particular theoretical framework and specific actors’ relationships. At this later stage it is 
already clear that the structure, the policy exchange and the degree of institutionalized 
cooperation varies across different fields295. Functional cooperation depends on the pressures 
from external actors and internal struggles among especially private actors, while political 
leadership has been weakened by these informal exchanges of information and expertise. I 
maintain that at least a certain degree of predictability is achievable by looking at the interplay 
                                                            
295 Howorth, J. (2009), “A New Institutional Architecture for the Transatlantic Relationship?”, Europe-Vision 5, 
IFRI-Bruxelles 
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occurring between these two “images”. They do not constitute a coherent reflection on the 
multifaceted nature of transatlantic cooperation, obviously. Still, they can be useful to assess 
the empirical part, which will be presented in the next two Chapters. They simply recognize 
the existence of different interpretations of the same subject by assembling together variables 
that could mean nothing if presented alone. This is a pure mind exercise, which nevertheless 
has consistent predecessors, as most of the academic (and non-academic, i.e. think-tank) 
works on the transatlantic community of actors testify296. 
Problematizing helps both clarifying the past and evaluating the future. It may be useful to 
categorize the broad theories exposed and to pre-judge the amount of empirical material 
outlined hereafter. Since this is not a truly experimental work, the main goal is to show how 
different theories can apply to the existing knowledge on this subject. This can give a more 
structured view, at the same time allowing for a deeper understanding of the mechanics 
behind transatlantic relations. These two scenarios encompass a mixture of theoretical 
reasoning, process-tracing logics and draw their own empirical mainly on what has been 
exposed mostly in Part 2.  
The first one is more positive, the second one is rather negative. They represent an attempt to 
frame next reflections on the subject by a different point of view. In the Conclusions it will be 
more clear whether transatlantic relations are going to follow the first scenario or the second.  
 
4.3.1: First scenario 
This first “image” looks at the power relationship between the two actors. It employs a liberal 
and (maybe) simplistic account of international relations, stressing the relevance of factors 
such as capabilities, preferences and inward looking attitude. According to this first scenario, 
                                                            
296  Risse, T. (2012), “Determinants and Features of International Alliances and Structural Partnerships”, 
Transworld Working Paper 02 
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transatlantic relations probably have already achieved the maximum level of cooperation297, 
and future imbalances in global economy and economic crises will only threaten and 
eventually hinder the existing relationship298. According to this picture, cooperation has been 
achieved only due to the structural imbalances among purely material factors.  
What may be criticisable of this view is the mere accent on power and force when looking into 
a completely interrelated scenario and enormous amount of exchanges during the last twenty 
years. Are then transatlantic relations going to evolve only according to predictable factors 
such as distribution of resources or power? This is questionable: many factors point towards 
diminishing the value of this first scenario, which has by the way its own raison d’être. First of 
all, the past suggests that if cooperation existed among transatlantic actors, it was due mainly 
to non-material elements. Common ideals were the ones that shaped the birth of the NTA, 
and only then the whole process was driven by material factors. Therefore, this first scenario 
would be too narrow in its focus, not encompassing all the nuances at least at the beginning of 
the process. Secondly, the NTA first steps were very much reliant upon joint initiatives and 
common programs, but the real impact of them was low, given the poor resources and the 
weak attitude. Finally, what to expect from the future, given the predictive role of this 
scenario? The ratio behind cooperation is the main variable to understand. This first scenario 
does not include non-material factors, and this is what undermines its own essence. The main 
implication concerns the link between ideational and material factors299. Material power and 
shifts in the global as well as the Euro-Atlantic power balance certainly matter. Yet, the more 
we theorize the transatlantic relationship as a security community, the more the importance of 
changes in the material power balance is mitigated by institutional and ideational factors. 
Social constructivists would add that the meaning of “material power” depends on its 
                                                            
297 Kupchan, C. (2006), “The Fourth Age: The Next Era in Transatlantic Relations”, 
http://www.cfr.org/world/fourth-age-next-era-transatlantic-relations/p11488 (last accessed: 06/10/2014) 
298 Cox, M. (2009), “No Longer Inevitable? The Transatlantic Relationship from Bush to Obama”, IDEAS 
Report, Special reports Series 
299 Sorensen, G. (2008), “The Case for Combining Material Forces and Ideas in the Study of IR”, European Journal 
of International Relations, Vol. 14, no. 1 5-32 
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discursive construction. The contemporary discourse about the “rise of China” is an example. 
One can safely assume that the economic capabilities of the People’s Republic of China have 
grown in recent years. What this means, however, is extremely controversial and open to 
interpretation. For some, the rise of China represents a challenge ultimately requiring a 
strategic balancing. Others see China primarily as an economic competitor, while there is also 
a group that perceives primarily business opportunities. In sum, there is widespread discussion 
of what a change in material capabilities actually means and how one ought to respond to it.  
Therefore, the first scenario leaves open the question of how to operationalize non-material 
factors within transatlantic governance.  
 
4.3.2: Second scenario 
The second scenario looks more deeply at the significance and effectiveness of the 
institutionalization process. It states that excessive laissez-faire in terms of exchanges and 
policy determination has produced the weak impact we can now recognize throughout 
transatlantic affairs. This impact was influenced not only by divergent strategies between the 
private and the public sector, but also by what has been termed the “transatlantic rift”300.  
More specifically, and implicitly, the question may also be posed is a dubitative way: would the 
dialogue have been more successful if governmental and political actors had been more 
talkative with each other in the process? Therefore, the strength highlighted in the H1 
becomes a weakness in the H2301. This second hypothesis aims at better shaping the research 
question by pointing at the negative side of cooperation, and asks whether governmental 
actors could have avoided the trap in which they fell if they had not let to subcontract their 
own foreign policy options to non-governmental actors. This second scenario highlights the 
                                                            
300 Grant, C. (2003), “Transatlantic rift: How to bring the two sides together”, Center for European Reform, 
accessible here 
http://www.cer.org.uk/publications/archive/report/2003/transatlantic-rift-how-bring-two-sides-together (last 
accessed 23/07/2014) 
301 More explanations on the hypotheses are in Chapter 2 
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role of factors, which are ideological and pertain to the world of norms rather than to the 
world of capabilities. The implicit assumption is that the creation of more richness, which was 
the main goal for many years and still lies at the core of the TTIP, can not be left without a 
guide. Predicting the future with this second scenario may seem more useful than predicting it 
with the first one. First of all, it employs more variables. Not only strength, power and 
material factors, but also ideological formations, thought substrate and norms. Moreover, it 
has a broader approach to the subject. It considers the functions of every possible actor, by 
pointing at their roles and interactive environments rather than at their singularity and typical 
traits. 
 
4.4: Summing up  
In this brief section I am reviewing what has just been exposed in the preceding chapters, 
trying to find out the main lines of evaluation.  
The goal of the dissertation, it has been advanced in the introduction, is to find out how EU-
US economic relations have evolved in the last twenty years, especially with regards to trade. 
The main hypotheses are two. First of all, a not negligible part of those relations have been 
influenced in some ways by NSAs. No moral judgment lies in these words: private interests 
have participated in the negotiations at every possible level, and still nowadays are engaged in 
high-level stakeholders’ meetings302. 
Secondly, despite NSAs’ huge support to transatlantic integration in the economic sector, 
there has been little progress so far. There are many reasons for this claim, and they will be 
exposed in next Parts. 
Theorizing how transatlantic relations work is a difficult task. No one has ever attempted to 
elaborate a “grand theory” of EU-US relations, nor it is the aim of this dissertation. A state-to-
                                                            
302 The TEC was until the launch of the TTIP the only real and concrete transatlantic institutionalized body for 
private actors’ interest representation. With regards to the TTIP, recent data published by the Commission on 
the public consultation on Investor-State Dispute Settlement Body (ISDS) show that public support has not 
vanished: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/consultations/index.cfm?consul_id=179 
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state (or international organization – state) relationship is hardly conceivable in terms of 
comprehensive theories in IR. Therefore, the analysis has evolved around two different levels: 
the first one is “middle-range” theories of cooperation. Some of them derive their own 
existence from liberalism and constructivism, some others do not. The second level is the one 
of low politics, which is more focused on theorizing the interactions between actors, how they 
enter into contact through processes, how they survive continuous competition.  
The third sub-Chapter addresses existing ties in economic cooperation, what is going on 
nowadays, how to conceptualize it and how to define it. The clear message of this part is that 
something has been achieved, but it is not sufficient to talk about a clear-cut existing 
economic integration. The reason why this topic is researched here is that there is a need to 
finalize things before proceeding towards the final part of the dissertation. 4.2 touches upon 
many interesting figures and data drawn from different sources, and tries to present evidence 
on the ongoing partnership, from the point of view of existing trade relations.  
In conclusion, this Chapter focuses on a middle-range theory of transatlantic cooperation, not 
by looking at why EU and US have cooperated, but looking at how they behaved in a certain 
manner303. This topic is interesting under many regards. First of all, a strong and sound 
theoretical account needs to take into consideration not only the structural components as 
given, but also how they interact, who they actually are and the reasons behind their own 
actions. Focusing on processes and typologies of actors allows then both for a rethinking of 
what has been outlined in the third Chapter but also for a new point of view on the 
transatlantic partnership. Secondly, assessing lower levels of cooperation may be useful to 
identify trends and go further into the details. Since it is much more complicated to evaluate 
years-long interactions and enduring partnerships than fixed state preferences or capabilities 
distribution, this Chapter has tried to forge the tools to evaluate these issues in a cross-time 
                                                            
303 On the relevance of middle-range theories of international politics, see Walt, S. (2005), “The relationship 
between theory and policy in international relations”, Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci. 8, pp. 23–48; for a lighter view, 
Jackson, P. (2012), “I can has IR theory?”, Duck of Minerva Paper Series 
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fashion. Therefore, the part on actors has a sub-Chapter on the sui generis concept of 
networks, highly relevant yet poorly researched.  
 
 
Fig. 1 
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CHAPTER 5: Public Opinion influence on transatlantic economic relations 
5.1: Why is public opinion analysis useful for this research?  
The current research takes account of all the methodological caveat, which have just been 
outlined. Nevertheless, it addresses the topic from the point of view of public opinion 
research. The reason why this first method is used traces back to the hypothesizing in the first 
Chapter. The goal of this research is to find out whether private actors have shaped 
transatlantic economic relations and more broadly what role private actors have played in the 
last twenty years. Therefore, the present Chapter aims at answering these research questions 
by looking at the general feeling towards economic integration and transatlantic trade in the 
public opinion. Moreover, it tries to go further into details by pointing at three characteristics 
in public opinion: first of all, the role of business élites, which historically have strongly paved 
the way for integration. Their role is assessed by using Transatlantic trends and Transatlantic 
economy data304, which contain tables and Sections dedicated to business leaders surveys and 
samples. This part also gives the opportunity to see in further details how people directly 
involved in the economic process decided at a certain point that there was a need to foster 
trade (and especially regulatory305) agreements.  
Secondly, literature306 on public opinion support to international trade has divided itself over 
the main issue of whether favourable views of trade were due to higher income on people, 
general economic situation improvement, or simply driven by unpredictable events. This 
research then points to the determinants of certain answers to surveys on the international 
                                                            
304 A massive survey on the opinions of people on the two sides of the Atlantic already touched upon briefly in 
previous Chapters, Transatlantic Trends reflect the eagerness by researchers to explore the divide that came to 
light only a decade ago.  
305 Vogel, D. (1997), “Barriers or benefits? : Regulation in transatlantic trade”, Brookings Institution Press, 
Washington 
306 Balistreri, E.J. (1997), “The Performance of the Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek Model in Predicting Endogenous 
Policy Forces at the Individual Level”, Canadian Journal of Economics, 30, pp. 1–17; Beaulieu, E., Ravindra A. 
Y., and Wei Guo Wang (2005), “Who Supports Free Trade in Latin America?”, World Economy, 28, pp. 41–58; 
Mayda, A. M., and Rodrik, D. (2005), “Why Are Some People and Countries More Protectionist Than Others?”, 
European Economic Review 49, pp. 393– 430 
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economic environment by stressing the differences among various methods used to assess the 
growth or decline in support to trade between the two partners.  
Thirdly and finally, the following part addresses a cleavage in public opinion studies, which 
has first been raised by Fordham and Kleinberg (2012). It states that trade preferences 
formation in the public is certainly driven by essential individual interests, but that also many 
sociotropic formations influence the desire of opening trade and markets to the outside world. 
The most direct shortcomings of this basic assumptions are that people tend to form public 
opinion by supporting each and every viewpoint as if they were divided into many different 
interest groups rather than societal actors or purely individualistic entities. Or, for example, 
that they could tend to show only a pale picture of what they really think and believe because 
otherwise they could lose the support of their group.  
This research tackles the theoretical limits of this view by considering the uniqueness of the 
EU and the US as case-studies. Even though most of the previously quoted research (but 
many more argue the same307) has focused entirely on the US as the most significant arena for 
the study of presidential leaderships, executive politics and legislatures, this contribution relies 
on data that include also the EU, which is considered as a sum of states rather than a single 
public opinion. Therefore, the potential aporias of this approach are overcome by the 
“singleness” of the public opinion under scrutiny. Notwithstanding the negative impact of not 
enough thoroughly researched public opinion trends, it is rewarding to see that, under many 
circumstances, answers picture a general framework, nothing more. They need to be studies 
according bearing in mind what has just been outlined.  
How to think public opinion in a fruitful manner then? An interesting tool to research public 
opinion is given by “domestic audience costs” (DAC) theory308. Every decision in foreign 
                                                            
307 Hainmueller, J., Hiscox, M. (2006) “Learning to Love Globalization: Education and Individual Attitudes 
Toward International Trade”, International Organization, 60, pp. 469–98; O’Rourke, K., Sinnott, R. (2001) “The 
Determinants of Individual Trade Policy Preferences: International Survey Evidence” in Brookings Trade 
Forum, 2001, edited by Collins, S.M., Rodrik, D., Washington, DC, Brookings Institution, pp. 157–206 
308 Developed by Fearon in 1994, DAC represents an interesting way of looking at the topic of foreign policy 
decisions: these costs “arise from the action of domestic audiences concerned with whether the leadership is 
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policy has its repercussions on the domestic level. Deciding to integrate at the highest level 
between the EU and the US needs to be put into contest: which kind of domestic politics do 
these two entities have? On the one side, the President takes the decision to sign the 
agreement but also the Congress is politically responsible to the US citizens and constituents. 
On the other side, responsibility is shared between the Commission, which has the main 
negotiating bargaining tasks on its shoulders, and the Council, which has the final word on 
negotiations. The European Parliament, albeit trying to be strongly involved at many stages of 
the transatlantic partnership and despite its relevance as the “voice of the European 
people”309, is not considered in this case, given its low salience in the twenty years before the 
Treaty of Lisbon. One could try to study audience costs directly, perhaps by examining the 
historical fate of leaders who issued threats and then backed down. The problem, which 
international relations scholars widely recognize, is strategic selection bias310. If leaders take the 
prospect of audience costs into account when making foreign policy decisions, then in 
situations when citizens would react harshly against backing down, leaders would tend to 
avoid that path, leaving little opportunity to observe the public backlash. It would seem, 
therefore, that a direct and unbiased measure of audience costs is beyond reach. In the case of 
the EU, DAC are low: there is not much political accountability from an election to the other. 
The tied political system and the strong executive, alongside the exceptionality of the Council, 
are exactly the opposite of the American system.  
Therefore, what DAC can teach us about the role of public opinion in transatlantic relations is 
that its salience will be much higher for the American side rather than for the European one. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
successful or unsuccessful at foreign policy”. Even though initially used to assess international (mostly military) 
crises, they have been applied also to foreign trade, international economic relations, etc. See Fearon, J. (1994), 
“Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes”, The American Political Science 
Review, Vol. 88, No. 3, pp. 577-592; Tomz, M. (2007), “Domestic Audience Costs in International Relations: An 
Experimental Approach”, International Organization, Vol. 61, No. 4, pp. 821-840 
309 See Gstoehl, S. (2013), “The European Union’s Trade Policy”, Ritsumeikan international affairs, Vol.11, pp.1-
22 
310 See Baum, Matthew A. 2004. Going Private: Public Opinion, Presidential Rhetoric, and the Domestic Politics 
of Audience Costs in U.S. Foreign Policy Crises. Journal of Conflict Resolution 48 (5):603-31.; and Schultz, K. A. 
(2001b), “Looking for Audience Costs”, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 45 (1), pp. 32-60 
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This is due to the greater standing public opinion has for American politicians. How can this 
impact on transatlantic integration? Two factors are likely to shape the answer to this 
question. First of all, the level of salience of a certain issue for the American public. It may 
also have consequences on the European one but for the moment  
 
5.1.1: The relevance of public opinion 
Public opinion analysis is a prominent method in contemporary political research311. Both 
quantitative and qualitative studies employ public opinion research tools to assess how things 
change in the political arena312. International relations’ discipline has for a long time neglected 
the usefulness of studying how opinions are formed and more specifically what citizens and 
policy-makers think313. How is an opinion formed? How can similar actors have so much 
different opinions? Public opinion research allows to evaluate in coherent terms the main lines 
of action in international politics. Literature on the subject has now grown a lot. Public 
opinion surveys have been carried out throughout the last years in order to assess many 
aspects especially of foreign policies.  
The aim of this brief overview is to develop a better understanding of the public opinion’s 
perception towards the transatlantic alliance. I have found 4 variables, which may be useful to 
evaluate the different perceptions across the Atlantic on certain issues. They will be explained 
                                                            
311 Olmastroni, F. (2010), “Public Opinion Research in Political Science”, Politikon – The IAPSS Journal of 
Political Science, Volume 16, Number 1 
312 For a good recognition of the state of the art in public opinion research, see Groves, R. (2011), “Three eras of 
survey research”, Public Opinion Quarterly, Special Issue - 75 (5), pp. 861-871 
313 In the early years of political science research, public opinion analysis was employed extensively, especially 
with regards to certain topics, such as civic culture, political preferences formation and élites in international 
relations. The cases of Almond and Deutsch are ostensibly clear: Deutsch’s original argument about security 
communities focused on national policy-makers and political, economic and social elites. Yet, there is no reason 
to exclude that attitudes and activities of ordinary citizens, particularly with regard to the formation of collective 
identities, can be considered as a cornerstone of security communities. Almond’s argument was that Americans 
react to foreign policy in a moody, rather than thoughtful, way. The mood may vary from indifference to fatalism 
to anger, but it was almost always a "superficial and fluctuating response." Almond simply believed that they 
were so involved with their immediate private concerns that they lacked the time and energy to stay abreast of 
world events. Nevertheless, he described the public mood as "essentially unstable" and prone to "dangerous 
overreactions". For further information, see Almond, G., (1950), The American People and Foreign Policy, Harcourt, 
Brace; Weissberg, R. (2002), Polling, Policy, and Public Opinion: The Case Against Heeding the "Voice of the People", New 
York, Palgrave Macmillan 
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in 5.2. The realm of security has always been at the forefront of gaining public support for 
transatlantic policy-makers. Political leaders have tried to make people rally around the flag, 
both for their own political purposes and for the greater sake of the country314. Polls on public 
opinion during pre-war periods have shown that the public tends to conform to decision-
makers only when they feel that the decision has a win-win outcome, meaning that nobody 
loses from it and everybody has its own share in the potential outcome. This does not mean 
that the decision will surely have positive effects: it simply means that in the cost-benefit 
analysis, people will be more prone to assess the relationship accordingly to their beliefs and 
aspirations on the expected positive outcomes, rather than thinking negatively at what could 
happen next. 
The analysis of the relationship between public opinion and international economic choices is 
located within the broader discussion on the nature and impact of public opinion on foreign 
policy315. Such debate, triggered by the appearance of the first public opinion surveys during 
the WWII, has been shaped by two main paradigms. According to the first one, developed 
during the first wave of research in the 1950s and 1960s (although anticipated by Lippmann 
(1922) to some extent), public opinion is ill-informed, volatile, irrational (if not dangerous), 
easy to manipulate and should not exert any significant influence on the conduct of foreign 
policy (Almond 1953; Converse 1962). This research was mainly focused on the pre-war 
period, and the empirical material was still rather raw. For scholars trying to understand the 
influence of public opinion on foreign policy in the era of McCarthyism, it was hard to tell 
what were the real roots of public opinion research. On a different note, scholars conducting 
research after the Vietnam War argued that public opinion is better informed, more coherent, 
rational, independent and influential than expected (Verba et al. 1967; Caspary 1970; Russet 
                                                            
314 Feinstein, M. (2012), “Rallying around the Flag: Nationalist Emotions in American Mass Politics”, Ph.D.thesis 
at University of California in Los Angeles, with extract available: “War that Feels Good: A new explanation for 
the rally-round-the-flag phenomenon”, accessible here: 
http://www.democracy.uci.edu/files/democracy/docs/conferences/grad/Feinstein_DemocracyConf_Irvine201
0.pdf 
315 Many research inputs will be dealt with in this Chapter. Most of them are connected to the analysis of the use 
of force and whether public opinion supports it or not.  
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1990; Holsti 1992; Page and Shapiro 1992)316. In looking specifically at the literature on public 
opinion and the international projection of economic power, it is particularly interesting to 
take stock of the works produced after Cold War and focused on public attitudes toward 
Western economic supremacy. As claimed by scholars dealing with public opinion but on 
other issues317, the most prominent explanations for public support are interests at stake, 
multilateralism, leadership cues and, as said, cost–benefit calculations. 
As mentioned above, élites think of the Atlantic divide as a major source of international 
misunderstandings and therefore call for more structured cooperation, at least since the first 
surveys have been circulated throughout the research community.  
Fig. 1 
 
 
                                                            
316 In particular, Holsti’s critique and reassessment of the Almond and Lippmann consensus on the role of public 
opinion addresses this issue vigorously: Nevertheless, there are at least four areas that seem to call for additional 
effort: case studies employing archival sources that will provide the most directly relevant evidence on the impact 
of public opinion, cross-national research, development of standard questions in order to encourage cumulation 
of survey results, and research that will enable us to distinguish results that are time- and context-bound from 
those that transcend the Cold War period”. See Holsti, O. (1992), “Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: 
Challenges to the Almond-Lippmann Consensus Mershon Series: Research Programs and Debates”, International 
Studies Quarterly, Vol. 36, No. 4 (Dec., 1992), p. 464 
317 One above many is Klarevas, L. (2002) “The “Essential Domino” of Military Operations: American Public 
Opinion and the Use of Force”, International Studies Perspectives, 3: 417–437 
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Calculating the usual caveats within the analysis, [Fig. 1] shows some interesting findings. 
They do not explain the whole story, but help understanding how much support has 
historically driven integration forward. Historically, élites have been pondering a lot on the 
positive side effects of integration at transatlantic level. Their idea was that favouring 
integration would have reduced the burden of tariffs, duties and non-tariff barriers to the 
market access in their respective economy.  
More broadly speaking, the tendency is to support each other’s leadership in world affairs318. 
Despite a slight decrease in US support for EU leadership in the world, the two partners seem 
to remain conscious that they will still lead international relations in the future. A second 
interesting variable is the support for government spending: the reduction of government 
spending normally induces businesses to be more confident and to trust the liberalization this 
decreased government spending may induce. Numbers seem unchanged since 2006, and this is 
a good sign, given that the crisis has instead shaped many political and social views in national 
public opinions. Thirdly and lastly, support for trade agreements in the transatlantic space has 
always been high throughout last years. What makes it even more interesting for future 
reflections on the issue, figures show an increased recent support, which can not be related to 
the TTIP proposal, but maybe to the TEC one. Be it a significant variable or not, policy-
makers have not certainly disregarded these numbers, and they can be useful to advance to the 
last part of this dissertation.  
This part uses secondary data from a variety of sources. As already mentioned in the 
beginning, the task of collecting opinions from business élites and more broadly from 
transatlantic decision-makers is a remarkable, risky and most of all costly exercise. It is 
remarkable because it might help researchers in many different fields: for example, IR 
theorists who want to find out why the US integrated with the EU instead than with regional 
                                                            
318 Jolliff, B. (2012), “Recovery through cooperation: the US and EU in the next four 
yearshttp://www.iss.europa.eu/fr/publications/detail-page/article/recovery-through-cooperation-the-us-and-
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partners already coalesced in an organization such as NAFTA. Or, as it has been made clear in 
the introduction, policy-oriented researchers that need empirical foundations (albeit only 
qualitatively grounded) on reasons to cooperate at the transatlantic level319. It is risky since it 
presents only a point of view, and purposefully assumes it as the only way to acquire 
knowledge on the subject. Parsimonious models usually tend to neglect many facets of a 
certain subject, and in this case this is particularly true. For example, not taking into 
consideration the interrelatedness between ideal and material factors could act to the 
detriment of a coherent and all-encompassing research. It is costly because it requires funding 
for a variety of surveys, statistical elaborations and numerous researchers. This is partially due 
to the width and breadth of research purposes. Solutions to this thorny problem could be the 
evasion of certain questions, which could as a consequence hinder the research results. 
Otherwise, researchers could limit their analysis only to single topics, like for example food 
disputes320 or mergers321, but this would certainly pose threat to the comprehension and 
thorough understanding of the subject.  
Thus far, this line of research has focused on two forms of trust: political trust (i.e., 
generalized trust in government) and social trust (i.e., generalized trust in other people). 
Recent studies have argued that citizens use each of these as a heuristic, or information 
shortcut, in forming political judgments across a range of topics322. It may be, however, that 
other forms of generalized trust also play important roles in shaping public opinion. In the 
                                                            
319 As Pippa Norris claimed, “The statistical revolution spurred the initial growth in survey research in Europe 
and the United States, emphasizing individual level social-psychological variables and quantitative scientific 
methods. More recently the rise of the European Union (EU), international networks in the social sciences, the 
diffusion of the market research industry, and the expanding number of democratic states worldwide have all 
facilitated the growth and scope of data resources. […] ”, see Norris, P. (2008), “The globalization of 
comparative public opinion research”, in Robinson, N., Landman, T., Handbook of comparative politics, 
London, Sage Publications  
320 Pollack, M. A. (2013), “A Truce in the Transatlantic Food Fight: The United States, the European Union, and 
Genetically Modified Foods in the Obama Years”, early draft freely accessible on SSRN, at: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2295197&download=yes 
321 Lucks, K (2008), Transatlantic Mergers and Acquisitions: Opportunities and Pitfalls in German-American Partnerships, 
Wiley, Erlangen 
322 Rahn, W., & Transue, J. (1998), “Social Trust and Value Change: The Decline of Social Capital in American 
Youth, 1976-1995”, Political Psychology 19(3), pp. 545-65.; Hetherington, M. J., and Globetti, S.. (2002). 
"Political Trust and Racial Policy Preferences." American Journal of Political Science 46(2), pp. 253-75. 
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present study, we argue that citizens use generalized beliefs about how much their nation can 
trust other nations to form judgments about world affairs. Specifically, I hypothesize that this 
form of trust, which I call international trust, influences how citizens perceive specific nations, 
whether they endorse internationalism or isolationism, and whether they favour specific 
foreign interventions or foreign trade relations323. It is worth pointing out that constructivism, 
as already explained, has been at the forefront in trying to conceive also trade exchanges as a 
result of shared mindsets in the evolving international arena. Speaking from a constructivist 
perspective, Wendt outlines the causal links between ideas, interests and regime structure. This 
relationship is clear when examining the regime structure of the GATT in terms of its role in 
shaping a state’s international trade policies. In their article, Bagwell and Staiger establish the 
key principles of the GATT: reciprocity and non-discrimination between trading partners324. 
Tariffs in the post-War period dropped by 40% as a result of the policy implications of these 
principles325. Similarly, John Ruggie notes how the GATT promoted a form of comparative 
advantage in order to maximize the gains from trade326. Furthermore, it provided dispute 
settlement mechanisms and multilateral surveillance to enforce fair participation. Thus, the 
GATT worked to establish a free-trade system externally, in which inter-state trade was – to a 
certain extent – based along the lines of comparative advantage, as was advocated by Ricardo 
and seen in the context of 19th century Europe. In contrast, Ruggie claims that in the post-
War era, states still saw the benefit in free trade externally; however, they had an equally strong 
interest in domestic economic growth and social security327. Furthermore, they understood 
that these socially optimal outcomes could not be achieved without government intervention. 
Ruggie dubs this economic system of externally liberal and internally Keynesian policies as 
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“Embedded Liberalism”. Harkening back to Wendt’s Constructivist theory, which draws the 
link between ideas, interests and regime structure, Ruggie explains how the historical 
experience of the failure of free markets during the inter-War period fueled an ideational 
change. He notes that after this experience, a blind “…trust in the methods of laissez-faire 
doctrine [would have been] a doctrinaire delusion which disregarded the lesson of historical 
experience”328. This change in ideas led to a change in interests, which produced a different 
regime structure, as seen through the GATT.  It was a regime that called for a reduction in 
trade barriers, while providing loopholes to minimize the destabilizing and costly effects of a 
fully competitive economic system329. 
While the Constructivist paradigm provides a comprehensive explanation for the similarities 
and differences between the late 19th and late 20th century trade regimes, both Liberalist and 
Realist approaches fail to do this to the same extent.  Evidence for this argument would carry 
important implications, particularly given that public opinion about world affairs may 
influence voting behaviour) and public policy). To begin with, findings of effects for 
international trust on mass beliefs about world affairs would add a new layer to our theoretical 
understanding of how citizens form foreign policy opinions. Recent accounts have shown that 
citizens base such opinions on abstract principles (e.g., preferences for internationalism or 
isolationism) and images of specific foreign nations330. Scholars have identified two sorts of 
beliefs that serve as bases for foreign policy opinions: Principles and images of particular 
nations. Among the American public, the divide between the principles of isolationism (i.e., 
the belief that the United States should avoid getting involved in other nation's problems) and 
internationalism (i.e., the belief the United States should play an active role in world affairs) 
plays a particularly important role in structuring foreign policy opinions. For example, 
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preferences between isolationism and internationalism influence opinion about defence 
spending, trade policy, humanitarian and economic aid to foreign countries. 
What makes public opinion so relevant then? Why is it useful to study it when assessing the 
role of private networks in shaping transatlantic relations? The answer could be 
straightforward: history teaches that public opinion has a great impact on the conduct of 
international relations331. There are many ways according to which public opinion usually 
comes under the spotlight of researchers.  
Three of them are worth a small discussion: first of all, public opinion’s intentions usually 
reflect the ones of policy-makers, at least in liberal democracies332. It is no doubt a truth that 
political leaders in modern democracies tend more often to be driven by the policy positions 
in the wider public. The reasons behind this growing trend 333  are accountability and 
responsiveness to the public that politicians seem more and more to be constrained to, both 
in their public discourses and in their political calculation. How to conceptualize the evolution 
of democratic processes towards a stronger role for public opinion and polling?  
Some authors have tried to understand contemporary politics as a continuous conquest for 
consensus: the space for polls has then increasingly grown, especially since contemporary 
politicians have relied on them to pursue their own interests.   
Secondly, public opinion studies help us understand how people associate with the political 
life of their own country. It may seem hard to find a substantial correlation in this case 
between the degree of political awareness of certain problems and the “politicization” effect 
from/on public opinion frames. Yet, researching broad and wide-ranging public opinions and 
samples gives the researcher the tools to assess whether or not preferences at the international 
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level are formed through the interaction between the public and policy-makers or on the other 
hand it is more an independent elaboration by decision-makers.  
Finally, public opinion studies have a strongly normative facet: if the research is enough well 
established and has enough explanatory power, it may also help giving hints on the future and 
on what policy-makers will do once in power. As an example, if EU-US public opinions 
strongly opposed the current ISDS system for transatlantic dispute settlement, then it may be 
likely that both principals (political leaders) and agents (negotiators) will be influenced in the 
degree of flexibility they will show during the course of negotiations. In the case of EU trade 
policy, in particular, as the recent political turmoils against the TTIP negotiations have 
shown334, political influence from non-élites is relevant. This does not mean that trade 
priorities and trade liberalization will follow the path traced by people: yet, it means that 
officials dealing with the day-to-day business in negotiations will surely have to take into 
account a much more informed public opinion, which strives to get its voice heard. There are 
examples in history that show the extent to which differing public opinion and policy-makers’ 
views on important issues usually lead policy-makers themselves to shift their own positions 
accordingly.  
 
5.1.2: How to operationalize public opinion? 
The task of operationalizing public opinion is required in order to express its full potential, at 
least limited to this brief research. What are the main issues to take into consideration? How 
to frame the decision of further integrating in the transatlantic sphere by using the lenses of 
public opinion research? This Chapter addresses two fundamental ways of exploiting public 
opinion polls to address international issues. On the one side, it maintains that studying how 
the public reacts to certain events may be the most fruitful way of looking at the subject. In 
fact, public opinion usually “reacts” rather than independently “pro-acting”: this means that in 
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order to understand its complexities and magnetic attraction by the decision-makers, one 
needs to research its reactions to an external stimulus rather than its longstanding traits. 
Nevertheless, it is by far harder for researchers to understand public opinion attitudes at given 
moments in time (for example after the signing of an agreement or before high-level 
negotiations with a potentially great impact) than studying what people think using certain 
guidelines at fixed times. To better clarify this point, transatlantic economic relations are a 
perfect example: while for important security events such as wars or military alliances there is 
a huge potential for investigating people’s attitudes335, transatlantic trade does not seem to be 
similar. Surveys are conducted more or less regularly, always on the same topics, with fixed 
questions. They tend to investigate ideas rather than feelings, or, to put it more scientifically, 
personal conceptions rather than personal attitudes. In this case, mind elaboration influences 
strongly the impact of – albeit well conducted – surveys.  
On the other side, this Chapter takes note of the lack of secondary data on the reactions of 
public opinion to specific events, such as the launch of the NTA or the renewed transatlantic 
partnership in 2007. Reasons are manifold: a lack of media coverage, a weak political 
commitment and also the tendency to be more engaged with issues that have direct and 
tangible impact on people’s lives (such as wars) rather than poorly perceived ones. This, as 
said, has as its direct consequence the scarce availability of data on public opinion’s reactions 
to trade agreements. Therefore, the second way of researching people’s attitudes in the 
transatlantic sphere is to employ a twofold strategy: on the one side, the eye focuses on the 
evolving lines of public opinion. By using this approach, there is no certainty that all the 
details will be caught under the spotlight. On the other side, the strategy could be to focus on 
the changes within public opinion from one year to the other. By doing this, variations in the 
overall “pro/anti trade” attitude could be correlated to the ongoing negotiations or to existing 
agreements. The drawbacks of this strategy are the poor availability of data even in this 
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domain and the loose correlation that could be established between, as an example, growing 
support for trade agreements and advancements in the negotiations.  
What can be taken from this discussion on the methodology of public opinion research? First 
of all, the acknowledgment that this kind of mixed method approach needs to be pondered 
deeply. Public opinion may be a useful tool, but only if its relevance is stressed through proper 
means. Secondly, the need to carefully tailor research designs according to the proper method. 
In the case of public opinion, what matters most is the link between policy-makers and “the 
public”. Should only legislators and directly elected politicians be accountable to the public 
that elected them or should also policy-makers comply with their policy preferences? This is a 
longstanding issue, that encompasses a reflection on key tenets of democratic theory. How far 
can the independence of decision-makers go? Usually, negotiators have a clear mandate on 
what to do, the policy domains to stick to and also the relevance of the different tasks and 
positions they represent. This is due to the fact that the repercussions of an error are very 
much dependent on the ability of the principals to make them responsible336. When it comes 
to policy-makers in foreign policy, the borders are more shady. Having to do with “distant” 
issues, they seem even less responsible to the public than the agents they task to conduct 
negotiations.  
Thirdly, the study of public opinion may influence the way we look at the domestic politics of 
a single country or two countries involved in the same negotiation. What does this mean in 
practical terms? Many different groups contribute to the development of foreign policy, and 
they are bound together by the same goal, i.e. maximize their own interest in shaping the 
negotiations337. Moreover, it must be said that these groups do not only reflect different 
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societal combinations, but also different interests, issue-salience and preferences. Therefore, a 
map of the different groups’ positions in the society could help to understand how future 
transatlantic economic relations will be. The drawbacks of this strategy are mainly two: on the 
one hand, it is hard to predict if the same groups will be still part of the domestic preference 
formation for the next decades. On the other hand, the same groups might be ready to shift 
their opinion on certain economic issues like trade agreements, especially if they do not see 
any tangible results or if lobbying from the opposing side is strong.  
 
5.2: An inquiry into what Americans and European think 
In order to conduct an inquiry into what Europeans and Americans broadly think of the 
transatlantic partnership a simple collection of data is not enough. In this case, the task is a bit 
harder, since the focus is on perceptions on the economic situation and even more specifically 
on how these issues impact on the choice by decision-makers to further integrate or to stop 
negotiations. To conduct the empirical analysis, a good choice would have been the three 
periods of time which seem particularly interesting for the sake of this research. 1995, the 
following implementation period and finally 2007-2012, which represents the revamped 
interest for transatlantic issues. Data from the abovementioned sources refer only to the last 
period, and will be used later. Data from the early 2000s come from the Chicago Council on 
Global Affairs (CGGA)338, which started surveying both European and American public in 
2002. Data are mainly taken also from Transatlantic Trends surveys339, which is a recent 
publication started in 2003, and initially aimed at considering the evolution of the crisis 
between the two partners in a security-oriented light. 
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The task of this Chapter is to find out the interconnectedness of public opinions on the two 
sides of the Atlantic, by pointing at four key clusters: general attitudes towards free trade (1), 
general feeling about the economy (2), support for trade agreements (3), each other’s 
perception in the general public (4). This task is fulfilled by looking at both singular events and 
trends. In some cases (1,4), the focus is more on long-term lines of development, since the 
issue at stake is much better understood if looking at a broader picture. In the other cases 
(2,3), medium-term changes are more important. They actually reflect an environment that 
pays more attention to the immediate problems and issues at stake in the transatlantic 
partnership. Methodological pedantry suggests to explain what is meant by “EU public 
opinion”. Usually, EU as a whole has little explanatory value340: it might be an interesting tool, 
but yet it has to be defined clearly. Is it the sum of Member States, like the Eurobarometer 
survey, or is it a broader concept, entailing research on a real European wide public 
opinion341? For the sake of this analysis, European public opinion means a simple average of 
Member States’ opinions. Constructivist pondering on the existence of a common public 
opinion is not an object to these reflections. Single countries’ public opinions will however be 
highlighted when relevant.  
 
5.2.1: General attitude towards free trade  
This is the less difficult topic to discuss. Figures from Transatlantic Trends 2013 show that a 
more free-trade oriented attitude is likely to be seen in Europe rather than in the US. What 
causes for this strange behaviour? Among many others, two are worth noting. First of all, the 
impact of the crisis. The same poll suggests that there are substantial differences both in a 
cross-survey perspective and in a cross-European perspective. US attitudes on this subject 
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have changed significantly after the crisis. Even if the unfolding of the financial turmoil did 
not have immediate consequences on the US public, after some years polls have experienced a 
sharp decrease in people’s perceptions on the issue. Secondly, the US public tend to have a 
rather isolationistic approach342 to foreign affairs in terms of openness in times of crisis. This 
is also shown in the same poll, and supported in its claim by figures showing the high regard 
US people have in front of their own role in the world.  
The case of trade is emblematic: a possible trade agreement between the EU and the US is 
widely acknowledged to be a key and useful element for the next years, but still people do not 
show unanimous support. At the beginning of the transatlantic crisis in 2002, a year that saw 
the CGGA conducting its polls for the first time, the views on transatlantic trade were quite 
clear. Central to globalization was the growth of trade, according to most of Europeans and 
Americans343. Americans, for the most part, believed Europeans practice free trade, but 
Europeans were more divided in their evaluations of the trade practices of the United States. 
When asked whether they thought certain countries practice fair or unfair trade with the 
United States (Fig. 1), 60% of American respondents indicate that they believe the countries 
of the European Union practiced fair trade, as opposed to 20% who think they practice unfair 
trade. On the other hand, 44% of European respondents thought the United States practiced 
unfair trade, as compared to 43% who believed it practiced fair trade. The French were the 
most critical, with a striking 74% indicating that the United States practiced unfair trade, 
versus 20% fair trade. For all other European countries, a plurality (a majority in the case of 
Germany) maintained that the United States practiced fair trade. Notably, European 
respondents gave more positive evaluations of Japanese trade practices (48% fair trade versus 
31% unfair trade) than they did of American.  
Fig. 2 
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In their trade relations, a prominent point of conflict between the United States and the EU 
was over biotechnology344. U.S. agricultural producers have done battle for over a decade with 
European consumer groups over their right to export genetically modified products into the 
European Union345. European protesters have rallied against American “Frankenfoods”346. 
However, the survey found out that while Europeans were, not surprisingly, opposed to such 
innovations in food production, Americans were surprisingly ambivalent. When asked, 
“Overall would you say you strongly support, moderately support, moderately oppose, or 
strongly oppose the use of biotechnology in agriculture and food production?” 62% of 
Europeans indicated moderate or strong opposition, with 33% showing moderate or strong 
support. Among Europeans, the most opposed were Italian (65%) and British (69%) public 
opinions. On the American side, 45% showed moderate or strong opposition, and 48% 
showed moderate or strong support. Americans were also quite sympathetic to the argument 
that European countries should be able to label genetically modified foods - something that 
the U.S. government has strongly opposed. Asked specifically whether the European Union 
and Japan should be able to require labelling of genetically modified food, even if this might 
keep consumers from purchasing food imported from the United States, 66% of American 
respondents thought the EU and Japan should be able to impose such a labelling requirement, 
while 26% thought it should not.  
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Americans generally see international trade in a positive light. In a 2010 CCGA poll, nine out 
of ten respondents said that “promoting international trade” is a very (33 percent) or 
somewhat (58 percent) important foreign policy goal for the United States347. Asked in the 
same poll about various factors that might determine whether the United States remained 
competitive with other countries in the global economy, 77 percent of Americans said that it 
was important to support “open trade around the world” (very important, 23 percent)348. 
Americans are also more likely to see trade as an opportunity than a threat. Asked about what 
“foreign trade means for America” by CCGA in 2010, a majority (55 percent) chose “an 
opportunity for economic growth through increased U.S. exports”, while 43 percent chose “a 
threat to the economy from foreign imports.” 
 
5.2.2: General feeling about the economy 
Economy is still one of the most important issues for public opinion on the two sides of the 
Atlantic. There are many reasons for this: firstly, economic issues revamped in recent years 
after the crisis as a reaction to the long shadow of terrorism and security threats which were 
perceived for a long time as being at the highest in the early 2000s349. Secondly, economic 
attitudes were once again at their highest in the consideration of the public for the renewed 
commitment, especially in the EU, for a new institutional governance. Major economic 
downturns and reforms usually influence people’s thoughts on the economy. The general 
feeling about the future of the transatlantic economy is therefore really interesting to analyse, 
since it gives a picture, which is probably the closest to the real public opinion’s attitude. In 
Europe, globalization appears to be associated heavily in public perceptions with the export of 
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jobs. Eurobarometer polled thirty European countries in 2008 on what globalization brings to 
mind from a list of options. In the average of all thirty countries, 36 percent said that 
globalization brings to mind the relocation of some companies to countries where labor is 
cheaper, 18 percent said it reminds them of opportunities for their country’s companies in 
terms of new outlets, 16 percent said it brings to mind foreign investment in their country, 
and 12 percent said it reminds them of increased competition for their country’s companies. 
In twenty-one countries, the relocation of companies was the most common answer and in 
four countries it was the answer of a majority (France, 63 percent; Germany, 59 percent; 
Luxembourg, 56 percent; and Finland, 55 percent350). The general feeling about the economy 
can not be viewed as being simply a combination of good attitudes and reactions to the 
external environment. EU and US public opinions tend to differ strongly with regards to their 
economic acquis: usually, EU public opinion tends to be much gloomier on issues related to 
trade unions, the role of individual freedom, the liberalization of financial services and so on. 
US people generally tend to view the economy as a combination of free market and 
opposition to government interventionism. This is reflected quite homogeneously in every 
Eurobarometer or Gallup poll, regardless of age, religion, party affiliation. Even though, quite 
understandably, Socialdemocrats in Europe lie further on the continuum from Conservatives 
than Democrats from Republicans in America.  
 
5.2.3: Support for trade agreements 
Support for free trade agreements is somewhat correlated to the general support for economic 
integration and, most relevantly, to the general feeling about the economic situation. This is 
partially due to the ongoing trade relationship between the EU and the US, which has 
characterized a great share of the past years. Therefore Americans, as well as their European 
counterparts, have expressed support for greater economic ties across the Atlantic only when 
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the economic situation was favourable or at least certain indicators were spreading trust into 
the public. This includes many digressions into widespread conflict on certain issues351, which 
nevertheless can not be taken as examples of a positive “antagonization”. In a 2007 GMF poll 
(Fig. 3) of the United States and six European nations, respondents were told, “There has 
been talk recently of a new effort to deepen the economic ties between the European Union 
and the United States, by making transatlantic trade and investment easier,” and asked, 
“Would you support a transatlantic initiative like this?” Most Americans (64 percent) favored 
a transatlantic economic initiative while 25 percent were opposed. In the average of all the six 
European countries polled, 67 percent favored such an initiative and 24 percent were 
opposed.  
Fig.3 
 
In 2013, the figures are now a bit less positive, as a consequence of the worsening of the 
situation after the crisis, even though there is no real loss of consensus, which is due to the 
relieved economic situation. As it can be seen from the chart (Fig. 4), the perceptions on the 
upcoming trade agreement by the EU and US citizens varies strongly. 49% of the US citizens 
had a positive view of the TTIP, after it was initially launched. Europeans had stronger 
positions, which means that they probably had the will and time to extensively assess the 
positive and negative sides of it. What are the reasons behind this differing opinions on free 
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trade agreements, which are not comparable to the almost similar views that they share on the 
other issues? Two answers may provide an explanation. First of all, US citizens tend to answer 
the same with regards to every possible trade agreement352. Not only they have fear for their 
businesses in complying with other countries’ standards, but they also think of opening trade 
agreements as being counterproductive. This is particularly true when it comes to the EU, 
which for a long time in history evoked a sense of protectionism in the US public opinion353. 
Therefore an explanation could be that fear of losing business opportunities and richness 
influences every stipulation of trade agreements. Secondly, questions regarding trade 
agreements are usually intertwined with more general questions in polls, such as those related 
to economic cooperation, the effects of globalization or increased exports. Bearing this in 
mind, polls usually do not contain the entire framework. Polls conducted on the US and on 
the EU side have shown too much differing views on the same subject to be taken for granted 
in the research. As said in the introductory part, this is an issue that has known too many 
evolutions to be seen as undoubtedly true. 
 
Fig. 4: public opinion on the potential output of a EU-US trade agreement  
European and American leaders are negotiating proposals to increase trade and investment 
between the United States and the European Union. Some people say that this will help our 
economy grow, while others say that this will make our country’s economy more vulnerable. 
Which statement is closer to your own opinion? (2013) 
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5.2.4: Each other’s perception in the general public 
The perception of the respective transatlantic partner is certainly one of the most important 
topic, albeit maybe the easiest to assess. What history has told researchers is that the EU and 
the US have for a long time strived to be allied, yet losing sight of what  
Four opinion polls offered, right after the Iraqi war, an important starting point for assessing 
the changing public perceptions within which transatlantic relations are currently managed. 
The four polls are: (1) a Eurobarometer poll of the 15 EU member countries of Spring 
2003354, (2) a Eurobarometer poll of the 13 EU accession countries of May/June 2003355, (3) a 
Pew Research Center poll of EU and US respondents of June 2003356, and (4) a German 
Marshall Fund poll of EU and US respondents of September 2003357. 
A majority of Europeans viewed the US global role as strongly negative in categories that 
included the preservation of peace, fighting poverty, and protection of the environment. A 
majority of Europeans believed that US global leadership was undesirable. In fact, there had 
been a clear and significant deterioration in this indicator between fall 2002 and spring 2003358. 
In contrast, since 1947 the highest percentage of Americans favoured an active US role in 
world affairs (77%)359. 71% of Europeans wanted the EU to become a “super power,” but 
only half of them (35%) did so if it involved more military spending360. The polls were all very 
much focused on a range of issues that tended to exclude non-military ones, even though by 
                                                            
354 Eurobarometer 59: Public Opinion in the European Union Spring 2003. European Opinion Research 
Group EEIG. <http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_ opinion /archives/ eb/eb59/eb59_highlights_en.pdf>. 
355 Eurobarometer 2003.2: Public Opinion in the Candidate Countries May-July 2003. Magyar Gallup 
Intezet. <http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_ opinion/archives /cceb/ 2003/2003.2_full_report_final.pdf. Two 
additional Eurobarometer polls (on the European candidate countries, September 2003, and on all European 
countries, December 2003) were consulted 
356  The Pew Global Attitudes Survey. The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press. 2003. 
<http://people-press.org/reports/display.php3?ReportID=185 
357 Transatlantic Trends 2003 Survey. The German Marshal Fund of the United States. 
http://www.gmfus.org/apps/gmf/gmfwebfinal.nsf/$UNIDviewAll/DB6E3FB8A75A3C7F85256D96007A158
3?OpenDocument&K1E73ABE2 
358 ibidem, p. 21 
359 ibidem, p. 22 
360 ibidem, p. 31 
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doing this they left out a significant part of the whole picture. Nevertheless, parts of the same 
polls were dedicated to the economic standing of each country, and despite the recognition 
that militarily they preferred to have strong opposing positions, there was widespread 
consensus361 both in the EU and in the US that the former could certainly play a role as 
relevant as that of the latter. Especially when it comes to trade, development and aid. 
A cross-time Eurobarometer survey362 (Fig. 5) conducted in the timeframe 2003-2006 shows 
an interesting picture regarding the role of the US according to the EU public. Public opinion  
 
Fig. 5: EU perception on the role of the US in the world economy 
 
 
 
In the last years, surveys have shown that a little more than half of EU respondents (55%) said 
it was desirable that the United States exert strong leadership in world affairs, almost 
unchanged throughout the years, but much higher than previously outlined figures. Nearly 
three-in-four Europeans (70%) continued to hold favourable views of the United States, but 
views across Europe varied widely. Favourable opinion of the United States rose in Poland 
from 65% to 72%, but dropped several percentage points elsewhere in Europe - in Spain, for 
                                                            
361 Question 16 of the Transatlantic Trends 2003 Survey. See note 39 for details  
362 http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/cf/showtable.cfm?keyID=2324&nationID=11,1,27,28,17,2,16,18,13,6,3,
4,22,7,8,20,21,9,23,31,24,12,19,29,26,25,5,14,10,30,15,&startdate=2003.11&enddate=2006.09 
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example, it dropped ten percentage points to 62%. Opinion of the United States remained low 
in Turkey, with unfavourable views going up seven percentage points to 64%. Fifty-seven 
percent of Americans (down six percentage points from last year) said it was desirable for the 
European Union to exercise strong leadership as well. Within the EU, support for EU 
leadership went up in the U.K. (by five percentage points to 60%), but down in France (by 
eight percentage points to 68%) and Spain (by 11 percentage points to 56%). Favorable 
opinion of the EU remained stable at 50% in the United States and 66% in Europe. Sixty-
three percent of Turks felt EU leadership to be undesirable; 60% held an unfavourable view 
of the EU itself.  
 
5.3: Conclusions 
At this point it has been made clear what differences exist between the public opinions on the 
two sides of the Atlantic. These cleavages are key to understand why certain sectors of public 
opinion converged on foreign policy choices and others did not. And it may also be useful to 
assess the potential future implications of a trade deal for each sector of society and public 
opinion. As outlined in the introductory part, it is hard to tell if policy choices are well 
endorsed by the public, and this is one of the most difficult issues in contemporary politics363. 
What is the degree to which these polls have impacted on decision-makers364? How have 
decisions been influenced so far by the public in the transatlantic arena? Answers to these 
questions are difficult to find. Methodologically, it is hard to establish a causal relationship or a 
simple correlation. It would be much easier if we took for granted that an influence exists and 
we are simply not able to analyse coherently the implications. In this case, what could be 
                                                            
363 A very good contribution and seminal work is the one by Risse-Kappen, T. (1991), “Public Opinion, 
Domestic Structure, and Foreign Policy in Liberal Democracies”, World Politics, Vol. 43, No. 4, pp. 479-512 
364 The need for comprehensive polls and surveys is stronger than ever. While in the EU there are only few 
certain (yet value-driven, like Eurobarometer) examples of massive polling, in the US polling is almost an “art”, 
with codified regimes and structured partnerhsips between polling institutes and institutions. For an example of 
an interesting comparative polling, see Lorenzoni, I., Pidgeon, N., (2006), “Public Views on Climate Change: 
European and USA Perspectives”, Climatic Change, Volume 77, Issue 1-2, pp 73-95 
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inferred from this Chapter is that public opinion had an appreciable influence on the conduct 
on transatlantic relations. There are two reasons that explain what happened and two 
consequences that may be useful for the following part and for the sake of this analysis. First 
of all, the two reasons behind it. With regards to the support for free trade and more generally 
for an open economy, US and EU public opinions diverged not very strongly, meaning that 
there was a “transatlantic consensus” on what priorities should be taken in the economic 
sphere. Widespread public opposition against free trade is strong when factors suggest that it 
could only worsen off the people’s situation, even though the potential advantages of a long-
term commitment to free trade are higher365. Secondly, the chance of influencing decision-
makers is higher in case there are no obstacles and filters between them and the people. The 
more “direct” the political system, the stronger influence will be. In the case of the EU, given 
the multilelvel governance structure in both political and economic affairs, it will be much 
harder than in the US to influence the ultimate decision by political leaders. What makes this 
Chapter interesting is its implications: firstly, on the other strand of the present research, 
namely the role of private networks in shaping transatlantic policy-making. How to connect 
the three? How to draw a line between public opinion, political choices and non-governmental 
actors? Briefly, who follows whom? It has been advanced (H1) that private networks have 
contributed greatly to shaping the conduct of transatlantic relations. This will be better and 
thoroughly explained in the next Chapter. What matters here is that private networks are not 
the result of monads independent from each other. They are deeply embedded in the reality 
they are part of. They may be seen as a consequence, but also as emanation of the public 
opinion preferences. If policy-makers are somewhat entangled in their incapacity of 
concluding anything, they may feel inclined to delegate power in the regulatory sphere to non-
partisan and non-governmental authorities. This is what private networks were at first 
conceived of in the NTA.  
                                                            
365 See Shapiro, R (2011), “Public opinion and American democracy”, Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 75, Issue 5, 
pp. 982-1017 
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CHAPTER 6: Case-study research 
6.1: Why is case-study analysis useful for this research? 
Case-study research may not have enough explanatory power when researching deeply into 
any subject366. It is a single point of view, and really few generalizations can be assumed even 
from the most detailed analysis. Nevertheless, bearing in mind the hypotheses, it might be 
interesting to consider strengthening the empirical account with a comparative analysis 
detailing the fortunes and the demise of the TABD and TACD, good examples to show all 
the complexities within the environment political and business that actors have encountered. 
Why TABD and TACD? By using a process-tracing logic within a comparative method367, 
they are analysed first as successes (though temporary) and then, as the second hypothesis 
suggests, as deficient units in the transatlantic economic sphere. As George and Bennett368 
show, the method of case-study is taken in bad consideration by many academics, even 
though its usefulness is praised by an equal amount of scholars. The TABD would adapt well 
to the experiment of tracing the roots and values of a certain subject, but here the comparative 
analysis seems to be preferred.  
Following the same reasoning, also the second empirical demonstration aims at answering the 
two hypotheses by looking at different documents (either from the Commission or the USTR) 
dealing with the transatlantic business issues, in particular the Transatlantic Economic 
Council. In this case, qualitative analysis (both discourses and textual) may be useful in order 
to evaluate the strategies employed by institutional actors to justify the interaction with private 
actors in policy-making. The raison d’être of comparative and discourse analysis is the same 
when put into real researchable terms. The last part of this dissertation aims at analysing a 
                                                            
366 See criticisms to the extensive use of case-studies in modern social sciences here: Ragin, C., Rubinson, C. 
(2009) The Distinctiveness of Comparative Research”, in Landman, T., Robinson, N.(eds.), The Sage Handbook of 
Comparative Politics. London: Sage.  
367 The method is the typically used in EU studies to assess the birth and development of agencies: Panke, D. 
(2012), Process tracing: testing multiple hypotheses with a small number of cases”, in Radaelli, C., Exadaktylos, 
T., “Research Design in European Studies: Establishing Causality in Europeanization”, Palgrave Studies in 
European Union Politics, London 
368 Bennett, A., George, A. (2004), “Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences”, MIT Press 
Cambridge, Massachusetts 
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complex relationship by measuring the relevance of the hypotheses put forward in this 
section. The more it will prove these intuitions right, the more added value will be treasured 
for future directions of this research strand.  
An admission is noteworthy at this point: too broad empirical material and two robust 
(conflicting?) approaches create the risk of giving birth to a “catdog”. Furthermore, the topic 
may be greasy at some points. With these caveat in mind, the next section details the findings 
of my attempt to give an answer to the previously outlined hypotheses. 
Three methodologies are outlined: the first one draws on case-study analysis to assess why at a 
certain point in transatlantic relations history a good degree of cooperation developed. The 
second one tackles the role of discourses and the creation of certain communicative standards. 
The third approach considers the texts agreed upon by the EU and the US and tries to 
compare them byanalyzing the recurrence of certain words and phrases.  
  
6.2: TABD & TACD: less for less, more for more? 
The TABD is usually regarded as the most typical example of transnational policy shaping by 
non-state actors, which try to build a coalition to drive policy-makers’ agenda forward. This 
dialogue, which as it was mentioned before pays its tribute to the original idea of a NTA, 
employs very different strategies to get its message across, but the ratio is as simple as it 
appears at first sight369. The TABD merged at the beginning of 2013 with the European-
American Business Council (EABC)370, joining forces with a partner in transatlantic lobbying 
actions in order to create a Transatlantic Business Council (TABC), on which no concrete and 
                                                            
369 Areas of intervention of the TABD are, according to the website: “Capital Markets, Energy & Climate, ICT, 
Innovation, Intellectual Property, Life Sciences, Skilled Workforce, Trade”. See here for details on each thread: 
http://transatlanticbusiness.org/policy-areas/  
370 Founding components of the EABC were industries from both sides of the Atlantic, coming together in 1989 
under US law as a European Communities Chamber of Commerce in the United States. As the presentation 
goes, “Founding Co-Chairs were Gerrit Jeelof, Chairman, Philips North America and John Bryan, Chairman, 
Sara Lee. Founding Members were Akzo Nobel, BASF, Bowater, BP, Enimont, Fragomen Del Ray, IBM, ICI, 
ING, Lazard Freres, Philips, PwC, Sara Lee, Siegel & Gale and Xerox. […] 9 European and 6 American-based 
firms”.  
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valuable judgment and empirical dissemination is still available. The pooling of resources, 
expertise and management was the determinant factor to achieve a tangible solution to some 
raising concerns. According to its own introductory statement, the TABD aims at “[…] 
providing unfiltered business advice from CEOs, with the objective to work with policymakers 
in thinking through how best to sustain the dynamism and global impact of the transatlantic 
economy”371. Nowadays, among almost 30 companies, only 2 of them (BASF and Philips) can 
be found in the early version of the Dialogue. Starting as a merely informal body of 
consultation, it grew up until it became a more structured cooperative environment, with the 
establishment of chairs and co-chiars, in 2000372. Drawing on the insights and evaluations of 
Maria Green Cowles (2001) for her account of the early stages of the TABD and its 
development, it may be advanced a very sui generis characterization: “[the TABD] is probably 
the first time in American history that the private sector is determining the substance of future 
executive or legislative agreements”373.  
When it comes to the TACD, what is striking are its undisputed continuous efforts to 
postulate messages across the Atlantic since its establishment. Nowadays, the TACD fosters 
dialogue among consumer organizations and other relevant  associations, by connecting them 
to the transatlantic decision-makers374. The main actor is the Bureau Européen des Unions de 
Consommateurs (BEUC), whose current Director-General, Mrs. Monique Goyens, is the 
European Chair in the TACD. The US Chair is Ed Mierzwinski, Consumer Program Director 
and Senior Fellow at the Federation of State Public Interest Research Groups (US PIRG). The 
                                                            
371 Italics added by the author 
372 Another important feature to be highlighted is the alternation of a EU and a US Chair every two years, which 
gives the idea of a formally pure equivalence between the two partners.  
373 Levine, N. (1995). “A Trans-Atlantic bargain”, Journal of commerce, p. 6A 
374 As an example of their activity, the TACD strongly criticized the investor-state dispute settlement mechanism 
(ISDS), which, according to TABD’s views, hampers the development of a truly accountable TTIP. See TACD 
senior policy advisor Anna Fielder discussing it on viEUws here: http://www.vieuws.eu/eutradeinsights/ttip-eu-
us-consumers-want-isds-out-argues-transatlantic-consumer-dialogue/ (last accessed 03/19/2014).  On the other 
side, TACD also strongly supports the TTIP when studies find that it could boost SMEs growth. See another 
ViEUws interview here: http://www.vieuws.eu/foreign-affairs/ttip-great-opportunities-for-smes-claims-trans-
atlantic-business-dialogues-europe-co-chair/ 
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main areas of work for the TACD are in these days intellectual property, financial services 
and, obviously, the TTIP negotiations.  
Why can the TABD and the TACD be taken as relevant and comparable case-studies? Their 
early attempts to foster cooperation have been researched and categorized (Green Cowles 
2001, Steffenson 2005) under many headings. Some have seen more convergence, at least in 
the beginning, while others have noticed misunderstandings among partners on the two sides. 
Especially in the US, where there were much more early contacts with business than in the 
EU375, there was an initial opposition that coincided with the traditional resistances to further 
supranational integration by small-scale producers. In order to answer the question at the 
beginning of the paragraph, there are two elements to be pointed out: first of all, with regards 
to TABD and TACD, the depth of the cooperative environment was much more advanced 
than for other agreements. Private and non-official contacts were established since the early 
signs of further cooperation by institutional actors. Secondly, there is a broader empirical 
substance from which to draw conclusions376.  
After this brief overview of the foundations and initial teachings from the TABD and the 
TACD, this paragraph analyses them by trying to touch upon all the relevant information for 
the purposes of this research. Namely, I will discuss three key aspects that either have more 
ample explanatory power or much better focus on the consequences of cooperation. They are 
the issues tackled by the two Dialogues, their reference point and their respective 
                                                            
375 The National Association of Manufacturers (NAM) and the US Chamber of Commerce were fiercely contrary 
to the developments that were occurring in 1995, after the project was launched. As Green Cowles (2001) 
reports, they saw the dialogue as a “CEO to CEO” one, which was finalized at preventing small- and medium-
sized firms to do their part. Rather typically, small-scale businesses do not favour broad liberalization measures in 
international trade, either through tariffs reduction or abolition of restrictions on import duties. What led 
scholars to think that the TTIP could gain much better credentials has been the positive reception of SMEs and 
small-scale producers on the two sides of the Atlantic.  
376 Quite understandably, it would be difficult to keep track of every press release and meeting minutes produced 
by the two fora. To address this issue, I have developed a three-variables matrix (Fig. 5) that compares the two 
dialogues by looking at their self-consciousness, capabilities and commitment to the cause. The source data come 
from a compendium (a reader) developed by Kalypso Nicolaidis (accessible here: 
http://www.sant.ox.ac.uk/people/knicolaidis/TER_Reader_part1.pdf), which compiles a great number of 
documents and other relevant texts. I will draw on this reader to find information and first-hand material. As the 
author recognizes, it is no brand new material, but a useful collection of already published works, press releases 
and minutes.    
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membership. Specifically, the goal is to find out in a comparative perspective the reasons why 
cooperation was successful at the beginning and then turned out to be a rather ineffective way 
of handling problems, as my first and second hypothesis suggest. Issues will turn out to be 
relevant only if the comparison demonstrates a satisfactory fil rouge in their own existence. 
As shown in [Fig. 5], I have introduced four variables that help understanding the different 
degrees of institutionalization between the two dialogues under consideration. Partially, they 
also explore the substance of issues, their reference point and their membership. As shown 
supra377, drawing on the literature review and on the judgments of policy officials collected in 
the literature, an early assessment of the transatlantic dialogues can be designed, by referencing 
to some key elements of evaluation. This comparative analysis follows on the same logic, and 
it assesses four variables (namely clarity of goals, clarity of roles, implementation difficulty and 
output legitimacy) empirically drawing on the works of already mentioned scholars and on 
personal elaborations.  
TABD and TACD have been chosen not only because of their higher relevance among the 
other fora, but also because of their potential for becoming milestones for future cooperation, 
especially in view of the ongoing TTIP negotiations.  
The methodology I am following in the comparative analysis comes from Ragin and Rubinson 
(2009), and aims at developing a sound knowledge on the topic in a closed universe system, by 
looking at how the two different institutions have faced the constraints given by the already 
mentioned crisis of 2005. After that date, there is short availability of information collected on 
both TABD (and its predecessors) and TACD. Comparative analysis in such a short time and 
space can be fruitful if good variables are chosen: clarity of goals, clarity of roles, 
implementation of measures and output legitimacy seemed to me the most 
“operationalizable” ones. I am going to create a scale of levels [low, medium-low, medium, 
                                                            
377 See par. 2.2 
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medium-high, high] that can be both measurable and related to previous research tools378. In 
fact, the difficult task when doing such a comparative analysis is to define the real causal 
relationship, which sometimes can be hidden or hardly findable.  
Data are taken from TACD and TABD websites, and from informal interviews that do not 
constitute sufficient material for a dissertation. Despite an initial intent of finding source data 
through a qualitative evaluation of questionnaires expressing interest groups’ views, the task 
has turned out to be unfeasible.  
Elaboration on the material under consideration may begin by looking at the first variable, the 
clarity of goals, and see whether there has been a change in the goals of the two bodies from 
the beginning of the crisis up to nowadays. Despite redundant claims that interest groups are 
simply an helping hand in policy-making, that may render the process much more accountable 
and much more democratic, the real goals of private groups have been explicitly been 
suggested many times by group leaders. On the business side, the TABD has curiously enough 
attempted to shape its own image as a rather authoritative source of valuable information, 
especially through its vast web if connections with the American Chamber of Commerce to 
the EU, the biggest US-only lobby in Brussels379. The TACD did not reach the same 
ambitious goal, especially because of its scarcely resourced staff and lower cooperation it 
reached. Nevertheless, the judgment cannot be too much detrimental for the purposes of this 
analysis. Taking note of the crisis between partners, started off with Bush and famous Venus-
Mars querelle, and of subsequent worsened relations, the goals of the two organizations don’t 
seem too much changed. This can also be clear by looking at statements on both sides, 
                                                            
378 In particular, since there would not be enough space to develop a new index, I am using Steffenson’s (2001) 
own calculations and index, (called TABD Scorecard), which is applied also to the TACD. This choice may be 
questionable, but in fact the rationale is the same behind the choice of TABD and TACD as case-studies. I am 
also taking into acount Philippart and WInand’s conclusions in their major asssessment of transatlantic policy 
output (2001), where they develop a scale on 8 levels, taking into consideration much more variables than those 
allowed for the sake of this dissertation 
379 One of the most prolific lobbies in Brussels and winner of many awards during recent years (European Public 
Affairs Awards in 2014) 
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unequivocally pointing the finger towards shared objectives and shared actions to tackle the 
financial crisis in 2008380.  
The clarity of roles is certainly much more identifiable: by looking at documents on both 
sides381, there are always explicit references both to the “constituencies” they represent and to 
the specific policy areas they want to address. With regards to this issue, it may be stressed 
that TACD activities are much more characterized and narrow in their goals than the ones by 
TABD. This is due to the smaller amount of resources that the TACD possesses, but also to 
the bigger constituency the TABD advocates for.  
Thirdly, the data show a strong evidence supporting the idea that both dialogues share 
difficulties in the implementation of their proposals and therefore in shaping the policy 
process. In primis, there would not be so few assessments of the work carried on throughout 
the last years in the case there was total satisfaction with the policy goals. Overview and 
assessments are typically used to postpone and procrastinate the results (O’ Toole, 2000). The 
effectiveness of certain proposals is well displayed also by doing an analysis of the situation 
before and after the “red line” I have traced in a range if issues. Even though the two 
dialogues do pursue policies in different sectors, there are some overlaps. As an example, 
actions on IPR on both sides have been numerous, but their effectiveness has faded after the 
crisis, with a shift towards a multilateral settlement of these disputes382. 
Finally, output legitimacy can be assessed by looking at the legitimization processes that 
accompanied the two dialogues in the development of their respective positions. An example 
of the legitimization processes can be the presence of TABD and TACD officials on official 
meetings between policy-makers to discuss regulatory issues. The legitimization in this case 
proceeds from the role given to them. They acquired a better standing in many occasions, 
                                                            
380 See TACD’s blog for recent years’ accounts (especially on IPR), http://tacd-ip.org, and also TABD 2010 
Activities Report accessible here: http://transatlanticbusiness.org/2010-tabd-activities 
381  See the second part of the abovementioned compendium by Nicolaidis, accessible here: 
http://www.sant.ox.ac.uk/people/knicolaidis/TER_Reader_part2.pdf  
382 See the publication which marked the change in the status quo in 2005, VV.AA. (2005) “Review of the 
Framework for Relations between the European Union and the United States”, European Commission 
Independent Study 
	   178	  
especially through direct contacts with those involved in the policy process, but also high-level 
meetings and conferences383. 
 
6.3: Qualitative analysis of Transatlantic Economic Council documents 
Established in 2007 after a revamped interest in fostering better transatlantic relations by 
German Chancellor Merkel384, the TEC has acquired the status of the most relevant forum for 
dialogue and policy exchanges at the transgovernmental level in recent years385. It has been 
categorized under many headings, but the official one defines it as a “political body”386. It 
managed to have an impact on a rather various range of subjects, which can be listed as 
follows: “Regulatory cooperation, Intellectual Property Rights (IPR), securing trade, financial 
markets, innovation and technology, investments” 387. What makes the analysis of TEC 
documents and meeting summaries interesting and useful for the purposes of this research is 
the reference to the common set of norms and ideas that constructs the relationship. As 
pointed out before388, both actors share a substantive ground of common interests but suffer 
from diverging strategies to achieve their goals. The political space was crowded with good 
intentions but few real improvements, as it was noticed, have been brought to transatlantic 
approach towards policy-making in the course of time. Europeans and Americans have two 
different websites where TEC’s minutes and meetings’ summaries are held. This constitutes 
good source data if the main goal is to distinguish between the American vision and the 
European one, and looking into the causes that led to the collapse of this forum. The 
                                                            
383 See Steffenson, R., op.cit., pp. 71-98 
384 At that moment, she was also President of the Council of the European Union, since Germany was holding 
the rotating Presidency. 
385 The Communication establishing the TEC was signed by the German Prime Minister, by US President J.W. 
Bush, and the European Commission President José Barroso. The final text approved with related annexes is 
accessible here: http://eeas.europa.eu/us/docs/framework_trans_economic_integration07_en.pdf (last accessed 
02/22/2014)  
386 See Note 20 
387 See  
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/international/cooperating-governments/usa/transatlantic-economic-
council/index_en.htm#h2-2 (last accessed 02/23/2014) 
388 See par. 2.3 
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relevance of discourse analysis is high when a shared communicative standard or register is 
adopted. As the hypotheses outline, the initial success was not followed by good and effective 
policies, due to differences in purposes and expectations. Since these two variables are quite 
difficult to operationalize, I will try to specify the discursive limits of pressures from private 
groups on the political and high-level sphere, with the goal to point out the structural 
deficiencies in the relationship between the state-driven interests and the private ones.  
According to Torfing (2005), discourses are “systems of meaning that constitute the identity 
of subjects, objects and practices”389. In this case, subjects are participants in the Transatlantic 
Economic Council meetings, objects are the core issues of cooperation and its determinants, 
while practices are cooperative liaisons. Discursive meaning of established norms may become 
effective if the right lenses are used. Drawing on Radaelli (1999) and Roe (1994), who are both 
authors that apply discourse theory to a very limited timeframe, policy area and policy locus, a 
good theoretical account may be designed to ensure the feasibility of a research with such 
means.  
As the [Fig. 1]390 I designed suggests, the whole empirical part goes on like this: first, I am 
finding a destinator of the main message, i.e. “policy-shapers” or simply influencers on both 
sides. Secondly, I am outlining the receiver, which becomes the focus of the whole story, 
given the importance it acquires: in this case, it represents the decision-maker, the one who 
carries the legitimacy to wield power and finalize legislation. Opposers are identified as units 
that either on purpose or not aim at distracting the message and prevent it from getting to 
destination391. The word “opposers” for the sake of this analysis is used to create a better 
connotation than the word “opponent”, more widely used. 
 
                                                            
389 Torfing, J 2005, 'The lingustic turn: Foucault, Laclau, Mouffe and Zizek”, in Hicks, Schwartz, Alford & 
Janoski (eds), Handbook of Political Sociology: states, civil societies, and globalization. Cambridge University Press, New 
York, pp. 153-171 
390 The point of reference is Greimas’ Actant Model, as adapted by Fiol (1990). 
391 Van Dijk, T. (1997), “What is Political Discourse Analysis?”, In Blommaert, J. and Bulcaen, C. (eds.), Political 
Linguistics,. vi, pp. 11–52 
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Fig. 1: Greimas’ Actant Model 
 
 
The subject of the discourse is persuasion392: how come could single CEOs or business groups 
or finally NGOs and consumer organizations manage to influence the policy environment so 
that they could reduce the burden of regulatory side effects on their shoulders? The object is 
instead the belief that independent actors can better enhance policy proposals or even finalize 
them if let free to agree and conclude negotiations. This is the typical consequence of the push 
for market liberalization and trade practices reform, which can be best understood by the 
continuous reference to the evoked mutual conformity assessment regime. More clarity on the 
rules of the transatlantic trade has been almost a necessity for decades: when private actors 
                                                            
392 Lazarrabal, J., Korta, K. (2002), “Pragmatics and Rhetoric for Discourse Analysis: Some conceptual remarks”, 
Institute for Logic, Cognition, Language and Information (ILCLI) - The University of the Basque Country 
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have entered the game in such a predominant way, this feeling was even stronger for 
politicians. Other two key figures become really important in this regard: shared norms are the 
adjuvants to the whole process, alongside the common concern on opening the markets and 
advancing international exchanges. Opponents are external events, which can be a 
straightforward element, such as economic crises or security threats, but most importantly also 
divergent state-trajectories in terms of public interest and domestic decision-making.  
I am going to find the data in a whole dataset of TEC documents and declarations that have 
been released throughout the years393. Since discourse theory is useful to scrutinize and take a 
picture of a given (yet constructed) reality, the “narrative” that I am going to advance and to 
propose as an epistemological key to comprehension is static, and not a dynamic one. This 
implies that in the post-structuralist approach I am using to assess the potential of cooperative 
environments only few elements can play a key role. As Greimas model emphasizes, the 
construction of meaning pays a huge tribute to the communicative process that exists between 
two actors, as structural semantics make clear.  
I claim that the destinator had a weak commitment in shaping the communicative register of 
documents and negotiations, therefore breaking the rules of the game in more than one part. 
Given this poor intervention, the discourse was shaped only by institutions and the outcome 
of the process was negative. Poorly resourced, poorly informed, dialogues and private 
consultations have demonstrated their loss of force after the turn of the century. The findings 
are then in line with the second hypothesis, underlining failure of efforts from both sides 
when gates of access to the policy-sphere are closed to non-governmental actors and 
                                                            
393 Reference websites are the one by the US State Department 
 (http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rt/eu/tec/index.htm) and the one on the EEAS platform 
 (http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/international/cooperating-governments/usa/transatlantic-economic-
council/index_en.htm). The latter is maybe clearer in its structure than the former, and the choice of content 
uploaded is in itself a strikingly feature of this phenomenon: the US website appears much less detailed than the 
European one, quite surprisingly given the much clearer institutional framework from which it generated in the 
US. 
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coalitions. No trace of non-governmental interests, in fact, is present in the last meetings of 
the TEC394.  
I am going to conduct the empirical part as a threefold reconsideration of the structure 
outlined in [Fig. 1]. The evolution of practices can well be understood by looking at 
documents from the five meetings of the Council, before its technical disruption. I am 
grouping the documents as follows: first meeting, second and third meetings, fourth and fifth 
meetings. Special emphasis will be put on the objects and opposers that each time are shaping 
the result. Data collection from the documents has followed a double review, drawing on 
Biegòn’s (2013) suggestions395: on the first reading, I have attempted to find out the relevant 
similarities and analogies between the two discursive practices, while during the second 
reading I have established the roles and tested them through a counterfactual analysis.  
With regards to the first meeting (held in Washington in November 9, 2007), which 
epitomizes also the first set of roles that I have constructed, documents show an 
unquestionable preponderance of the destinator and of the subject in the semantic of the 
discourse. Both in the agreed conclusions and in the preparatory meetings, the focus is on the 
advisory bodies to the Council, i.e. the TABD, TACD and TALD, and how they will improve 
mutual understanding. Their impact seemed to be at the highest: “The Council will continue 
to address priorities identified at the last U.S.-EU Summit and will work with stakeholders to 
identify other priorities to be addressed by the Council”396. The Progress report shows a real 
influence, in terms of citations and narratives around them. This level of integration of the 
private actors into the realm of political decision-making will no longer be replied in the 
following years397. Moreover, the object is almost self-evident: political leaders convened 
                                                            
394 http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2010/december/tradoc_147140.final.pdf  
395 See Biègon, D. (2013) “Specifying the Arena of Possibilities: Post-structuralist Narrative Analysis and the 
European Commission’s Legitimation Strategies”, JCMS, Vol. 51. Number 2. pp. 194–211 
396 See the Joint Statement here:  
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/international/files/tec_joint_statement_en.pdf  
(last accessed 02/21/2014) 
397 See as pure indicative examples the joint publication. “Framework for advancing transatlantic economic 
integration between the European Union and the United States of America” (2007), 
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together but having the already established dialogues as a point of reference. This is no 
surprise: the advancement on the path to further integration was high for TABD and TACD, 
rather than for institutional actors, which suffer from a longstanding deficit in committing 
themselves in further negotiations to improve the existing status quo.  
The second group of meetings shows a middle-way redistribution of roles. The main 
destinator is changing and this is shown in the total attention which is paid to the institutional 
background and meetings at the expenses of stakeholders’ typical communicative register 
based on interests and business-related issues. As the phrase “[…] presentations were made by 
the Office for Information and Regulatory Affairs and the Secretariat-General of the 
Commission of the current rules for notice and comment and consultation of interested 
parties during the regulatory process” makes clear, the role of the destinator is shifting from 
the private interests-driven consumer and business communities to the institutions and 
governmental set-up. This phase may be denominated “transition”, and it is crucial to 
determine the reasons why the narrative did not reach an upper level on the more general 
public. Another example can be the “impact assessments strategy” that blocked negotiations 
and stopped communications between the two sides of the “transatlantic coin” (US/EU 
private/public actors) at a certain point. Moreover, the need to wait for better conditions 
became a good motivation for the opponents to join the process398. While in the first phase 
there was no real opposition, during the second phase many contrary forces came into the 
game. On the one side, the narrative used by the actors become more and more one-sided. 
Only institutional actors are quoted, only institutional actors’ speeches are reported. The TEC 
seems at a certain point to turn into a lateral project for policy-makers to distribute power 
diffusely, therefore causing a collapse in the system, which is clearly visible in the third group. 
The semantics of the discourse also shift internally among policy-makers: as an example, as 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
http://eeas.europa.eu/us/docs/framework_trans_economic_integration07_en.pdf 
398 http://esharp.eu/be-our-guest/51-the-transatlantic-free-trade-agreement-and-the-big-picture/ 
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soon as the EU Commission and the Congress begin releasing their own material, and joint 
action plans, figures and reports become rare399.  
The third group of meetings represents the demise of the TEC: institutional actors are now 
focused on many other issues, and the opponent (namely in this case the incommunicability 
between the private and the public and also within the private and the public themselves) has 
won its battle. This leads to a twofold consideration: on the one side, at the moment of major 
need for a real transatlantic joint policy sphere, the diverging interests (perfectly portrayed by 
the 9th Meeting of the EU-US Regulatory Cooperation Forum400) overwhelmingly demolished 
the weak and unstable fundamentals. On the other side, the role of the adjuvant was not 
played with sufficient self-consciousness by the expressed need for a liberalization of the 
markets and a push towards a regulatory battle against non-tariff barriers.  
 
6.3.1: Textual analysis with AntConc and Wordscores 
This analysis can also be reframed by using a simple qualitative and textual analysis tool such 
as AntConc401, a software that allows to combine three levels of analysis: word frequency list 
(or wordlist), keywords in context, and frequency of the categories. While the first level 
provides the list of all the terms included in all the texts examined by the software, the 
frequency of categories illustrates how many times the categories of the vocabulary, created 
according to the main conceptual frameworks, appear in each document. Finally, the third 
level of analysis, keywords in context, shows the extracted piece of text where the term is 
inserted, allowing for a better understanding of its meaning.  
                                                            
399 The archive of joint documents on trade is here: 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/cfm/doclib_section.cfm?sec=146 
400 A joint report under the co-chairmanship of Heinz Zourek, Director-General for Enterprise and Industry, 
and Cass Sunstein, Administrator of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) , a component of 
the U.S. Office of Management and Budget (OMB), accessible here: 
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/international/files/ec-us-hlrcf-9-meeting_en.pdf (last accessed 
01/13/2014) 
401 http://www.antlab.sci.waseda.ac.jp/index.html 
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The analysis is conducted with a cross-temporal focus: it addresses two key timeframes in 
history and uses the same framework to develop a possibly coherent picture. The aim is to 
find out if clusters of words and meanings have changed through time, by focusing on two 
key periods, namely the opening and closing phases of transatlantic trade relations’ 
agreements. This purpose will be fulfilled by analysing official agreements, conclusions, 
statements and declarations and by using clusters, keywords and thematic distributions.  
The first timeframe reflects the one already indicated by Meyer and Luenen, in this case 1995-
1998, while the second addresses more recent years. They are chosen because they share two 
important traits and they differ under two specific conditions. With regards to commonalities, 
the first one is the general background over which transatlantic cooperation flourished. Both 
after the NTA and before the launch of TTIP negotiations, there was a renewed commitment 
to end struggles on both sides and begin a new era for trade and regulatory agreements. 
Secondly, both cooperative endeavours were generated by game-changing agreements, namely 
the NTA and the TEC. With regards to their differences, it must be said that the relevance, 
organization and scope of private actors was very different. At the beginning, there were few 
private fora to discuss the evolution of transatlantic relations, as already observed402. In the 
past years, these fora have seen a sharp increase in their breadth and competences. 
Governments and political leaders have tried to make them involved, in order to give them a 
voice in difficult processes. They have been more allies than enemies, as they have managed to 
be effective when supportive and ineffective when opposing.  
Secondly, another important difference lies in the window of opportunity for cooperation. 
Things have changed greatly in twenty years. At the beginning, there was much engagement 
from few actors, while in the recent years the ratio has changed, allowing for more actors to 
have their say but perhaps in a world with closing windows of opportunity.  
                                                            
402 See Chapter 2. For a good recognition of the role of private fora at the beginning, see Smith, M., Green 
Cowles, M. (1999), “Public goals and private strategies in the Transatlantic Economic Partnership”, Paper 
presented at the Sixth Biennial International Conference in Pittsburgh 
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To compare policy positions taken by stakeholders with the content of the evolving EU 
legislation it may be useful to use the scaling algorithm Wordscores. Wordscores infers policy 
positions, or scores, for new documents—“virgin texts”—on the basis of documents with 
known scores, “reference texts”. It uses the frequency of words in each document, relative to 
the total number of words in a text, based on the assumption that agents with different policy 
positions use different wording, reflecting their ideology or stance. When an unknown text 
includes more text about the economy and business, it is more likely to reflect a private sector-
friendly position than one from the public actors.  
This approach has been previously validated for political texts and economic policy 
speeches403 and has also been applied to European Commission documents404. In the first step 
of the analysis, I transferred EU documents from pdf to text405 and then manually removed 
superfluous information, including all interest group names and their descriptions, headers 
and footers, contact details and citations from Commission documents. I then used AntConc 
to elaborate the required information on the frequency lists of words inside the two 
timeframes I am considering.  
Fig. X and Y show the most used words in “Transatlantic Economic Relations: A reader (Part 
1 & 2)”406, and regroups them by looking at their correlation to the word “regulatory”. The 
collocates can be ordered either by total frequency, frequency on the left or right of the search 
term, or the start or end of the word. They can also be ordered by the value of a statistical 
measure between the search term and the collocate. The value measures how “related'” the 
search term and the collocate are. These variables are all listed in Fig. , which shows a 
                                                            
403 Klemmensen R, Hobolt SB, Hansen ME. (2007), “Estimating policy positions using political texts: an 
evaluation of the Wordscores approach”. Electoral Studies, 26:746–55. 
404 Bennani H, Farvauqe E. Speaking in tongues? Diagnosing the consistency of central banks’ on official 
communication, accessible here:  
http://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/epcs2014/openconf/modules/request.php?module=oc_program&action=view.ph
p&id=198. But also Klu ̈ver H. (2009), “Measuring interest group influence using quantitative text analysis. 
European Union Politics,, 10:535–49.I drew texts from both EU Commission DG Trade website and EEAS’ US 
Section 
405 I used OnlineOcr, which has the reputation of being the clearest one to perform such task. Details here: 
http://www.onlineocr.net 
406 Part 1 results are in Fig. X, while Part 2 results are in Fig. Y 
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coherent picture according to the framework given by the word “regulatory”. As it may be 
drawn from the results, the term is consistent with many others, especially those related to 
“markets”, “cooperation” and “agencies”. What does this suggest? Regulatory regimes usually 
apply to environments where markets are interrelated, cooperation exists and agencies on both 
sides operate accordingly. This is the case in the EU and the US, which is no surprise, as it has 
been shown in previous parts. Moreover, the interconnectedness shows that regulatory 
“barriers” are definitely much likely to be tackled by transatlantic policy-makers407. And they 
are also preferred to regulatory Dialogues, as the incidence of their name shows. The whole 
picture is clear: generally, agencies are easier to find than dialogues.  
 
 
Fig. 2: 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
407 This finds empirical evidence also in Farrell, H. (2005), “New issue-areas in the transatlantic relationship: E-
commerce and the Safe Harbor arrangement”, in Egan. M., op.cit., pp. 112-129 
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Fig. 3 
 
Probability of finding a certain word in official texts is not obviously a scientific proof of 
anything408. It simply shows how much attention has been given by policy-makers to certain 
issues rather than others. It is an indicator of a wider phenomenon, that entails various 
consequences. Among them, the need to research not only how transatlantic relations have 
developed under a purely quantitative point of view, but also how they have been shaped by 
context-driven factors such as international agreements, negotiations and so on and so forth. 
The relevance of this approach may well be discovered by looking at the number of researches 
that have employed AntConc software409.  
 
                                                            
408 See Laurence Anthony’s own defence of Antconc here: http://cass.lancs.ac.uk/?p=1228 
409 An example may be Qi, Yang Qiaoyan, (2010), “Changes in the U.S. 2010 National Security Strategy——
Based on Frequency of Word Usage”, Contemporary International Relations, Volume 20, Number 5, pp. 119-
131(13) 
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6.4: Conclusion 
The topic of transatlantic trade relations has at this point been analysed quite deeply. Many 
issues still need clarity, further research and more details. For example, transatlantic dialogues 
for cooperation at the private level have been strongly supported by policymakers, at least 
during their initial phases. After the establishment, a positive spillover effect endured and it 
allowed these fora to continue in their engagement with business leaders410. After a good start, 
however, the political will and the general attitude towards such issues declined strongly. On 
the one side, the reason has to be found in the difficulty in preventing consensus on 
transatlantic cooperation to fall apart. TABD, TACD and other dialogues knew that they 
needed to find more than a single reason to live: when they did not find one, they were on the 
verge of collapsing. On the other side, transatlantic players never really had the chance to 
concretely put in place their aspirations. Regulatory commitments, for example, were never 
followed by sufficient practical and tangible results. This had a lot of consequences, especially 
on the way people started thinking at the EU-US relationship. As the previous Chapter has 
already shown, views on transatlantic relations have differed a lot in the past years. The reason 
behind this is linked to the development of an independent regulatory scenario: the US tried 
to develop their own attitudes and perspectives on how to regulate their external economic 
relations and their markets. The scenario has never shifted in favour of a more open 
regulatory approach. This is the reason why both in the first and in the second series of 
documents very few differences can be highlighted, and why in the discourse analysis of 
documents from the Commission it is not hard to find a coherent structure. 
What can then be drawn from the previous analysis? Three points are worth mentioning. First 
of all, empirical material shows how diverging interests have certainly shaped negatively the 
transatlantic partnership. By looking at documents agreed upon by both parts, the analysis has 
shown how much they have been influenced by both respective roles and tasks. 
                                                            
410 Fahey, E. (2014), “On the Use of Law in Transatlantic Relations: Legal Dialogues between the EU and US”, 
European Law Journal, Vol. 20, Issue 3, pp. 368–384 
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Secondly, the convergence of interests has not always happened at the same time, with the 
same pace and with the same intensity. The result of this has been the loss of political 
credibility at certain crucial times at the expenses of many actors on the field.  
Thirdly and lastly, the discourse and text analysis have highlighted the role of private actors, as 
it was claimed by the main hypothesis of the thesis, in advancing market integration forward. 
The harder and more specific the issues became, however, the less they were capable of 
influencing both the process and the outcome of negotiations. It turned out then, that all the 
main players in the transatlantic regime were subject to varying degrees of responsibility. 
Private actors, although strongly connected to the decision-making process, lacked the 
capabilities and opportunities to influence the process.  
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CHAPTER 7: Conclusions 
 
This dissertation aimed at assessing cooperation in economic exchange achieved after the 
NTA’s launch twenty years ago. It has attempted to find a solution to its two main 
hypotheses: first of all, transatlantic relations since 1995 have been a limited success. More in 
detail, decentralized cooperation and low-level meetings have been much more effective in 
terms of results and achievements when compared with state-driven policies. Secondly, the 
state (or, better to say, the public actor) has suffered from knowledge gaps and high 
information losses that prevented these Dialogues to enter a new phase. These are very broad 
hypotheses, but I managed to stick to them and develop an analysis useful to assess the degree 
of institutionalization and the level of effectiveness. Epistemologically, I tailored a 
constructivist-based approach to understand the role of cooperation between two main actors 
in the international arena, drawing some insights from neo-liberal institutionalism and 
stressing the role played by institutional factors. Moreover, there will be room to underline the 
role of shared values and norms, according to social constructivist tenets. The latter ones will 
only be used to acquire a thorough and clearer view on the factors that fostered cooperation. 
Methodologically, it will rest upon a comparative scrutiny. The N=2 problem411 comes out in 
terms of comparative analysis: only the TABD and the TACD, as it has been shown, are 
associated to enough empirical materials to work on. Moreover, the US do not have 
cooperation in such terms with another regional organization in the world (to which they are 
not part of), and this creates a problem in assessing the (eventual) international character of 
the Dialogues. Do other instruments as such exist in the world? Do regional organizations or 
states allow private parties and individuals to retain so much power in their hands? Do these 
individuals represent a vulnus in the system or do they help powers achieving their goals?  
                                                            
411 See Tortola, P. (2012), “N=2: The comparative study of the EU and the US as a research programme”, 
Collegio Carlo Alberto Notebooks, No. 290  
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What future research could focus on with regards to transatlantic integration and cooperation 
strategies is a long list of possible research strands.  
Among them, the behaviour, beliefs and core assumptions of real policy-makers on both sides 
of the Atlantic. This brief research has used secondary data to assess whether there are some 
“core” ideas that may be key to shape transatlantic policy-making in the near future.  
Conducting surveys among those who take decisions, which have political significance and 
those who implement those decisions may be really useful. On the one side, it shows whether 
ideas common to business leaders on both sides influence also policy-makers. If this happens, 
then it is more likely that policy-makers will prefer integration if business leaders will think 
integration is good to foster transatlantic economy and therefore to create jobs. On the other 
side, such research allows for  
Secondly, strong research potential could come from surveying consumers’ organizations in 
the EU and the US. Public engagement with stakeholders from the consumers world during 
trade agreements’ negotiations usually takes place through online surveys, open consultations 
and meetings with business and officials412. Therefore, consumers do not have nor the time 
neither the resources to let their voices heard with sufficient strength. Another important 
characteristic is their tendency to focus only on low-level battles and trivial issues413, which 
undermines their reputation in front of policymakers.  
Thirdly, operationalizing ideas and norms in a better way may help researchers in IR theory to 
understand a thorny issue in international politics, namely economic cooperation in times of 
non-existential threats to the economies of states or macro-regions. This may also be 
interesting for those who study the relationship between economic leverage and trade 
relations: are there any binding constraints from the bigger and more prosperous state on the 
                                                            
412  The Bureau of European Consumers (BEUC) website is makes some interesting examples: 
http://www.beuc.eu/blog/ 
413 http://cspinet.org/International/main.htm 
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weaker one? Do differences in GDP, import/export imbalance or growth jeopardize the 
likelihood of cooperation?  
These questions seem to have scarce predictive and normative value, since they might be seen 
as tackling only minor elements of the whole transatlantic relationship. Nevertheless, there are 
many hints that the future will be shaped by cooperation between economic “giants”, instead 
of multilateral “dwarfes”. If the echoes from Geneva and WTO are not a positive sign at all, 
then we might think that achieving economic growth through sustainable trade could 
somewhat be counterproductive for world’s powers, leading them to focus more on trade 
between themselves.  
In order to gain more knowledge from the past discussion it may be useful to point out four 
key elements that may be at the same time a summary and food for thought for further 
research on the topic.  
First of all, not all IR theories explain the diplomatic game, up to a certain extent. This is 
typical of many phenomena in international politics414, yet there are few things that can be 
highlighted. It is no more possible to derive highly specific policy guidance from such broadly 
framed theoretical perspectives than it is to offer detailed predictions about transatlantic 
relations. A trade-off usually exists between the range of instances to which a theory might 
apply and the degree to which it can illuminate a specific case. Consequently, perhaps the 
most that can be hoped for are very general guidelines, including an indication of the types of 
conditions and policy instruments to which policy makers should devote their attention. With 
regards to realism, it is clear that many Realist predictions on economic cooperation proved 
wrong in the long run. When it comes to offering advice, realism is in one respect the least 
useful of the three perspectives (the other two being Liberalism and Constructivism), since the 
factors that it emphasizes are the least subject to conscious manipulation. There is not much 
one can do about the loss of the unifying Soviet threat or about the relative decline of 
                                                            
414 Bueno de Mesquita, B. (1998), “The End of the Cold War: Predicting an Emergent Property”, The Journal of 
Conflict Resolution, Vol. 42, No. 2, pp. 131-155 
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American power vis-à-vis Europe. Nor would it be worth attempting to resurrect the Soviet 
threat or to construct a substitute merely for the sake of preserving allied unity even if one 
could do so. EU and US seemed at a certain point to be torn apart for the particular reason 
they had found a common enemy, which was not a state but a “threat”, international 
terrorism. 
Nevertheless, realism can help to suggest the forms of cooperation that are more or less 
possible and sustainable in the altered geopolitical circumstances of the post–Cold War era. In 
the area of security affairs, it makes clear that a high level of U.S. involvement in Europe will 
be more difficult to justify and thus to sustain than in the past, absent the re-emergence of a 
compelling threat. Consequently, it behoves the Europeans to take the steps necessary to 
become collectively a more equal military partner of the United States, one that can bear a 
greater share of the burdens of regional defense—and now peacekeeping— efforts than it has 
been able to do thus far, and it behoves the United States to encourage this process.  
Future research directions could tackle most of the issues touched upon in this dissertation 
without much impact on the academic debate. The reason behind this is that transatlantic 
relations are an on-going process of continuous changes and developments. The future is 
shady: given the recrudescence of many opposing factors and many negative events in 
international politics, it is likely that the outcome of negotiations on trade agreements will be 
influenced mainly by contingent factors, and only for a minor share they will be dependent 
upon structural ones. This dissertation has tried to find out the distance between the two.  
	   195	  
Appendix 
 
1) The Transatlantic Declaration  
 
The United States of America on one side and, on the other, the European Community and 
its Member States, 
· mindful of their common heritage and of their close historical, political, economic and 
cultural ties, 
· guided by their faith in the values of human dignity, intellectual freedom and civil liberties, 
and in the democratic institutions which have evolved on both sides of the Atlantic over the 
centuries, 
· recognizing that the transatlantic solidarity has been essential for the preservation of peace 
and freedom and for the development of free and prosperous economies as well as for the 
recent developments which have restored unity in Europe, 
· determined to help consolidate the new Europe, undivided and democratic, 
· resolved to strengthen security, economic cooperation and human rights in Europe in the 
framework of the CSCE, and in other fora, 
· noting the firm commitment of the United States and the EC Member States concerned to 
the North Atlantic Alliance and to its principles and purposes, 
· acting on the basis of a pattern of cooperation proven over many decades, and convinced 
that by strengthening and expanding this partnership on an equal footing they will greatly 
contribute to continued stability, as well as to political and economic progress in Europe and 
in the world, 
· aware of their shared responsibility, not only to further common interests but also to face 
transnational challenges affecting the well- being of all mankind, 
· bearing in mind the accelerating process by which the European Community is acquiring its 
own identity in economic and monetary matters, in foreign policy and in the domain of 
security, 
· determined further to strengthen transatlantic solidarity, through the variety of their 
international relations, have decided to endow their relationship with long-term perspectives.  
 
Common Goals: 
The United States of America and the European Community and its Member States solemnly 
reaffirm their determination further to strengthen their partnership in order to: 
· support democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights and individual liberty, and 
promote prosperity and social progress world- wide; 
· safeguard peace and promote international security, by cooperating with other nations 
against aggression and coercion, by contributing to the settlement of conflicts in the world 
and by reinforcing the role of the United Nations and other international organisations; 
· pursue policies aimed at achieving a sound world economy marked by sustained economic 
growth with low inflation, a high level of employment, equitable social conditions, in a 
framework of international stability; 
· promote market principles, reject protectionism and expand, strengthen and further open 
the multilateral trading system; 
· carry out their resolve to help developing countries by all appropriate means in their efforts 
towards political and economic reforms; 
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2) The New Transatlantic Agenda  
 
I. Promoting Peace and Stability, Democracy and Development Around the World 
 
II. Responding to Global Challenges 
 
III. Conbtributing to the Expansion of World Trade and Closer Economic Relations 
 
IV. Builiding Bridges Across the Atlantic 
 
V. Parliamentary Links 
 
VI. Implementing Agenda 
 
We, the United States of America and the European Union, affirm our conviction that the ties 
which bind our people are as strong today as they have been for the past half century. For 
over fifty years, the transatlantic partnership has been the leading force for peace and 
prosperity for ourselves and for the world. Together, we helped transform adversaries into 
allies and dictatorships into democracies. Together, we built institutions and patterns of 
cooperation that ensured our security and economic strength. These are epic achievements. 
 
Today we face new challenges at home and abroad. To meet them, we must further 
strengthen and adapt the partnership that has served us so well. Domestic challenges are not 
an excuse to turn inward; we can learn from each other's experiences and build new 
transatlantic bridges. We must first of all seize the opportunity presented by Europe's historic 
transformation to consolidate democracy and free-market economies throughout the 
continent. 
 
[…]  
 
Our economic relationship sustains our security and increases our prosperity. We share the 
largest two-way trade and investment relationship in the world. We bear a special 
responsibility to lead multilateral efforts towards a more open world system of trade and 
investment. Our cooperation has made possible every global trade agreement, from the 
Kennedy Round to the Uruguay Round. Through the G-7, we work to stimulate global 
growth. And at the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, we are 
developing strategies to overcome structural unemployment and adapt to demographic 
change. 
 
We are determined to create a New Transatlantic Marketplace, which will expand trade and 
investment opportunities and multiply jobs on both sides of the Atlantic. This initiative will 
also contribute to the dynamism of the global economy. 
 
[…] 
 
We are determined to reinforce our political and economic partnership as a powerful force for 
good in the world. To this end, we will build on the extensive consultations established by the 
1990 Transatlantic Declaration and the conclusions of our June 1995 Summit and move to 
common action. 
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Today we adopt a New Transatlantic Agenda based on a Framework for Action with four 
major goals: 
 
Promoting peace and stability, democracy and development around the world. Together, we 
will work for an increasingly stable and prosperous Europe; foster democracy and economic 
reform in Central and Eastern Europe as well as in Russia, Ukraine and other new 
independent states; secure peace in the Middle East; advance human rights; promote non-
proliferation and cooperate on development and humanitarian assistance. 
 
Responding to global challenges. Together, we will fight international crime, drug-trafficking 
and terrorism; address the needs of refugees and displaced persons; protect the environment 
and combat disease. 
 
Contributing to the expansion of world trade and closer economic relations. Together, we will 
strengthen the multilateral trading system and take concrete, practical steps to promote closer 
economic relations between us. 
 
Building bridges across the Atlantic. Together, we will work with our business people, 
scientists, educators and others to improve communication and to ensure that future 
generations remain as committed as we are to developing a full and equal partnership. 
 
Within this Framework, we have developed an extensive Joint EU/U.S. Action Plan. We will 
give special priority between now and our next Summit to the following actions: 
 
[…]   
 
- Conbtributing to the Expansion of World Trade and Closer Economic Relations 
 
We have a special responsibility to strengthen the multilateral trading system, to support the 
World Trade Organisation and to lead the way in opening markets to trade and investment. 
 
We will contribute to the expansion of world trade by fully implementing our Uruguay Round 
commitments, work for the completion of the unfinished business by the agreed timetables 
and encourage a successful and substantive outcome for the Singapore WTO Ministerial 
Meeting in December 1996. In this context we will explore the possibility of agreeing on a 
mutually satisfactory package of tariff reductions on industrial products, and we will consider 
which, if any, Uruguay Round obligations on tariffs can be implemented on an accelerated 
basis. In view of the importance of the information society, we are launching a specific 
exercise in order to attempt to conclude an information technology agreement. 
 
We will work together for the successful conclusion of a Multilateral Agreement on 
Investment at the OECD that espouses strong principles on international investment 
liberalisation and protection. Meanwhile, we will work to develop discussion of the issue with 
our partners at the WTO. We will address in appropriate fora problems where trade intersects 
with concerns for the environment, internationally recognised labour standards and 
competition policy. We will cooperate in creating additional trading opportunities, bilaterally 
and throughout the world, in conformity with our WTO commitments. 
 
Without detracting from our cooperation in multilateral fora, we will create a New 
Transatlantic Marketplace by progressively reducing or eliminating barriers that hinder the 
flow of goods, services and capital between us. We will carry out a joint study on ways of 
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facilitating trade in goods and services and further reducing or eliminating tariff and non-tariff 
barriers. 
 
We will strengthen regulatory cooperation, in particular by encouraging regulatory agencies to 
give a high priority to cooperation with their respective transatlantic counterparts, so as to 
address technical and non-tariff barriers to trade resulting from divergent regulatory processes. 
We aim to conclude an agreement on mutual recognition of conformity assessment (which 
includes certification and testing procedures) for certain sectors as soon as possible. We will 
continue the ongoing work in several sectors and identify others for further work. 
 
We will endeavour to conclude by the end of 1996 a customs cooperation and mutual 
assistance agreement between the European Community and the U.S. 
To allow our people to take full advantage of newly developed information technology and 
services, we will work toward the realisation of a Transatlantic Information Society. 
 
Given the overarching importance of job creation, we pledge to cooperate in the follow-up to 
the Detroit Jobs Conference and to the G-7 Summit initiative. We look forward to further 
cooperation in the run up to the G-7 Jobs Conference in France, at the next G-7 Summit in 
the Summer of 1996 and in other fora such as the OECD. We will establish a joint working 
group on employment and labour-related issues. 
 
- Builiding Bridges Across the Atlantic 
 
We recognise the need to strengthen and broaden public support for our partnership. To that 
end, we will seek to deepen the commercial, social, cultural, scientific and educational ties 
among our people. We pledge to nurture in present and future generations the mutual 
understanding and sense of shared purpose that has been the hallmark of the post-war period. 
 
We will not be able to achieve these ambitious goals without the backing of our respective 
business communities. We will support, and encourage the development of, the transatlantic 
business relationship, as an integral part of our wider efforts to strengthen our bilateral 
dialogue. The successful conference of EU and U.S. business leaders which took place in 
Seville on 10/11 November 1995 was an important step in this direction. A number of its 
recommendations have already been incorporated into our Action Plan and we will consider 
concrete follow-up to others. 
 
We will actively work to reach a new comprehensive EC-U.S. science and technology 
cooperation agreement by 1997. 
We believe that the recent EC/U.S. Agreement on Cooperation in Education and Vocational 
Training can act as a catalyst for a broad spectrum of innovative cooperative activities of 
direct benefit to students and teachers. We will examine ways to increase private support for 
educational exchanges, including scholarship and internship programmes. We will work to 
introduce new technologies into classrooms, linking educational establishments in the EU 
with those in the U.S. and will encourage teaching of each other's languages, history and 
culture. 
 
- Parliamentary Links 
 
We attach great importance to enhanced parliamentary links. We will consult parliamentary 
leaders on both sides of the Atlantic regarding consultative mechanisms, including those 
building on existing institutions, to discuss matters related to our transatlantic partnership. 
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- Implementing Agenda 
 
The New Transatlantic Agenda is a comprehensive statement of the many areas for our 
common action and cooperation. We have entrusted the Senior Level Group to oversee work 
on this Agenda and particularly the priority actions we have identified. We will use our regular 
Summits to measure progress and to update and revise our priorities. 
 
For the last fifty years, the transatlantic relationship has been central to the security and 
prosperity of our people. Our aspirations for the future must surpass our achievements in the 
past.” 
 
 
 
3) The Transatlantic Economic Partnership 
 
Transatlantic Economic Partnership - Action Plan 
1. Introduction 
At the London EU-US Summit of 18 May 1998, Summit leaders adopted a joint statement on 
the Transatlantic Economic Partnership (TEP) identifying a series of elements for an initiative 
to intensify and extend multilateral and bilateral cooperation and common actions in the field 
of trade and investment. As called for in that statement, the present document sets out a Plan 
identifying areas for common actions both bilaterally and multilaterally, with a timetable for 
achieving specific results. This Plan has been established through intensive and detailed 
discussions between the US Administration and the European Commission.  
Some elements of the Plan will be pursued through cooperative actions (such as improved 
regulatory cooperation, cooperation among scientists, identification of priority sectors for the 
removal of obstacles, coordination of EU and US positions in international organisations). In 
other cases action will take the form of trade negotiations. Finally, the Plan also addresses the 
general organisational arrangements needed to realise the Transatlantic Economic Partnership 
via the actions identified in the present Plan. As part of the confidence-building process 
foreseen in the New Transatlantic Agenda of 1995, we will also reinforce our efforts to 
resolve bilateral trade issues and disputes. 
 
2. Multilateral Actions 
 
- 2. 1. Regular dialogue 
We will set up a regular dialogue between us in order to ensure closer co-operation in the 
runup to the 1999 Ministerial Conference in the WTO, with a view to providing leadership 
and facilitating preparations initiated in May 1998. This dialogue will be realised in a pragmatic 
way and piloted by a series of meetings at ministerial and official level from now until the 
1999 WTO Ministerial meeting. In addition to the London Summit Statement on TEP, we 
will take into consideration the statements delivered by our Leaders at the 1998 WTO 
Ministerial Conference and 50th Anniversary Celebrations. Our cooperative effort in the 
WTO context will not exclude cooperation in other international fora. Moreover, our co-
operation will continue thereafter (timeframe related to future negotiations/work programmes 
of particular issues). 
On substance, the dialogue will start from the shared objectives set out in paragraph 8 of the 
TEP statement, include a general overview of WTO issues and develop progressively more 
detailed coordinated positions on individual subjects for the WTO process. The scope of our 
consultations shall be comprehensive, while taking into account existing deadlines as well as 
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the need to pursue ongoing and long-term work in Geneva. Our objective will be to explore 
and compare each others’ policy positions on key issues on the multilateral agenda, and inject 
urgency into the process where necessary to enhance the WTO’s credibility with stakeholders 
in order to strengthen support for the system. In some cases we may develop common 
positions or elaborate proposals to be submitted in multilateral discussions and negotiations. 
We have agreed on an initial calendar of meetings and other practical arrangements for our 
dialogue for the period up to December 1999, to be progressively adapted according to results 
already achieved. As appropriate, more detailed work plans will be developed. 
In pursuing our multilateral objectives under the Plan we will seek as a matter of priority to 
closely involve other trading partners in our co-operative activities in the multilateral field, and 
exploit all opportunities for dialogue with them. We intend to keep one another fully informed 
of our respective consultative processes regarding the development of the agenda for the 
Ministerial and we will work together in developing opportunities and actions that facilitate 
dialogue with stakeholders  
 
- 2. 2. Issues for dialogue 
The following listing of issues that will feature in our dialogue remains to some extent 
indicative, since the content of the dialogue may have to be adapted in the light of 
developments of the Geneva process. More specific co-operative actions may also emerge 
from this dialogue. 
We will exchange views on possible modalities and principles for conducting negotiations, 
pursuant to paragraphs 9, 10 and 11 of the May WTO Declaration, which requires that 
Ministers receive recommendations for decision concerning the further organisation and 
management of the WTO’s work programme, including scope, structure and time frames, that 
will ensure that the work programme is begun and concluded expeditiously and aimed at 
achieving overall balance of interests of all members. We intend to give leadership to this 
process and in this context we will explore the desirability and appropriateness of negotiating 
modalities, addressing the question of how negotiations should be conducted, including 
consideration of "single undertaking" and other approaches suited to the new economy to 
ensure that an open global trading system moves as fast as the marketplace. As part of this 
effort, we will consider principles and techniques including standstill provisions, the use of 
implementation thresholds and critical mass requirements and other innovations. 
Where possible we will take common approaches to the DSU review, in particular as regards 
improvement of the transparency and functioning of panels. 
We confirm that we will accord a high priority to the promotion of greater transparency in the 
operation of the WTO, from enhancing the general public’s access to WTO documents to 
making the system more open to consultation with the public, while preserving the 
government to government nature of the WTO. We will therefore devote the necessary 
attention to the WTO transparency procedures and provisions that need to be updated or 
revised. In the light of the experience gained so far, we will seek to derestrict documents more 
rapidly and make them available to all interested parties including via new technologies. 
We will review the state of implementation of the various WTO agreements, identify potential 
problems, and discuss possible actions, including to ensure full implementation of WTO 
commitments by all WTO Members. This will also include joint work to sustain and improve 
transparency and surveillance across WTO bodies as well as efforts to streamline existing 
requirements with a view to avoiding duplication and cooperation on technical assistance 
and/or other support measures. Such efforts should facilitate the development of the WTO’s 
forward agenda. 
- Services 
Our co-operation will focus on the foreseen continuation of negotiations on the basis of 
GATS Article XIX with the aims of: - increasing worldwide market access opportunities; - 
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addressing specific obstacles faced by several service sectors; - improving the conditions for 
establishment; - improving the cross-border commitments to make full use of the opportunity 
for electronic trading; - examining ways in which movement of persons necessary to the 
supply of services can be enhanced; - and developing additional disciplines to strengthen 
market access and guarantee that services can be supplied in a pro-competitive environment. 
- Agriculture 
We intend to strengthen our cooperation to facilitate the launch of negotiations as mandated 
by the Agreement on Agriculture, noting the important contribution of the Analysis and 
Information Exchange process already underway relating to current issues of concern, and the 
fact that the General Council now has a process to prepare for the launch of negotiations as 
envisioned in Article 20 of the Agreement on Agriculture. We will improve and supplement 
our regular contacts in order to facilitate the process in Geneva. Our discussions will focus on 
the existing framework of commitments established in the Uruguay Round and the provisions 
of Article 20. 
- Trade Facilitation 
Recalling our agreement at London to intensify forward-looking work in the WTO on trade 
facilitation, we will cooperate on developing the WTO work process on trade facilitation, with 
a view to producing concrete results. We will furthermore seek to build consensus for 
improving the trading environment by increasing transparency and predictability and by 
reducing administrative burden, while safeguarding the integrity of customs procedures.  
- Industrial Tariffs 
Recalling the shared objective from London that we would pursue a broad WTO work 
program for the reduction on an MFN basis of industrial tariffs and the exploration of the 
feasibility of their progressive elimination within a timescale to be agreed, we will work 
together to ensure that the necessary work is undertaken by the WTO Secretariat and 
Members with respect to data bases and the work of the Committee on Market Access to 
permit appropriate analysis on all possible options for proceeding with further liberalisation. 
This work should permit us to consider the range of approaches and modalities for further 
liberalisation. As for work currently underway in the WTO in respect of pharmaceuticals and 
ITAII, we will continue our efforts to successfully conclude our work before the end of 1998, 
so that implementation can take place in July 1999. 
- Intellectual Property 
Cooperation will, in particular, encompass all issues related to the TRIPs built-in agenda, the 
full and timely implementation and enforcement of TRIPs by developing countries by the 
January 2000 deadline and the consideration of topics for negotiations to improve the TRIPs 
Agreement. Close cooperation will be extended to issues other than TRIPs, such as, in 
particular, ensuring ratification and implementation of the two recent WIPO Treaties, 
encouraging accession to and implementation of the Trademark Law Treaty, encourage efforts 
in other fora to resolve domain name conflicts with trademarks on the Internet, and pursuing 
measures to fight all optical media piracy. 
- Investment 
We will actively coordinate our participation in the Geneva process, with a view to securing a 
factual report to the General Council by the end of 1998 which adequately reflects the 
discussions which has taken place in the Working Group on Trade and Investment. We will 
consult further on possible additional work that might be done in this area in 1999, with a 
view to deepening our joint analysis on the inclusion of investment in the WTO agenda. We 
will seek the support of all our partners for next steps towards the creation of investment rules 
in the WTO. 
- Competition 
We will cooperate in securing an objective and informative report by the Working Group on 
Trade and Competition to the General Council, which factually summarises the work 
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undertaken and highlights the value of an active policy of competition law enforcement as a 
complement to the process of trade liberalisation. We will furthermore cooperate in the 
preparatory process for the 1999 WTO Ministerial with a view to permit appropriate decisions 
on next steps in the WTO, including possible negotiations as noted in the Singapore 
Ministerial Declaration. In this context, we will exchange views inter alia on issues relating to 
the question of multilateral rules on competition law and its enforcement, and on means of 
enhancing international cooperation among competition authorities in relation to 
anticompetitive practices with a significant impact on international trade and investment. 
- Procurement 
We share the aim of reaching a comprehensive set of multilateral rules on procurement within 
the WTO. To this end, we will continue to co-operate closely with a view to accelerating and 
completing the work of the Working Group on Transparency in Government Procurement 
with the aim of reaching agreement in 1999, and consider how such an agreement can be 
featured in the WTO's broader efforts to strengthen practices reflecting principles of good 
governance. We will also work together to encourage expanded participation in the plurilateral 
GPA and to advance GATS work on procurement of services. In addition, we will work 
together to promote progress in the ongoing review of the Government Procurement 
Agreement, and to ensure that GPA obligations are properly and fully implemented. 
- Trade and environment 
We will discuss how to incorporate environmental concerns into WTO work with the aim of 
giving full weight to environmental considerations throughout the WTO Agreements. As a 
first step, we are seeking to build consensus for the convening of a High Level Meeting during 
the first half of 1999, and will focus our short-term attention on creating a positive outcome 
from such a meeting, in order to pave the way for consensus on how to handle environment 
issues at the 1999 WTO Ministerial and in the WTO’s future agenda. 
- Accessions 
We will continue to work closely together to obtain the early accession of candidate countries, 
large and small, on the basis of mutually acceptable and commercially viable market access 
commitments and adherence to WTO rules, recognising that the pace of progress depends 
largely on the candidate’s efforts. We will work together to better coordinate our technical 
assistance efforts. 
- Developing countries 
We will seek to ensure fuller participation of developing countries in the WTO as part of the 
WTO forward agenda because of the important contribution it will make to their economic 
development and growth. With respect to the least-developed countries we will continue to 
examine how we can improve substantially the trading opportunities and the better integration 
of the least developed countries, in particular through the implementation of the results of the 
High Level meeting on Least Developed Countries. We will furthermore examine whether the 
particular constraints of least developed countries, in particular, are properly assessed and 
adequately taken into account. 
 
[…]  
 
 
Core Labour Standards 
We will work together to promote full and timely implementation of agreed follow-up 
procedures of the new ILO Declaration on core labour standards. Furthermore, the EU and 
US should support the WTO and the ILO Secretariats cooperating on research, reports and 
studies and identify other areas of joint cooperation between the two Secretariats. In this 
regard, we will examine how to strengthen their reciprocal relationship.  
- Rule of law issues 
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We will exchange views on the implementation of the OECD Bribery Convention and on 
further work within the OECD. We will furthermore work together to determine which 
action in various areas covered by the WTO work programme can enable all WTO Members 
to strengthen the rule of law and due process in their respective territories. 
- Review of progress 
We will review the progress in our discussions on all the above issues, for the first time by the 
end of 1998 and subsequently at regular intervals, with a view to ensuring that all important 
issues of future multilateral negotiations are well prepared. 
 
3. Bilateral Actions 
3. 1. Technical barriers to trade in goods 
3. 1. 1. Regulatory Cooperation 
In order to improve (1) the bilateral dialogue between U. S. and EU regulators and (2) the 
effective access to the regulatory procedures of public authorities by private interests and 
government authorities on both sides, we will initially take the following action, taking into 
account the requirements of our respective domestic regulatory procedures, such as 
transparency and meaningful participation of the public and of all other interested parties, 
notably the TABD. 
- Existing bilateral mechanisms 
(a) Prepare an illustrative summary of existing bilateral cooperation between U. S. and EU 
regulatory authorities. Such a summary should not be exhaustive but should provide a clear 
and meaningful indication of U. S. -EU bilateral regulatory cooperation including in the 
framework of multilateral institutions (e. g. , under the WTO TBT Agreement) and other fora. 
Such a review could include the type of information exchanged, the effectiveness of the 
exchange of information, the continuity of the dialogue over time, the frequency of meetings 
and the timing of the dialogue in relation to the internal regulatory procedures of either party. 
Target Date: end January 1999 
(b) Identify and implement jointly defined general government principles/guidelines for 
effective regulatory cooperation. Such principles/guidelines will build upon the December 
1997 Joint Statement that refers to consultations whenever possible in the early stages of 
drafting regulations and to greater reliance on each other's technical resources and expertise. 
Further work should also be done, for example, on the need to move the consultation process 
as far upstream as possible in the regulatory process, as well as on the importance of 
promoting the exchange of technical and scientific knowledge as a basis for regulatory 
activities. 
(c) Identify possible improvements in existing bilateral regulatory cooperation on the basis of 
the jointly defined general principles/guidelines  
(d) Identify areas where bilateral regulatory cooperation could be expanded or established ex 
novo on the basis of the jointly defined general principles/guidelines. 
Target Date: end of (b) to (d) June 1999 
- Internal procedures of regulatory authorities  
(a) Jointly review mutually agreed issues, notably access to each others’ regulatory procedures 
with respect to transparency and participation of the public - including the opportunity for all 
interested parties to have meaningful input in these procedures and receive reasonable 
consideration of their views. 
Target Date: April 1999 
(b) Examine the results of the review of the respective regulatory procedures and, on that 
basis, identify ways and means to improve access to each other's regulatory procedures, 
develop jointly agreed general principles/guidelines on such procedures, and when possible, 
work to accommodate those improvements, while preserving the independence of domestic 
regulatory authorities. 
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Target Date: end 1999 
 
3. 1. 2. Mutual Recognition 
Our objective is the removal or substantial lowering of barriers resulting from any additional 
or different requirements to be met by goods which could be legally produced and / or 
marketed in one of the parties when going into the other party while maintaining our high 
level of protection for consumers, human, animal, and plant health, safety and the 
environment. 
We will endeavour to extend the current MRA to new sectors. We will also endeavour to 
determine the appropriate "degree" of mutual recognition on a sector by sector basis and, e. g. 
whether to go beyond conformity assessment to mutual recognition of the technical 
regulations, and/or to determine whether actions or arrangements other than an MRA are 
possible for other sectors. As a practical step to this end we will, where appropriate: 
(a) Exchange views on sectors where there appears to be an interest in pursuing one or more 
degree(s) of mutual recognition, notably on the basis of recommendations from interested 
parties. 
This exchange of views should be accompanied by a description of the laws, regulations 
and/or standards applicable to the sector. 
(b) Exchange views on the concept and practical application of different degrees of mutual 
recognition. 
Target Date: for (a) and (b) by 1998 December Summit 
(c) Identify specific sectors in which a comparison of regulatory requirements shows the 
potential for mutual recognition of technical regulations (d) Identify specific sectors in which 
an extension of the current MRA appears feasible and 
desirable. 
(e) Where no degree of mutual recognition appears feasible or desirable for a particular sector, 
determine whether other actions or arrangements, if any, are possible in order to reduce or 
remove regulatory barriers to trade in that sector, while promoting domestic regulatory goals. 
Target Date: for (c) to (e) end January 1999 
(f) Negotiate new sectoral annexes to current MRA. 
(g) Negotiate mutual recognition of technical regulations of those specific sectors that have 
been identified as being feasible and desirable with the aim of removing or substantially 
lowering remaining barriers resulting from any additional or different regulatory requirements 
to be met by imported products coming from the other party, while maintaining our high level 
of protection for consumers, human, animal, and plant health, safety and the environment. To 
the extent necessary, this should include the establishment of a new framework to encompass 
the specific sectors that have been identified for negotiation. 
(h) Identify sectors where further negotiations could usefully be pursued beyond end-1999, 
while promoting domestic regulatory goals. 
Target Dates for: for (f) to (h) end of 1999 
 
3. 1. 3. Alignment of standards and regulatory requirements 
In light of U. S. -EU involvement in and commitment to international standardisation 
activities, as well as the work being carried out in the framework of the WTO TBT 
Agreement, we will: 
(a) Assess existing work in the field of international standardisation (e. g. , planning, 
adoption, transposition and utilisation of international standards) to determine ways to 
develop closer U. S. -EU cooperation, where feasible, to overcome difficulties that might 
hinder progress in this area and to better serve U. S. and EU health, safety, quality, and 
environmental needs, and to determine whether greater use could be made of mutually agreed 
international standards when developing domestic regulatory requirements. 
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Target Date: end January 1999 
(b) Identify ways of encouraging closer links between international, regional and national 
standards bodies. 
Target Date: end June 1999 
(c) Review, taking into account domestic constraints, the activities and role of private sector 
standards bodies in determining domestic standards, with a view to improving cooperation in 
standards development at the national, regional and international level. 
Target Date: end of 1999 
 
3. 1. 4. Consumer product safety 
In the interest of consumer protection and transparency, we will: 
a) identify ways of developing cooperation between enforcement agencies on potentially 
dangerous consumer products, and 
b) consider the possibility of eventually linking the EU and U. S. rapid alert systems on 
dangerous products. 
 
3. 2. Services 
(§ 10. b and 11) 
3. 2. 1. Keeping markets open 
· We will establish an arrangement to provide for future early exchanges of views on 
any policy proposals that either side believes capable of having an adverse impact on 
business conditions for service providers. 
Target Date: end of 1998 
 
3. 2. 2. Reduction of existing barriers through mutual recognition 
· We will negotiate an agreed framework of general principles and objectives and 
consistent with existing WTO rules and guidelines. The framework will serve as a 
model for the negotiation of mutual recognition agreements on specific services 
sectors with an appropriate participation of relevant professional and regulatory 
bodies. 
· We will seek, by March 1999, to complete a model and identify services sectors for 
negotiation including, first, engineers but also other sectors. 
· These agreements should address the commercial interests of our respective services 
suppliers. In parallel and on the same timescale, we will work together to develop 
support from a critical mass of our respective responsible authorities to accede and 
implement the agreements as soon as possible. We will review each other’s progress 
in this respect to ensure support for implementing a mutual recognition deal in order to 
achieve our market access objectives. 
· In addition, in those sectors covered by mutual recognition agreements, we will work 
together with the responsible authorities to consider complementary steps to eliminate 
market access restrictions in sectors where this is needed in order to generate new 
business opportunities. 
· We will also identify, together with the responsible authorities, a second wave of 
sectors for follow-on work within agreed deadlines beyond 1999. 
Target Date: end of 1999 
 
3. 2. 3. Trade aspects of services regulations 
· We will undertake bilateral work on establishing disciplines, in appropriate sectors, on 
trade aspects of services regulations to ensure effective market access, with initial 
work to be completed by December 1999 in one or more agreed sectors, and reflecting 
common regulatory principles. These disciplines could then be used, in turn, to 
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advance discussions among other countries in GATS 2000. 3. 3. Procurement 
We will explore possibilities for the balanced expansion of market access opportunities for 
US and EU companies in US and EU procurement markets. Recognising national constraints 
in certain areas of procurement, we will pursue the following lines of actions, with the 
possibility of adding others by mutual agreement as our discussions continue: 
· Work together to promote the expansion of existing coverage at all levels of 
government, where possible, for both goods and services; 
· Seek other ways to increase access in areas not covered by existing agreements; 
· Identify conditions that could permit the removal of sanctions imposed by both sides 
in 1993; 
· Cooperate to promote equal access for our firms to electronic tendering systems in 
both the US and EU, where feasible, at all levels of government. In this area, we 
additionally agree to strengthen our cooperation, to regularly exchange information on 
our respective systems and to share experience in operating those systems with a view 
toward promoting their use as widely as possible. 
Target Date: end of 1999 
 
3. 4. Intellectual Property 
Although the TRIPs Agreement already offers a strong basis for the protection of IPR, 
further improvement of the protection available to rightholders should be addressed in EU-
US bilateral relations. The issues to be addressed involve both short-term and long-term 
objectives: 
(1) As a matter of priority, negotiations and discussions should aim at reaching concrete 
results as regards: 
a. Examine all aspects of patent rights in order to identify and possibly adopt measures to 
reduce costs of obtaining patent protection. This should also include sharing by patent offices 
of the results of patent searches and examinations. 
b. Resolve the voting right issue, allowing the U. S. to accede to the Madrid Protocol. 
c. Examine ways and possibly adopt measures to ensure that government agencies in the EC 
and the U. S. make use only of authorised software. Subsequently, encourage third countries 
to adopt similar measures. 
d. Work bilaterally on issues related to the two recent WIPO Treaties. 
e. Ensure, through co-operation in the appropriate fora, appropriate protection of 
geographical indications and trademarks. 
(2) In addition, a series of mid to long-term objectives should be examined. No timeframe for 
the achievement of concrete results can therefore be specified at this stage. These are: a. 
Examine the consequences of the use of patents without authorisation of the right holder, 
including government use, and working requirements. Where there are concrete problems, 
identify possible solutions. 
b. Examine appropriate means to grant patent protection for inventions involving computer 
programmes. 
c. Examine ways to ensure appropriate protection of confidential data submitted by 
pharmaceutical companies to support approval of new products. Address the issue also at 
multilateral level. 
d. Examine the consequences of the EC’s requirement to use a single trademark throughout 
the EC as a prerequisite for registration and marketing approval of pharmaceutical products. 
Where concrete problems arise in relation to co-marketing and co-licensing of products, 
identify possible solutions. 
e. Examine the consequences of the EC’s regime on the exhaustion of pharmaceutical patent 
rights and whether they are adequately taken into account in the EC’s and national policies. 
Where there are concrete problems, identify possible solutions. 
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f. Examine appropriate design protection in the field of textile and clothing. 
g. Examine ways to ensure appropriate protection of databases. 
h. Explore the issues raised by the possible introduction and varying treatment of artists’ 
resale rights in the EC and the U. S. 
i. Explore possibilities of enhancing the enforcement of intellectual property rights, including 
related costs. 
k. Examine how best to support efforts aimed at reaching mutual use of patent search results 
between EPO and USPTO 
 
3. 7. Labour 
Worker rights considerations are included in the GSP schemes of both the US and the EU, 
but these programmes operate differently. The EU and the US will exchange views regarding 
the implementation of the worker rights provisions of our respective GSP schemes. 
Recognising that voluntary codes of conduct are an effective tool to improve working 
conditions worldwide, we will further support the process of transatlantic dialogue between 
employers, workers and NGOs on such codes of conduct that began in Brussels in February, 
1998 and will continue at a meeting scheduled for Washington, DC in December 1998. We 
will continue our dialogue with respectively the US business and labour advisory groups and 
with the EU social partners and solicit their ideas for additional Transatlantic labour related 
projects. We will support the Transatlantic Labour Dialogue (TALD) in its efforts to develop 
input into the TEP process. As a first step we will co-sponsor, with our respective entities 
responsible for labour, a joint meeting with the TALD to lay a foundation for further 
understanding of the labour issues related to the TEP. We will step up our commitments to 
funding the ILO’s International Program for the Elimination of Child Labour (IPEC) to help 
eliminate abusive child labour. 
 
3. 8. Consumers 
The Transatlantic Consumer Dialogue (TACD), launched in September 1998, will also feed 
into the TEP process. 
 
 
4) The Positive Economic Agenda (PEA) 
 
ISSUE 
The Positive Economic Agenda (PEA) is key in efforts to enhance bilateral co-operation 
between the EU and the U.S. Result–driven and focused, its aim is to allow for progress on 
well-identified and mutually-beneficial bilateral projects and to report each year to the EU-
U.S. Summit to take stock of this ongoing process with a high degree of accountability and 
transparency. 
 
- EU POLICY AIMS 
The EU seeks to further expand and promote transatlantic co-operation in all areas where a 
dialogue between regulators can achieve common solutions to the concrete problems affecting 
transatlantic business.  
 
- THE WIDER CONTEXT 
A PEA roadmap was jointly drafted and agreed in December 2002 in order to identify the 
most promising sectors of co-operation and to outline the way ahead towards our joint 
objectives. The roadmap refers to: 
-the implementation of the EU-U.S. Guidelines for Regulatory Co-operation and 
Transparency; 
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- the resumption of exports of Spanish clementines to the U.S.; 
- the resumption of U.S. poultry exports to the EU; 
- trade in organic products; 
- electronic tendering; 
- electronic customs; 
- the financial markets dialogue and; 
- regulatory co-operation in the insurance sector. 
 
- FACTS AND FIGURES 
After one year of existence the Positive Economic Agenda has achieved the following: 
- Launch of the Financial Markets Dialogue and agreement on “timelines” between the 
European Commission and U.S. Treasury, notably to address issues of corporate governance, 
access to financial markets, accounting standards etc. 
- Resumption of exports of Spanish clementines to the U.S.; 
- Launch of EU-U.S. regulatory co-operation in four priority areas: cosmetics, automobile 
safety, metrology and nutritional labeling; 
- Initialing of a Mutual Recognition Agreement (MRA) on certificates of conformity for 
marine equipment; 
- Steady progress towards the resumption of U.S. poultry meat exports to the EU, 
- Successful completion of the exploratory talks designed to begin negotiations on the 
facilitation of trade in organic products 
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